



**IS IT TODAY OR**  
**YESTERDAY?**

*(i) February 2013 \**

Francis Burger

## IS IT TODAY OR YESTERDAY?\*

'Is it Today or Yesterday?' is a cumulative project that spans the exhibition '23 kilograms' (curated by Bettina Malcomess, 25 January - 9 March 2013, West, the Hague, the Netherlands). The project will continue in March 2013 as part of Kuns Nou Nou [Art Now Now], (curated by Anja de Klerk, 1 - 31 March 2013, University of Stellenbosch Museum, Stellenbosch, South Africa).

This publication is intended as an associative archive that collates images and texts collected and excerpted during the 23 kilograms exhibition. It is published here mid-process on the event of my departure from the Netherlands back to South Africa, to be worked on and with as a personal, draft encyclopaedia.\*\* Its structure is roughly conglomerated in correspondence with a mindmap, featured as part of the 'Is it Today or Yesterday' installation at West.

Responding to the quiet provocations (in the form of books and other texts left within the exhibition space, or keywords traded through conversations with the curator Bettina Malcomess or the other participating artists Donna Kukama, Siemon Allen and Zen Marie) the fragments circulate passages of thought to do with recent South African history (roughly 1890 to the present) - preoccupied particularly the upheavals of the mid to late 70s, the Information Scandal or 'Muldergate' and the Soweto student riots.


Much of the scanned material gathered was found at the Zuid Afrika Huis (ZAH) library in Amsterdam with the help and patience of librarian Corine de Maijer. ZAH is an umbrella institute focused on relations between the Netherlands and South Africa (SA). Zuid Afrika Huis combines the Netherlands-South African Society (NZAV), the South African Institute (SAI), the Study Fund Foundation for South African Students and the Maandblad Zuid-Afrika. Launched in 1881 the history of NZAV is unavoidably awkward as it parallels political developments within SA. The collection reflects this oscillating allegiance as opponents and oppressors sit neatly alongside one another as strange bedfellows on the bookshelves.

Interestingly, Eschel Rhoodie, SA Secretary of Information between 1972 and 1977 alleges that NZAV, "listed as G26-B in the secret programme" received covert financial support from the South African government's hyperactive Department of Information, including salary payments to individuals as well as editorial and distribution fees of the organisation's 'house magazine', Zuid Afrika maandblad. An excerpt from Rhoodie's The Real Information Scandal, 1983 with the allegation is featured within this publication. The allegation is seconded by an excerpt from Burgess & du Plessis (et al.) 1977 p 85, which states that NZAV "allows itself to criticise aspects of apartheid to disguise its call for support for the machinery that enables it to survive...". Burgess & du Plessis' text was found within ZAH and shows a first loan date of 1979, simultaneously affirming and disaffirming its own critique by being given shelf-space by an apparent enemy, though the book may have arrived within the collection later as part of the absorption of smaller anti-apartheid archives or libraries.

Certain fragments to be included in a second printing are part of an initial library brought to the Hague from my personal collection. Others chart slight, opportunistic connections: a book grabbed from my bookshelf at the last minute by Gilles Deleuze on Baruch Spinoza, who, as it transpired, lived in the Hague from 1670 until his death in 1677, approximately 260 meters from West...small publications on Dutch communes and 'woongroepe' found within the apartment of Arianne Olthaar, a friend of West's owner, Marie José Sondeijker, a fake wood print from a local hardware store, a letter written in Dutch and an ornate script by C.J.S. Kekana of Leeuwkraal to 'station chief' B. Oonk from 1899 given to me by a cousin of my mother, John Van Berg, who runs the Museum Oud Overschie in Rotterdam.

\*The title 'Is it Today or Yesterday?' is a quote from Crispin Hemson who relayed the question as asked (in earnest) by his elderly mother.

\* \* The temporaneity of this output - a defeat in some ways - is the result (possibly) of two things: the lure of the perpetually relevant (the associative archive allows for the endless deferral of editing and publishing in favour of collecting/hiding/seeing/reading more + more + more and also of having imagined that the shape of things viewed from a distance could enable some kind of magical ability to trace an outline

i.e. cans of worms → 

→ for a victory for the many liberties that can be taken of and the gallery space if one knows how (or what) to ask

Anderson & Lessing (c.1965?) South Africa Land of Promise



*South African wild flowers, as wide in range and varied as the potentialities of this exciting country.*

# FACTS AND REPORTS

PRESS CUTTINGS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

E1: The Times(Br), Mar. 5, '80

10th Vol. no. E, March 7, '80

## Landslide victory brings Mugabe overall majority

From Nicholas Ashford and Dan van der Vat Salisbury, March 4

Mr Robert Mugabe, leader of the radical Zanu (PF) party, today began talks with other party leaders, aimed at forming a broadly based Government for an independent Zimbabwe after official confirmation of his sweeping election victory.

Mr Mugabe, who this morning was asked by the Governor, Lord Soames, to form a government, has already had talks with Mr Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Patriotic Front, and Mr Ian Smith, leader of the white Rhodesian Front.

Zanu (PF) won 57 of the 80 black seats in the new House of Assembly, enough for a comfortable absolute majority even when the 20 seats reserved for whites are taken into account.

However he told a press conference today that the new Government would be "a patriotic Front government" in which Mr Nkomo's party would also take part. Mr Nkomo won 20 seats, leaving only three for Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC. This Mugabe-Nkomo partnership would amount to a revival of the old Patriotic Front alliance which fought the guerrilla war against white rule and negotiated as a unit at Lancaster House.

Mr Mugabe also made it clear that he would consider bringing Europeans into his administration "so as to bring about a government that will be reassuring to all people of Zimbabwe". According to informed sources, he may offer junior positions in his cabinet to the Rhodesian Front and the UANC.

In a broadcast to the nation tonight, Mr Mugabe said he hoped to establish a national front which, in the interests of reconciliation, would include representatives who were co-opted from other communities. This government would adhere to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and would uphold fundamental rights and freedoms.

Statements from both victors and vanquished today emphasized the need for peace, reconciliation and cooperation. At his press conference, notable for its conciliatory tone, Mr Mugabe said he would ensure that there was a place for everybody in a new Zimbabwe.

In his broadcast tonight, he assured civil servants that their pension rights would be respected and said he had received assurances from senior members of the armed forces and the public service that they would be prepared to work under his Government. He added that he had authorized Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, commander of combined operations, to preside over the integration of the Zanu and Zipra forces with the Rhodesian security forces.

NATIONAL RESULT			
Party	Votes	% total vote	Seats
NDU	15,056	0.568	—
NFZ	18,794	0.709	—
PF	638,879	24.113	20
UANC	219,307	8.277	3
UNFP	5,796	0.219	—
UPAM	1,181	0.045	—
Zanu	53,343	2.013	—
Zanu (PF)	1,668,992	62.992	57
ZDF	28,181	1.064	—

Total valid votes 2,649,529  
Total seats 80  
Spoilt papers 52,748  
Total poll 2,702,275 (94 per cent)

### Everyone must accept result

Mr Nkomo also preferred to see the election result as the triumph of the old Patriotic Front alliance. "Together we have won 77 seats," he said. "What everyone must do now is to accept the result, which gives us independence—that is the central point."

He said it was essential to create a stable state with the cooperation of all possible groups to provide the foundation of national reconciliation. But he fought shy of questions about what possible governmental job he would ask for or expected to be offered.

Mr Ian Smith, who conferred with the Governor this afternoon, said that Rhodesians were used to difficulties and adversities and knew they would never solve problems by running away from them. He said that despite Mr Mugabe's Marxist reputation, he thought the Prime Minister-Designate was a pragmatist. He felt it was unlikely whites would flee the country.

Even Bishop Muzorewa, who suffered a thoroughly humiliating defeat only 10 months after his party had won a landslide in the "internal settlement" election, grudgingly accepted the outcome.

"I am already on record as saying that the election was totally and absolutely unfair and in no way demonstrated the true will of all our people in determining their own future", he said today. None the less, he had written to Mr Mugabe to congratulate him on his victory, hoping that God would guide him and offering cooperation.

### Jubilant crowds in townships

The atmosphere in the Salisbury African townships today after the results were officially announced was exuberant but not threatening. Jubilant crowds danced and sang, there was constant cheering and repetition of the cock-crow (the brilliant choice of a cockerel as party

symbol must have helped Zanu-PF immensely) and little work seemed to be going on.

Much of the tension visible during the campaign and the electoral period has died down. No major incidents have been reported and contacts between security forces and guerrillas in the bush seem to be dwindling, with no sign of the guerrillas wanting to leave their assembly areas.

At his press conference, Mr Mugabe made it clear he intended to retain General Walls in his present position for the time being. "We have not asked anyone to resign", he said. "Everyone stays on. No one is being retired."

There would be no victimiza-

tion or nationalization of private property", he said. "We will bring about changes in a realistic manner."

He added that the economic structure of the country was based on capitalism and "whatever ideas we have for the future must be built on that structure".

His Government would follow a strictly non-aligned foreign policy. Zimbabwe would also have to co-exist with South Africa on the basis of mutual recognition of the political differences between the two countries, he said.

"South Africa is next door to us. We cannot get away from that fact even if we wanted to".

E2: The Guardian(Br), Mar. 5, '80

## Ministers endorse results

By Ian Aitken, Political Editor

The Government yesterday grudgingly endorsed the Rhodesian election results and made it clear that it would have no truck with Right-wingers who condemned them as unrepresentative and unfair.

On the contrary, both Lord Carrington in the Lords and his Foreign Office deputy in the Commons, Sir Ian Gilmour, said the elections had been free and fair and that the result represented the true feeling of the electorate.

Both Lord Carrington and Sir Ian were emphatic that Mr Mugabe had emerged as the

true choice of the Rhodesian people. But they were less willing to congratulate him on his extraordinary triumph, preferring to reserve that formality until he actually becomes prime minister of an independent Zimbabwe.

Sir Ian told MPs that he believed such congratulations would be in order as soon as the new government took office in Salisbury. Lord Carrington suggested that congratulations would be due only when it could be seen that the outcome of the election was "a free and fair multi-racial society operating in peaceful conditions."

E3: The Times(Br), Mar. 5, '80

## S Africa starts relationship on a threatening note

From Ray Kennedy Johannesburg, March 4

Mr Pieter Botha, the South African Prime Minister, today set the tone for relations with the new black state of Zimbabwe with a warning to Mr Robert Mugabe not to overstep the mark.

He said: "Any neighbour which allows its territory to be used for attacks on or the undermining of South Africa and its security will have to face the full force of the republic's strength".

Possibly there was no country more surprised by the election results than South Africa, Rhodesia's closest neighbour. And there can be little doubt that Mr Botha was deplorably badly advised as to the way things were going there.

South Africa hedged its bets on Bishop Muzorewa, not gaining an overall majority, but winning sufficient support to be

in the forefront of a coalition which would exclude Mr Mugabe. This was based on assessments prepared by the bright young men of the Department of Foreign Affairs and passed on to the Prime Minister by Mr R. F. Botha, the Foreign Minister.


It is certain that there will be bitter recrimination within the Cabinet. Apart from anything else, it will damage the Foreign Minister's own political prestige at a time when he is locked in ideological battle with the hard-line leader of the Transvaal Nationalists, Mr Andries Treurnicht.

It could also have a marked effect on the outcome of negotiations which began in Cape Town today between the South African Government and a team of senior United Nations officials about the future of South West Africa (Namibia) and the establishment of a demilitarized zone.


# THE SOWETO UPRISINGS:

Counter-memories of June 1976

Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu



RAVAN LOCAL HISTORY SERIES  
General editors: Monica Seeber  
Luli Callimcos



When the Soweto uprisings of June 1976 took place, Sifiso Ndlovu, the author of this book, was a 14-year-old pupil at Phefeni Junior Secondary School. With his classmates, he was among the active participants in the protest action against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.

Contrary to the generally accepted views, both that the uprisings were 'spontaneous' and that there were bigger political players and student organisations behind the uprisings, Sifiso's book shows that this was not the case. Using newspaper articles, interviews with former fellow pupils and through his own personal account, Sifiso provides us with a 'counter-memory' of the momentous events of that time.

Sifiso Ndlovu is currently a research specialist at the Centre for Science Development (CSD) in Pretoria. He has an MA in History from the University of Natal at Pietermaritzburg.



LOCAL HISTORY SERIES



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# Parents stand firm in language row

By Don Manaka  
MEADOWLANDS parents have stood by their decision of rejecting Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in their schools and have asked the BophuthaTswana Government to pursue the matter further with the South African Government.

This was after hearing a report of talks between the Bophuthatswana Government and the South African Prime Minister, Mr B J Vorster, at a heated meeting at Thutolore Secondary School, Zone One, Meadowlands, yesterday.

### CIRCULAR

They asked the Tswana Urban Representative, Mr S L L Rathebe, to ask the Bophuthatswana Govern-

ment to take the matter further with the Central Government.

They said in the meantime a circular issued by the Tswana School Board in January that the Tswana children should be taught through the medium of English should stand.

The Bophuthatswana Government took up the question of the medium of instruction in Meadowlands with the Central Government after the chairman of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board, Mr J M Peele and the former chairman, Mr A A Letlape were expelled. Shortly thereafter the entire Meadowlands School Board resigned.



Mrs Elizabeth Mathope: "If we allow our children to be taught in Afrikaans all they can become is ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church."

Mrs Elizabeth Mathope told the meeting: "We pay for the education of our children and we should determine their education."

Black parents speak out at a heated meeting: 'We pay for the education of our children and we should determine their education.'  
The World 8 March 1976

We welcomed the highly competitive spirit and conscientiousness that existed in this class of 1975-1976. We knew from our tests, exams and other forms of assessment, that we were a highly efficient and successful class.

During these formative days of the uprisings we discussed student issues only - issues that affected us directly in the school

and classroom. This included authoritarianism and the absence of channels, through which we could talk to the inspectorate and other relevant officials of the regional department of Bantu Education or through which we could seek redress for our grievances. We held several unsuccessful meetings with our prefects, teachers, principal and a junior representative from the regional office. As early as February and March, leading local, black newspapers and some parents and teachers, were, like us, very concerned about using Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools.

Suid - Afrikaanse Instituut  
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1015 CK Amsterdam

### May 1976

I do not remember any liberation movement, such as the Black Consciousness Movement or the South African Student Movement (SASM) contributing to our daily meetings and discussions. In short, as students we faced our destiny and problems. After a month or two on a go-slow with no solution in sight, we decided to embark on an official class boycott which commenced in mid-May. As the Joe's Burg column in *The World* newspaper correctly pointed out, Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was 'a killer subject'.

We had to use unorthodox methods to convince our teachers and principal that we were serious. I remember one incident when we dumped various Maths, Geography and Biology textbooks written in Afrikaans, at our principal's office and when he emerged from the pile at his door. The incident was comical. I could not help laughing. A few days later, other schools in the vicinity decided to join us. These included Belle Higher Primary Schools in which the Standard Five pupils were affected by the directive of using Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. But some of these schools soon returned to class after being sweet-talked by various authorities.

Continued on page 12

# Now I know why teachers want to get out

I HAVE BEEN wondering why so many of my friends in the teaching profession have been phoning me desperately asking me to let them know if I heard of a clerical position somewhere.

After a closer look at the latest directive from the Department of Black Education I can appreciate the frustrations of these ladies and gentlemen!

According to a teacher in this burg - one of the many who are threatening to resign and join industry - the department is pushing Afrikaans down their throats, expecting secondary schools to teach 50 percent of their subjects in Afrikaans.

### AFRIKAANS

"You just look at the Junior Certificate and Matriculation results and you don't have to look far to realise that Afrikaans is the killer subject. And the

principals can tell you what a sweat it is to get teachers willing to offer Afrikaans, let alone being capable and qualified to teach it," said the teacher.

The situation is really bad when one considers the decision by members of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board to resign en bloc.

And if I know old man Letlape and the determined Mr Joe Peele, both executives of the Meadowlands board, they really mean business when they say they have the full backing of all the Tswana boards. And the department will be faced with a serious situation if the parents come up and elect the same men onto the boards. It could go on and on and in the end it is the poor students who are going to suffer!

### FIRM STAND

While I am fully behind



the Meadowlands board for their firm stand in refusing to have their students do half their subjects in Afrikaans and the other half in English, I would also like to sound a word of advice to the members of the boards.

If you expect any co-operation from the teachers you must also assist them when you are still in power. Far too many school board members tend to bully teachers and boast that they are the bosses. This is one time that you should effectively stand together.

And just to give you an idea of how Mathematics would sound in Afrikaans here we go: "Die loodregte lyn is die kortste van al dwarslyne wat kan geteken word vanaf buite 'n genoemde dwarslyn."

Frustrated black teachers start looking for jobs outside of education, as they are forced to teach in Afrikaans.  
The World 13 Feb 1976

# School strike over Hundreds of kids return to classes this morning

THE STRIKE by more than 2 000 Soweto pupils which started with one Orlando West school almost three weeks ago and spread to another six schools, is virtually over today.

Pupils from Belle, Thulasizwe and Pimville Bantu Higher Primaries are back in class today while at least half the striking pupils at Emthonjeni Higher Primary have returned.

By this morning it was only the form one and two pupils at Phefeni Junior Secondary who were still remaining out of class.

Pupils at the Senaoane Junior Secondary who were the latest to join the strike this week were unsure of whether to return to class or not early today.

Pupils at the seventh school in Diepkloof who joined the strike last week are also back at school today.

Although the Emthonjeni and Belle pupils have returned to class they seem to have won a minor victory.

It is reported by the pupils that they have gained the assurance that both mathematics

and social studies - the two subjects taught in Afrikaans which led to the strike - will be suspended for the present.

The principal of Thulasizwe Higher Primary School, Mr L Mguni, said yesterday that he was happy that at least the students were learning, even if they had dropped some subjects.

"They are now doing only five subjects but it's better than nothing," he said.

He said this was the result of a meeting with pupils where they were convinced to go back to classes as the June examinations were about to start.


Meanwhile it has been reported that the controversy will have a sequel in Parliament tomorrow, when Mr M C Botha, Minister of Bantu Education, is to answer a series of questions from Dr Alex Boraine, MP, of the Progressive Reform party.

The questions will be based on the background to the strike and whether the matter is receiving attention from the Government.

Striking students return to class on condition that Maths and Social Studies classes taught in Afrikaans are suspended.

The World 3 June 1976

## The route of the Soweto march



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THE WORLD, Monday, May 24, 1976

## 1600 pupils keep up strike

THE 1 600 striking Soweto schoolchildren today defied their parents who at a weekend meeting in Orlando West decided they should return to school. The pupils, from four Orlando East schools, again refused to go into class this morning.

The pupils are from Phefeni Junior Secondary (form one and two), and the Standard five and form one pupils at Belle, Thulasizwe and Emthonjeni Higher Primary Schools.

They began their strike last week in protest at having to study mathematics and social studies through Afrikaans.

### MILLING

Early today the striking pupils were milling around their schools in Orlando but would not go into class.

At a packed parents' meeting in the township over the weekend it was decided that the pupils should return to school while the whole matter is being looked into.

Last week the circuit inspector of Bantu Education, Mr M C De Beer, said he was taking no action against the striking pupils because he was "in no position to force the pupils" to go to school.

*At a packed meeting, parents decide pupils should go back to school but now about 1600 pupils defy them and continue their strike.*

24 May 1976 *The World*

resources and facilities. But the use of Afrikaans the following year as a medium of instruction soon compounded the issues. What were initially problems that related to the lack of facilities and resources, now became epistemological and ideological issues which included the (ab)use of language and power. As we were not benefiting from this situation, we asked ourselves: 'What is the use of studying something that does not make sense to you, does not sustain your quest for knowledge and does not improve your critical faculties?' According to me these are classroom issues and they needed people with first-hand experience to articulate them; hence our determination to use passive resistance as a tool to put our grievances to the authorities.

One has to also point out the problematic manner in which the terms 'student' or 'pupil' are used when discussing the origins of the uprisings. These terms are used simplistically, in a way that does not highlight

and take into cognisance the various differences among us. We were not a homogeneous group. Students from the various high schools in Soweto were not at first interested in our plight and struggle, as they were using English as a medium of instruction. They carried on with their studies as if nothing was happening during the formative, crucial days leading to the uprisings. I remember that in my school the senior students, Form Three (Std Eights), were both aloof and dismissive towards us. The Form Four and Form Five students from our high school and our neighbours, Orlando West High (popularly known as Matseke) were equally uninterested. The majority of the senior students were very reactionary and perceived us as young upstarts and delinquents who were interfering and disturbing 'normal' schooling. Therefore like the Tsietsies<sup>2</sup> of those early days, they simply went on with their studies in March, April, May and early June 1976 without questioning the status quo.

To elaborate, one should note that during the early period, that is prior to June, the student leaders that later emerged - like Tsietsie Mashinini, Khotso Seathlo, Dan Montsitsi, Murphy Morobe and representatives of South African Students' Movement - were not involved in our struggle. This is because they were senior high school students who were not affected. They were exempted by the Ministry of Bantu Education from the 'Afrikaans as medium' directive. They were among the last group using English as a medium of instruction in black secondary and high schools. Furthermore, historical fiction films such as *Sarafina* and *Cry Freedom* and other media wrongly assume that the students of Morris Isaacson High School in Central Western Jabavu played a crucial role in events leading up to 16 June 1976. This is because the dominant leaders of Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) were from this high school, including its first president Tsietsie Mashinini<sup>3</sup>. This representation is not correct. The SSRC was formed early in

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from the principal, teachers or the inspectorate... What happened was that the Form Threes were fully aware of the situation on the day-to-day basis... There was no other way but for them to join us and guide us or help us [as seniors] to get the problem sorted out. But the way things were going, they would be with us at a particular time and be on the other side at another particular time. We expected them to down their pens [and not to write their June half-yearly exams]. We wanted full sympathy from them, not a half-baked type of thing. They carried on with their studies [and began to write their June exams during the first week of June] whilst nothing was being resolved, so we decided to go inside the exam room and tore up the exam papers, and forced them out the classrooms. That is exactly when things started to get sour now - they then officially joined us because they had no option...

At home most of the parents were aware about what was happening at PJSS, about the class boycotts, but I can understand as to why the parents could not get involved as I see the situation now. The parents were totally not involved with the running of the school then. They said to us they do understand the situation we are facing, we should just try and fight on until the situation is resolved... I should think fear was [overwhelming] them because you will hear from a mother or father that we will get into serious trouble with the authorities...

From various newspaper reports it is clear that both the white government and the local government in Soweto, controlled through the auspices of the discredited and reactionary Urban Bantu Council (UBC), were out of touch with the situation right up to the actual day of the uprisings. They spent their time trying to legitimise themselves, implementing misguided, futile and undemocratic policies. From *The World* newspapers we have several reports that reflect on these issues.

What happened was that [by word of mouth] news spread around Soweto that students at PJSS are fighting within themselves [Form Twos and

Threes]. Other senior secondary schools like Orlando West High and Orlando High in Orlando East sent some messages saying that there should not be any fights among us. And then we had a meeting, it was on a Monday [June 14] whereby Seth addressed all of us and said that on Wednesday most of the schools in Soweto will come and assemble at our school from where we will stage a march. They [other schools] will come and assemble at our school from where we will stage a march, they will come and support the fight we are having with the Department of Bantu Education and the inspectorate and to stage a march. We will raise placards and the stuff to say to the authorities that Afrikaans as a medium of instruction should be done away with.

The march was going to be [an easy-going thing]... whereby female students will wear our trousers or their fathers' trousers and we will wear our sisters' dresses - it would be like a Guy Fawkes thing and we would go around Soweto making other statements... We laughed about the matter, we were frustrated and some students who had a sense of humour wanted us to release the tension creatively. It never turned out that way. Most of the students from other schools turned out in their full school uniforms. We did not take notice of them when they came to our school. What happened was that in other schools, when they decided to leave their premises to come and join us, the principals and the teachers in their schools did not know that the students were going to meet en masse. Teachers and principals became concerned with the situation and followed their students as their roads were leading to PJSS.

Where this school is situated you can actually see the Orlando Police Station across the railroad there. I should think that one of our teachers or the principal telephoned the police to sort of monitor the movement of the students - and the police were also amazed... It was very peaceful, nobody had a stick, stone or anything - all we wanted to do was to stage the march and then come back... We then converged at our school, then the route of the march was mapped out...

Continued on page 34

## UBC men in new school row

**COUNCILLORS WHO stormed out of the Soweto UBC meeting called to discuss the enforcement of Afrikaans teaching in schools are not pulling out of the issue - but, they say they will not accept the "illegal" deputation appointed at Monday's meeting.**

Councillors Lennox Mlonzi and Leonard Mosala said last night that they plan to see the Chief Director of the West Rand Administration Board to ask him to reject the deputation which was appointed after they and others walked out of the meeting.

### "ILLEGAL"

They said that the deputation, appointed to meet the Minister of Bantu Education and Development, Mr M C Botha, was "illegal" because it was appointed at a meeting which was not properly constituted.

Councillors stormed out of the meeting - leaving

By Collin Nxumalo and Willie Bokala

only nine councillors present - after Councillor David Thebehali threw his name plaque at Mr Mosala. No decision had been taken when the councillors, members of Progressive Party led by Mr Mlonzi and of makgotla under Mr Siegfried Manthata walked out.

### CONTROVERSY

Mr Mosala said other councillors were not taking the controversy seriously. "What happened at the meeting would not have happened if we were all serious about the matter. They shouldn't play around with an issue like this one.

"They have failed to realise that this is a burning issue which needs immediate attention. I doubt if we shall serve with them again after what they have done.

We were trying our best to solve our children's problems," Mr Mosala said.

Mr Mlonzi said the chairman, Mr T J Makhaya, should not have allowed the meeting to continue after that walk-out.

He said another meeting should be called immediately to continue the struggle against teaching in Afrikaans in schools.

### PREPARED

"We are prepared to fight the matter but we won't stand abuse from fellow councillors," Mr Mlonzi said.

He said he was going to see Mr Manie Mulder "because the deputation appointed was not democratically elected. I will also apologise to what happened at the meeting. The procedure was to adjourn the meeting for about 15 minutes and if after that there was still no quorum, the meeting should have been called off."

UBC members storm out of the meeting. They maintain the meeting failed to realise that the Afrikaans teaching is a burning matter that needs immediate attention.  
16 June 1976

## Need for cool heads over language row

THE warning by Urban Bantu Councillor, Mr Leonard Mosala, that another "Sharpeville" type incident could develop in Soweto over the controversial Afrikaans medium of instruction must be taken seriously.

As Mr Mosala points out, the presence of police on school premises tends to incite the children whose feelings are running high at the moment. On more than one occasion principals have had to appeal to police to leave the premises. Obviously a situation like this cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely. What is needed now, more than ever, is cool heads to deal with the issues confronting our children.

What should have particularly disturbed parents is their apparent lack of control over their children. We agree entirely with Mr Mosala's analysis that many kids have lost respect for their elders. They see us as people whose dignity and pride has been hurt and who have seemingly lost the will to resist injustice.

Our children's stand, suggests that they are giving warning that they do not intend to suffer a lot of soul searching. It should prompt those who are being among our people. Already there are those who are beginning to respond to the challenge. Men like Dr Aaron Mathlare and his interim committee of the proposed Soweto Parents' Association have made it clear that they appreciate the plight of the Black student. They have responded by saying they as parents are not going to stand idly by while their children fight their battles.

We therefore hope that this committee will be able to rally people around the defusing the tense atmosphere prevalent in Soweto.

Meanwhile, students should refrain from anything that may spark off serious trouble. In the same breath, we trust the police will act in a diplomatic manner. As for the Department of Bantu Education, an awful lot rests on their shoulders to act responsibly in the language controversy. They must realise that forcing Afrikaans down the throats of our people can only breed resentment.

The day before the notorious uprisings of 16 June 1976, Urban Bantu Councillor warns that another 'Sharpeville' incident could develop, as children's feelings are running high at the moment!

The World

1976

June 15



Schoolchildren marching through the streets of Soweto on 16 June 1976.



Students express their anger against Afrikaans as medium of instruction.

students who went into exile. As they were caught by surprise and were underprepared by this exodus of a large number of students, they cannot claim that they were instructive in organising the June uprisings.

In fact, initially the students went into exile looking for a symbolic 'home' in the various camps, since they were not recruited by the liberation movements, their reception was chaotic in most cases. There were various splinter groups which came into place within the liberation movements. Their major aim was to win the hearts and minds of this new, highly radical but politically immature support base. The different factions also wanted to push their own agendas for leadership within these movements. As soon as students recognized this and the tension caused by their presence, they set up their own organisations in exile. One can argue that the ANC managed to regroup and rise above factionalism. The PAC, however, was never able to recover and one suspects that its poor showing in the present-day South African political scene has internal dynamics which can be traced back to this era.

Themba Molefe, a political correspondence for the *Sowetan* newspaper, provides us with the following chronology and background to the events prior to 16 June 1976 upon which I base my counter-memories. This also includes his article based on eyewitness accounts from the *Sowetan* archives<sup>6</sup>.

*[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, partially obscured by the page number.]*

A day after the uprisings, the government is urged to carry out a top-level commission of inquiry into the events that led to the confrontation.

**Inquiry must be held into Soweto riot**

SOWETO today is a place savaged by grief and anger. Grief at the unnecessary loss of life. Anger at the insensitivity of all concerned about the rising bitterness that has surrounded the Afrikaans medium of instruction controversy.

What was at first a peaceful demonstration by school children erupted as students and police squared up to each other in confrontation. This is what we feared would happen, and this is what we have warned about all along.

Frankly we cannot see any way out of the situation other than a top-level commission of inquiry into the events of yesterday. The Government has no alternative but to appoint such a commission and get to the bottom of the disturbances.

We appealed for calm and cool heads yesterday — an appeal which we reiterate today with even greater emphasis. We would also urge the Government to take a less uncompromising stand on the Afrikaans language issue.

**Castrated bulls**

PERHAPS one of the ironies of yesterday's riot in Soweto is the incredible role played by the Urban Bantu Council in the face of such an explosive issue. Instead of putting their efforts together to solve the problem, they treated us to shocking scenes, turning the Jabulani Council Chamber into a battlefield, with a name plate flying and abuse the order of the day.

What is more, when they eventually got around to appointing a delegation to see the Government on the burning issue, they engaged in debates on the legalities of such a delegation on which they could not even agree.

Indeed, talk about castrated bulls!

17 June 1976  
World editorial

Despite a highly charged situation, the Urban Bantu Council fail to form a unified front to address the educational crisis.

**This is what led to the '76 riots...**

By Themba Molefe  
Political Correspondent

In 1974 the Southern Transvaal regional department of Bantu Education issued a directive that Afrikaans be a medium of instruction in black junior secondary schools — on a 50-50 basis with English.

This generated widespread protests from teacher organisations and school boards inside and outside Soweto.

Educationists saw the directive as a contradiction to a statement made the previous year by the then Secretary for Bantu Education, the late Dr H J van Zyl, who had made it clear that the medium of instruction in schools should be decided by the individual school boards in consultation with himself personally.

He had stated that it was not in the interests of the pupils to have two mediums of instruction.

This is what happened:  
•Following the 50-50 language directive in late 1974, school boards and teacher organisations made representations to the Minister of Bantu Education Mr C Botha for a decision against this policy. This was turned down.

•In May 1975 the joint northern and southern Transvaal school boards elected a committee to take up the issue again with

the Department of Bantu Education.

•The committee subsequently had at least one meeting with Van Zyl but returned home dissatisfied.

•During 1975 several school boards ordered their schools to ignore the language instruction and teach in English only.

•At several secret meetings the school boards were told in no uncertain terms to toe the line of the Department of Bantu Education. Most school boards relented.

•In February 1976 the dispute surfaced when two members of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board in Soweto were fired by the Regional Director of Bantu Education, Mr W C Ackerman.

The entire school board resigned in sympathy.

•Soweto secondary school pupils then took the matter up on May 17 1976 when the Form One (Std 6) and Form Two (Std 7) pupils refused to attend classes until their demands to have the Afrikaans order withdrawn were met.

•Within a week three schools had joined the Phefeni Junior Secondary in boycotting classes. Already, about 1 600 pupils had been affected.

At that stage the Bantu Education inspectorate responsible for those schools refused to get involved saying

the policy had been laid down by the Government.

•By the end of May 1976 seven schools involving more than 2 000 pupils had joined the strike but many later returned to classes. Only the Phefeni pupils were left sticking to their boycott.

•By Monday 14 June 1976 plans for a massive pupil demonstration were heard of.

After consistently refusing to even consider hearing black parents and teacher representation on the issue, Deputy Minister of Bantu Education Dr Andries Treurnicht told Parliament: "Why should blacks be allowed in schools if they do not want to be taught in the language chosen by the Government?"

"The Afrikaners were also forced by the English to learn their language."

On June 15 1976 Soweto awoke to find schools teaming with police.

A councillor in the then Urban Bantu Council, Mr Leonard Mosala, warned that another "Sharpeville" could occur in Soweto over the enforcing of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.

On 16 June the United Nations Security Council demanded answers after hearing that South African Police bullets had claimed the lives of 40 unarmed school children.

In 1995, a modern political correspondent reflects on the events leading up to the 1976 uprisings.

16 June 1995  
*Sowetan*



*An estimated ten thousand Soweto schoolchildren assembled to protest and march on 16 June 1976.*

THE WORLD, Friday, June 18, 1976

## Botha defends language rule

**SUBJECTS** are taught in "English only" at seven of the senior secondary schools in Soweto which took part in demonstrations against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, the Minister of Bantu Education, Mr M C Botha, said last night.

Only one high school offered one subject – history up to Form Three – through the medium of Afrikaans.

"The alleged aversion to Afrikaans as a medium can hardly be the only reason for

the demonstrations," the Minister said in a lengthy statement defending the 50-50 language requirement.

His department had certain responsibilities to consider in its approach to medium of instruction and could not simply accede to policy by "popular request".

- The equal treatment of the two official languages as entrenched in the constitution.


- The predominance of one official language over the other changed from region to region.

"Introduction of one of the languages as sole medium of instruction would adversely affect the region where the other language predominates."

- The introduction of a "foreign language" as medium in the primary school was a backward step educationally with which the department would not like to be associated: Concept formation and understanding at this stage takes place best through the vernacular.

The Minister of Bantu Education states that in seven of the schools that demonstrated against Afrikaans as medium of instruction, subjects are taught in English only.

# Kids told — get back to school



Tsietsie Mashinini pictured after a meeting of students at Morris Isaacson High School, Soweto, yesterday. He was elected chairman of the new Soweto Students' Representative Council.

**by DUMA NDLOVU**  
**SOWETO STUDENTS**  
**were yesterday urged to go back to school and solve their problems from within.**

Parents and students said this at a three hour meeting called by Soweto's Black Parents' Association yesterday.

The meeting was attended by more than 200 parents and students and was intended to solve problems arising from the present situation in Soweto schools.

Tsietsie Mashinini, a matric student at Morris Isaacson, who is the regional president of the South African Students' Movement and chairman of the body representing students in matters concerning the present rift, urged students to go back to school today so that a solution could be found.

"We can only conquer when we have a strong standpoint and stand as one."

He also said the students were going to meet at Morris Isaacson High School this morning and discuss what was to be done.

He urged all junior secondaries and high schools to send two representatives to the meeting, to start at 9 am.

### UNITE

Another student, Murphy Morobe, urged fellow students to unite.

Mr Clarence Mlokoti, principal of the Daliwonga Secondary School in Dube, called on parents to con-

sider the problems of the students.

"Our future today is being determined by the students. That is why we have to consider them. We should meet them and get to know their programme and then work alongside them," he said.

Police action was strongly criticised.

### PROTEST

At the end of the meeting the parents and students were called upon by Dr Manas Buthelezi, chairman of the BPA, to make resolutions.

Some of the points which arose were:

- The immediate release of all detained students. (It was also stated that although the Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, had given an assurance to this effect students were still being detained.)
- The total scrapping of the Bantu Education system.
- Members of the BPA, SASM, and all other Black organisations, parents and students, to march together in protest against the arrests of students.

Soweto's Black Parents' Association urges pupils to go back to school at a meeting of over 200 pupils and parents. 2 August 1976

## AFRIKANER YOUTH GET A RAW DEAL (written in 1964)

As the pressures mount against South Africa it is becoming plain to everybody, of all shades of opinion, that this country cannot stay as it is today. The result is that on all sides people are coming forward with plans for change. Some say 'one man, one vote,' others speak of 'one civilised man, one vote,' and others again have still more novel plans.

Even the National Party is planning for big changes. With the Afrikaans churches, press and cultural organisations, it is bent on changing the face of South Africa to fit the pattern of separate development.

Nobody, it seems, believes the country can stay as it is.

In the circumstances, one would expect the younger people of South Africa to be in an intellectual ferment. One would expect the students of Pretoria and Wits., of Fort Hare, Stellenbosch and the University of Cape Town to be asking bold and vital questions (as indeed many of them were until recently). But now there is little of this. We can hardly speak of the South African youth, for there is nothing to distinguish young South Africa from the mass of the Republic's population. There are no trends which can be said to represent an advance on the thinking of our older generations.

We seldom hear of young architects doing something new, or of young people writing with a new vigour and hope. We can't even produce a set of Beatles. In fact, the youth of this country seems to be as old as the hills compared with their counterparts in Europe and England. Even young Russians seem to be doing better than our lot. I hear they are successfully forging ahead with their jam sessions in open defiance of their country's opposition to jazz.

There are, to be sure, a few odd voices here and there. The Afrikaans journalist I met this week, for instance. He was earnestly seeking answers to one of our most urgent questions.

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Would there be no hope, he wanted to know, of African nationalists accepting compromise to relieve the tension which now exists between them and Afrikaner nationalists? What about a fair partition of the land? The Afrikaners would never be satisfied, he told me, unless they were assured of their 'piece of holy land' where they would give expression to their national aspirations.

Regardless of this man's ideas — quite impractical to my mind — there was a sense of urgency, concern and vitality in the way he spoke. He was a restless man, free of the complacency which seems to have seized most of his generation in South Africa.

For this condition I blame the Dutch Reformed Churches, the National Party, the Broederbond, the Afrikaans Press, and all the important institutions of Afrikanerdom. These are the agents which exercise the greatest influence upon the most important section of this country's youth.

Young Afrikaners are closer to the reins of political power than the rest of their generation. If they could open their mouths, their voices would be listened to at the highest level. But they are not likely to do anything like this. In this sense South Africa has been even more cruel to them than to their counterparts in other sections of the community.

The institutions I listed above have drilled Afrikaner youth to a point where they are without the will or the desire to see the stamp of their youth on the programmes and projects that this country undertakes. In my view, my Afrikaner contemporaries are getting a raw deal. The grip of authority on the minds of black youth is not as tight as it is on theirs.

The very conditions under which we live incite us to insubordination. Just being an African in itself is almost illegal. There are too many laws which we cannot humanly obey. As a result, instead of striving to obey, we spend more time thinking about how to disobey and get away with it.

Unfortunately, the rumblings of discontent which develop among young blacks are put down severely. Hundreds of African students have been expelled from schools for organising against authority. I am sure that similar actions by Afrikaner students would end up in proper round-table consultations instead of mass expulsions.

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It would be silly to suggest that the Government is to blame entirely for the dearth of *avant-garde* thinking among non-Afrikaner youth. There must be many other reasons. It is true, however, that Afrikaner youth, because of its closeness to authority, is in the best position to give impetus to some new and vigorous thinking in our generation.

## THE HAZARDS OF TOO MUCH EDUCATION

Many of us on this side of the colour line know that education is a useful thing. We also know that to be educated can become a liability if you are black in South Africa. For there is a growing number of us whose education has become the cause of constant frustration.

These are men who have the qualifications to take some of the country's best-paying jobs and do them well. But their blackness creates problems which few employers are willing to put up with. On the other hand, these men would not fit readily into employment normally set aside for blacks. A man who is a trained psychologist will find it painful to spend his life stamping passes in a Bantu Affairs office even if the pay is reasonably good and he is crowned with the title of Chief Clerk.

I have a friend, for instance, who holds three degrees, including an MA in psychology. One of his earliest jobs, more than ten years ago, was with a research organisation. He had only two degrees then and was employed as a research assistant. In spite of his degrees, he earned less than some white tram drivers.

'What is more,' he told me, 'we went on record as temporary assistants regardless of our qualifications. All of us who were black were permanently temporary.'

If my friend had not been so well educated he might have stayed in this job for life. But the ceiling was too close to his head, so he left. He subsequently became a public relations man on the African market divisions of several big firms. His were executive positions, once with a monthly salary of R346 plus various allowances which raised it to R460. By then he had got his MA

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who the members of the Transkei Cabinet are and what they are about when they leave Johannesburg. Their visit is nearing its end now and they are still carefully isolated from the people.

#### MENTAL CORROSION

'Amos,' said the Bantu Commissioner to his African interpreter, 'will you ask these boys if they want to take those girls for their lawfully wedded wives . . .?'

The interpreter fired the question at 15 men standing in a group opposite their brides. The men answered in chorus: 'Ye-bo, yes.'

This is one of a spate of stories which I have been hearing in Soweto since the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill became the subject of public discussion. The Government, like the Bantu Commissioner in the story above, appears to be unaware of the human being beneath the black skin in its dealings with Africans.

Africans are naturally worried about the provisions of the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill. But they are much more amazed at the state of mind in which white South Africa must be to produce such a law.

Like the Soweto salesman who said to me: 'You'd think they live in another world; a world without wives and husbands, or children and family life. I don't think they even see us.'

Telling stories such as that of the Bantu Commissioner, they point out that the Bill is part of a process which has been corroding white minds in South Africa over the years. They see the Bill, and the massive indifference of the white electorate to its introduction, as being remarkable only as the latest and most dramatic evidence of this.

The tendency to treat Africans as labour and not as individuals, human beings with human sentiments and desires, is devastating.

Among the hardest hit are family men who, only five years ago, had to demolish their homes in Sophiatown. They built new homes in Soweto or moved into Government-built houses and began improving them at great expense.

I know a man who has been building a home in Dube for the past four years. He stints and saves and, as he can afford it, adds a little more.

In terms of the Bill, such people will soon be in danger of being sent out of their homes once more should they lose their jobs.

#### SNATCHING AT THE GOOD LIFE

At a glance, Soweto looks dull and lifeless. Almost all the houses are built to the same pattern — thousands upon thousands of small match-box cottages separated from each other by wire fencing. In some parts the fence even looks like an emergency camp.

Yet there are few places I know which are as lively as this complex of multiple townships where 500 000 Africans have been housed by Government decree.

There are people, no doubt, who grumble that Soweto is too far from town and the factories where everybody works; that many of the homes are still without electricity although Africa's biggest power station lies next door.

One man complained to me that neighbours tend to keep to themselves in Soweto because their homes are fenced in and each has its private toilet. It's not like Sophiatown, where you used to meet your neighbours for a chat as you went to the communal lavatories.

Some people resent Soweto because it is not a place of their choice. They would prefer to find their own homes according to their own tastes and means. Some Africans even stretch their hair and acquire Coloured names in order to qualify for houses in places other than Soweto.

Yet, in spite of all this, Soweto lives. It lives precariously, sometimes dangerously, but with relentless will to survive and make the best of what I think is an impossible job. Soweto lives fitfully, mainly at the weekend, but it also lives for a few hours during the week.

Not many people earn much money here. There are people,

thousands of them, who don't eat three meals a day. There are homes where husbands give instructions that visitors are not to be served with tea, however long they may stay. That is the bleaker, more depressing face of this place. But then Soweto has many faces.

For instance, the number of large American cars never fails to amaze outsiders. There are streets in which every other house has a car in the yard. Admittedly, some of them don't go, but they are there all the same. The man of the house is able to say, 'You can't miss my place, there's a black Chev in the yard,' even if the poor thing has been on bricks for a decade.

As long as that car remains there, the world will know that the 'man of the house' once had his spell of gracious living. For this is the way of things in Soweto; a pattern of uneventful, austere living occasionally interrupted by 'great moments.' It may be one hectic night, one roaring weekend, or the good living may last for a whole year.

You see this in the drinking sessions. A man will take his whole week's pay and buy drinks for half a dozen of his friends. 'Fill the table and count the empties,' he will say to the shebeen queen. The idea seems to be to live well while you can and face the troubles of tomorrow when they come.

There are other people whose 'moments of life' come in a different way. The girls, for example, who begin to live when they get into their Sunday best and go to a wedding. Others will spend much of their pay on black shawls to be worn at a celebrity's funeral at the weekend.

All the time the pattern is the same. People live haphazardly, in snatches of a life they can never afford to lead for long, let alone for ever.

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## Reporting at Large

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(Nakasa 1971)

sjamboks or dig his back with knives. 'Yellow cowardice' is the better label.

## THE ECONOMY AND US

Johannesburg appears to be getting bogged down in a labour crisis. Only this week, a report from the Chamber of Industries said there was a 'surprisingly high demand' for African skilled workers. Meanwhile, the City Council has decided to employ white women bus conductors to relieve its manpower problem.

One would have thought the shortage of workers would induce the Government to scrap its absurd work-reservation laws. For there are scores of young African men, trained as builders and carpenters, who are not allowed to work outside the townships. Many are employed by the council at rates which are pathetically low compared with what their skills could command in the open market.

These laws are of use to nobody. The white workers do not need them because there is full employment among whites. Industry has repeatedly rejected them, and the Government itself is steadily giving 'white' jobs to Africans.

The only purpose they serve is to confuse and embitter a lot of people. I know of several young men who qualified at the City Council's Vocational Training School for Africans in Soweto, and who went to work as labourers instead of artisans. I also know at least one who settled for the business of robbing banks after leaving school.

It happened in Durban. I telephoned a booking office for a train ticket to Johannesburg.

'Could you please reserve a seat for me on the Wednesday night train to Johannesburg?' I asked.

Booking Clerk: Certainly, sir, will you hold the line a minute?

Me: Yes.

BC (after a while): Are you there sir? I'm afraid the Wednesday train is fully booked, sir.

Me: What about Thursday morning?

BC: I'll go and see, sir. Will you hold on again?

Me: Yes.

BC: Are you there, sir? Yes, I can put you on the Thursday morning train. What is the name, sir?

Me: Nathaniel Nakasa.

BC: Did you say MacArthur, sir? Could you spell it please?

Me: N-A-K-A-S-A, Nakasa.

BC: What nationality would that be?

Me: African.

BC: Damn it! Why the hell didn't you tell me in the beginning that you are a native?

Me: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't . . .

BC: Shut up! Jy lieg!

There is obviously some difference between railway booking clerks and garage owners. I say this because, last week, I went to buy a tyre for my car near the Magistrate's Court and something unusual happened.

The white man at the garage did not lift his eyes from the invoice book he was scribbling on. Quite matter-of-factly he said: 'What can I do for you sir?' I told him I needed a new tyre and he advised me to get a retread. Then he called to his African assistant: 'George, please go with this boss to his car and bring his old tyre from the boot.'

I looked around to see if a white customer had perhaps appeared behind me. There was nobody else in the place. This was it! For once in my life, I was being elevated to the status of a boss.

I heard later that this garage is doing a roaring business with Africans, especially taxi-drivers, who call regularly for their soothing ration of 'sir' and 'boss'.


## THE ISOLATED VISITORS

This week, thanks to Chief Kaiser Matanzima's visit to Johan-

**FACELIFT**

*Apartheid*

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER SOWETO by JUDY SEIDMAN



# FACELIFT APARTHEID

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER SOWETO

by JUDY SEIDMAN

The uprising of 1976 in South Africa left no room for doubt: apartheid must adapt or die. New labour laws and regulations affecting the lives of urban Africans were introduced. Some restrictions on black businessmen were lifted. "Whites only" signs came down. Even the Immorality Act was questioned.

Newspapers in Europe and America greeted this "new dispensation" in South Africa with evident relief: "South Africa Eases Race Barriers", was a typical headline.

Are such changes merely cosmetic? This book analyses the "new dispensation" for Africans. It argues that behind the apparent concessions lies increased repression for the majority of Africans in South Africa. And therefore, nationwide unrest continues.

The Author concludes that these changes are indeed a "facelift". Surgery has perhaps been deep enough to alter the superficial appearance of apartheid, but the main purpose of the "new dispensation" remains: to preserve the basic structure of minority rule.

Judy Seidman is a painter, born in the U.S.A., who has spent half her life in West and Southern Africa. She is the author of *Ba Ye Zwa (The People Live)* which is a book about daily life under Apartheid, published by South End Press, Boston, in 1978.



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£1.20

Further, white South Africa was shocked to discover that they could not depend upon Western support automatically, even if the menace was labelled "communist". In 1975 South African troops invaded Angola in an attempt to destroy the as yet shaky control of the MPLA; the MPLA received aid from Cuban troops to force back the South African army. South Africa claimed it had been promised large-scale American military support which failed to materialize. Instead, the Western powers have had more and more trouble avoiding United Nations' calls for sanctions against South Africa. In November 1977 the United Nations imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.

By 1978, then, the white South African government occupied an increasingly dangerous position. On the one hand, there was an explosive (if temporarily quiescent) black majority upon whose labour South Africa depends; on the other, an increasingly hostile international front. The apartheid state had to find a formula to diffuse these threats without destroying its own economic and political foundations. This book examines the formula which has been found, looking at the changes the government has made in apartheid, and their impact upon the structure of South African society.

#### Apartheid: how the system works

The population of South Africa is one-fifth white and four-fifths black. The white minority controls the political and economic structure; the black majority provides cheap labour within this white-controlled arena. This dichotomy was deliberately created and maintained. The first laws depriving Africans of legal rights to the land were passed in the nineteenth century. By 1940 there was a whole battery of laws restricting Africans' rights to own land, to travel, to work in skilled jobs, to vote, to organize, and so on. Then in the 1950s the Nationalist government systematically reworked these laws into one comprehensive structure, known as *Apartheid* (literally, "separateness").

The keystone of apartheid is the Bantustan (officially Homelands or Black States) policy. The African population is relegated to areas amounting to 13% of the land, previously known as "native reserves", often the poorest and least productive parts, scattered in small sections on the fringes of the industrialized heart of South Africa. To these lands, now labelled "tribal homelands", all Africans belong it is claimed; the rest of the country belongs to the whites.<sup>4</sup>

Blacks are only allowed to live on the "white land"—the other 87%—if they are economically productive. The unemployed, the old, and the very young, are to be sent away to the "homelands".

To enforce this, the government has strengthened the rigid system of control over the population's movements, known as the pass laws. Every African over the age of 16 has to carry a pass, a small book containing the holder's official life. The pass shows where the holder is permitted to live, and in what job he or she is permitted to work; whether he or she is in school or has permission to seek work; whether he or she is allowed to travel to a particular place.

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Africans are particularly restricted from living in urban areas. The government calls this "influx control". The main influx control law, Section 10 (1) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, allows an African to live in an urban area only if he has since birth continuously lived in that area (Section 10 (1) (a)), or if he has held the same job in that area for at least ten years (Section 10 (1) (b)); if he or she is the wife or dependent child of someone who qualifies under the above two rules (Section 10 (1) (c)), or if he or she is employed on contract in the urban area, his or her "permanent" residence then being in a "homeland" (Section 10 (1) (d)). Anyone found illegally in an urban area is liable under these laws to be "endorsed out"—"deported" to his "homeland". In 1977 a quarter of a million Africans suffered arrest for pass and influx control violations.<sup>5</sup>

In these ways much of the African workforce has been forced into migrant labour. Their families and "homes" remain in or have been removed to the bantustans. The worker must leave his family for most of the year to work in a white area on contract. Such black workers live in single-sex hostels and compounds. The family in the "homeland" survives on whatever money the breadwinner sends back to them; this money is eked out often by a small vegetable plot and a few animals, but many families have neither the labour nor the land nor the resources to make farming a reliable income.

This control on movement is backed up by political control. Africans have no say in the national government. They cannot vote in national elections. They are allowed to vote for their "homeland governments" under controlled conditions, thereby allowing them an illusion of influence over a fragmented thirteen per cent of the land and its products. Just how meaningful this is can be illustrated by the fact that the Transkei, the most coherent in land area and longest "independent" of the bantustans, had to be subsidized by the South African government in 1978 to the tune of R113 million, or 75% of its total budget.<sup>6</sup>

Black opportunities are further hampered by an educational structure that ensured that "natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them".<sup>7</sup> The curriculum is distorted, preventing pupils from gaining much knowledge of the world outside the apartheid system. The physical conditions are crippling, with over-crowded classrooms, few textbooks, badly trained teachers. In 1975-76 the government allocated 2.88% of the budget for white education, 0.53% for Coloured, 0.22% for Asian, and 0.70% for African education.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, apartheid rests upon rigid security legislation. The South African authorities can arrest anyone upon suspicion and hold them effectively indefinitely; they can "ban" a person, making it illegal for that person to participate in any political activities or even talk to more than one other person at one time; they have control over what information can be distributed and read; they have a police force notorious for torture and death in detention.

The apartheid structure enables most of the white population to live like those with high incomes in America or Britain. They own cars and swimming pools and television sets and freezers. Their children are highly educated, at

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state expense, and their health services although not free are quite possibly the best in the world. High wages for whites are usual.

The average black South African wage-earner—for those who are employed—earns a quarter of the average American wage, a third of the average British wage. The South African Department of Statistics claimed in 1978 that the average African wage was R120 per month, compared to R536 per month for whites.<sup>9</sup> The minimal living level, the lowest level of income upon which it is calculated a family of four should be able to survive, was in July 1978 in Soweto about R160 per month.<sup>10</sup> One survey showed that, even with more than one wage earner per household, just under half of the households surveyed (in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein) earned incomes below the minimum level needed to survive.<sup>11</sup> Blacks are forced to live in townships outside the cities, without indoor sanitation, electricity, or paved roads. Families are forced to split up by the migrant labour system. Education is hard to come by, and by law the content is very limited.

But apartheid hits worst those who are "removed" from the cities to the bantustans. These people are dumped on the land, without resources, sometimes with only tents as shelter, sometimes in "resettlement camps" without adequate food or water. Policy determines that these people are the economically unproductive, so they tend to be the old, mothers and children, the sick. Much of the land set aside for the "homelands" is poor, but even where it is potentially productive it is too drastically overcrowded to enable people to live off it. As a result, the bantustan population lives on the brink of starvation:

"These people are hungry", an agricultural training officer in the Msinga district of Zululand claims. "There are people here who by all normal standards should be dead. They are alive only because their neighbours help them, in the knowledge that they might find themselves in a similar plight the next day".<sup>12</sup>

Thornhill Resettlement Camp, in the Ciskei, became notorious in January 1977 when a doctor revealed a large number of deaths from malnutrition among the 10,000 inhabitants, reporting that:

"The babies are dying of gastro-enteritis and diarrhoea... the adult deaths are attributable to malnutrition and consequent incidence of diseases like kwashiorkor, tuberculosis and pellagra".<sup>13</sup>

The government, under pressure, sent emergency rations; the doctor was transferred. A year later, Thornhill again made news with a typhoid epidemic: three died and 130 cases were treated, according to official statistics. Apparently the emergency rations rushed in after the first scandal were of a lower standard than those supplied to Boer War concentration camp internees; and in any case the rations were discontinued after popular interest waned.<sup>14</sup>

This case is unusual in that it was published. The evidence indicates these conditions are not that uncommon among people who have been resettled. Nationwide child mortality rates for the African population have not been published since 1963, when 300 to 400 out of a thousand children born died

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before they were four (for whites the figure was 27 out of a thousand births).<sup>15</sup> But one recent study suggests that in rural areas "infant mortality among African children was 25 times that of white children, i.e. 530 per 1,000... 50 to 60% of them die before the age of 5". This study concludes that infant mortality for Africans has actually risen since the 1960s.<sup>16</sup>

The South African government has encouraged (some say "forced") these bantustans to become "independent" nations, electing their own governments. The territories are too physically fragmented, too poor and too overcrowded to ever be more than nominally independent. Yet the South African government, having granted this "independence", claims it has no responsibility for the people in the bantustans; any economic aid it may give to them counts as pure philanthropy. Moreover, under the bantustan programme all Africans are to become "citizens" of independent "Black States", thereby losing any claim to political and civil rights in the rest of South Africa.

This then constituted the apartheid system of the mid-1970s. It is primarily a system of exploitation based on a division of society in terms of race. The simple segregation of restaurants and restrooms (so-called "petty apartheid") carried the logic of this division into everyday life, and made everyday life just that much more miserable for the Africans. But apartheid theorists always intended petty apartheid to be a temporary measure, to enforce racial separation until the Grand Apartheid plans made integration out of the question.<sup>17</sup> The heart of the apartheid system (grand apartheid) lies in influx control, passes, resettlement and migrant labour.

The events of the mid-1970s threatened this system. However, the Nationalist Party had created this structure over the previous twenty years: it remained determined to save it despite internal revolt and international disapproval.

#### The "Save South Africa" Formula

The government therefore looked for some solution to the threats to apartheid. The simplest response lay with the military. The Defence budget of April 1979 reached a new level (nearly double the 1975 budget) of R1,857,000,000.<sup>18</sup> White males face a military draft that is extended for longer and longer periods as the military presence grows in the border areas in Namibia. And in October 1979 the US government reluctantly admitted that they held some evidence of a South African nuclear explosion.

But military strength, as the world has recognised since Vietnam, does not necessarily defeat a guerilla movement which has popular backing. Within the South African government pressure built up for some kind of change that would gain the support of at least a part of the black population for the existing structure. This is the key to the recent changes: they aim to preserve the existing structure, not destroy it.

The solution the government decided upon entailed building up a group of Africans with some stake in the existing system, described, not entirely correctly, as a "black middle class". Apartheid has hitherto blocked the formation of such

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## Introduction

Time is running out—time has run out . . . I don't think we have five years to play with.

Rear Admiral Edwards, South African Defence Force,  
February 1978<sup>1</sup>

This pessimistic statement was made two years after Soweto. The black townships erupted in 1976: across the country students attacked the government with whatever came to hand, stones and fire against a modern arsenal ranging from tear-gas machines to guns and helicopters. The government answered with widespread shootings. By December 1976, 499 Africans were listed as dead from gunshots in funeral parlours and police and hospital records; unofficial estimates of the number of dead rose as high as 5,000.<sup>2</sup> Yet the protests continued sporadically until 1978, Soweto followed by Cape Town followed by East London and Port Elizabeth. Even such remote places as Sibasa, "capital" of the Venda bantustan, faced student uprisings.

In some ways, the townships never returned to pre-1976 normal. The school boycott that triggered the demonstrations halted in early 1979, but secondary schools in Soweto never fully regained their previous enrolment. Everyday police patrols in townships, as opposed to massive semi-military "crime prevention sweeps", are practically non-existent with the result that, despite stringently enforced hours limiting petrol sales in white South Africa, petrol is available within the townships all night and all weekend, because garage owners do not fear police visits. According to the Security Police, an estimated four thousand Africans have fled South Africa for guerilla training camps to the north, and thousands more are still leaving.<sup>3</sup>

Internationally, the white government's position in 1978 appeared equally precarious. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974 first breached the cordon sanitaire of white states isolating South Africa from independent Africa. Mozambique and Angola no longer acted as buffers against freedom movements; instead, they provided bases for guerillas operating in Namibia, Zimbabwe and ultimately South Africa. Namibia and Zimbabwe themselves had become involved in guerilla wars, causing a continual drain on South Africa's economic and military strength. Above all hovered the danger that one of these guerilla movements would soon govern Namibia or Zimbabwe (as indeed happened) and in turn provide bases for direct attacks upon South Africa.

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Further, white South Africa was shocked to discover that they could not depend upon Western support automatically, even if the menace was labelled "communist". In 1975 South African troops invaded Angola in an attempt to destroy the as yet shaky control of the MPLA; the MPLA received aid from Cuban troops to force back the South African army. South Africa claimed it had been promised large-scale American military support which failed to materialize. Instead, the Western powers have had more and more trouble avoiding United Nations' calls for sanctions against South Africa. In November 1977 the United Nations imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.

By 1978, then, the white South African government occupied an increasingly dangerous position. On the one hand, there was an explosive (if temporarily quiescent) black majority upon whose labour South Africa depends; on the other, an increasingly hostile international front. The apartheid state had to find a formula to diffuse these threats without destroying its own economic and political foundations. This book examines the formula which has been found, looking at the changes the government has made in apartheid, and their impact upon the structure of South African society.

### Apartheid: how the system works

The population of South Africa is one-fifth white and four-fifths black. The white minority controls the political and economic structure; the black majority provides cheap labour within this white-controlled arena. This dichotomy was deliberately created and maintained. The first laws depriving Africans of legal rights to the land were passed in the nineteenth century. By 1940 there was a whole battery of laws restricting Africans' rights to own land, to travel, to work in skilled jobs, to vote, to organize, and so on. Then in the 1950s the Nationalist government systematically reworked these laws into one comprehensive structure, known as *Apartheid* (literally, "separateness").

The keystone of apartheid is the Bantustan (officially Homelands or Black States) policy. The African population is relegated to areas amounting to 13% of the land, previously known as "native reserves", often the poorest and least productive parts, scattered in small sections on the fringes of the industrialized heart of South Africa. To these lands, now labelled "tribal homelands", all Africans belong it is claimed; the rest of the country belongs to the whites.<sup>4</sup>

Blacks are only allowed to live on the "white land"—the other 87%—if they are economically productive. The unemployed, the old, and the very young, are to be sent away to the "homelands".

To enforce this, the government has strengthened the rigid system of control over the population's movements, known as the pass laws. Every African over the age of 16 has to carry a pass, a small book containing the holder's official life. The pass shows where the holder is permitted to live, and in what job he or she is permitted to work; whether he or she is in school or has permission to seek work; whether he or she is allowed to travel to a particular place.

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Africans are particularly restricted from living in urban areas. The government calls this "influx control". The main influx control law, Section 10 (1) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, allows an African to live in an urban area only if he has since birth continuously lived in that area (Section 10 (1) (a)), or if he has held the same job in that area for at least ten years (Section 10 (1) (b)); if he or she is the wife or dependent child of someone who qualifies under the above two rules (Section 10 (1) (c)), or if he or she is employed on contract in the urban area, his or her "permanent" residence then being in a "homeland" (Section 10 (1) (d)). Anyone found illegally in an urban area is liable under these laws to be "endorsed out"—"deported" to his "homeland". In 1977 a quarter of a million Africans suffered arrest for pass and influx control violations.<sup>5</sup>

In these ways much of the African workforce has been forced into migrant labour. Their families and "homes" remain in or have been removed to the bantustans. The worker must leave his family for most of the year to work in a white area on contract. Such black workers live in single-sex hostels and compounds. The family in the "homeland" survives on whatever money the breadwinner sends back to them; this money is eked out often by a small vegetable plot and a few animals, but many families have neither the labour nor the land nor the resources to make farming a reliable income.

This control on movement is backed up by political control. Africans have no say in the national government. They cannot vote in national elections. They are allowed to vote for their "homeland governments" under controlled conditions, thereby allowing them an illusion of influence over a fragmented thirteen per cent of the land and its products. Just how meaningful this is can be illustrated by the fact that the Transkei, the most coherent in land area and longest "independent" of the bantustans, had to be subsidized by the South African government in 1978 to the tune of R113 million, or 75% of its total budget.<sup>6</sup>

Black opportunities are further hampered by an educational structure that ensured that "natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them".<sup>7</sup> The curriculum is distorted, preventing pupils from gaining much knowledge of the world outside the apartheid system. The physical conditions are crippling, with over-crowded classrooms, few textbooks, badly trained teachers. In 1975-76 the government allocated 2.88% of the budget for white education, 0.53% for Coloured, 0.22% for Asian, and 0.70% for African education.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, apartheid rests upon rigid security legislation. The South African authorities can arrest anyone upon suspicion and hold them effectively indefinitely; they can "ban" a person, making it illegal for that person to participate in any political activities or even talk to more than one other person at one time; they have control over what information can be distributed and read; they have a police force notorious for torture and death in detention.

The apartheid structure enables most of the white population to live like those with high incomes in America or Britain. They own cars and swimming pools and television sets and freezers. Their children are highly educated, at

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a group. By law, Africans could not work in skilled jobs, could only own some types of businesses, could not employ whites, and so on. Further, even if they made some money, Africans were limited in what they could buy with it. They could not own a house or property in urban areas, they could not get a good education in South Africa, they could not even eat in the best restaurants. The new government policy is aimed at enabling a small number of Africans to prosper; this group would then have reason to ally themselves with the white government against the aspirations of the black majority. As Patrick Laurence, the *Rand Daily Mail's* political correspondent summarized in December 1978:

The strategy was to woo the black middle class as an ally of the white minority, or, as an Afrikaans newspaper put it, to consolidate the middle class as a bastion against attack on South Africa's free capitalist way of life. The Nationalist Party appropriated the liberal strategy of alliance with the black bourgeoisie and grafted it on to its earlier policy of winning over the chiefs and headmen through the homelands policy...

The success or failure of the policy is of crucial importance to the future of South Africa. On it will depend the extent to which the authorities can win black allies and on that, in turn, will determine in what measure the insurgents are isolated.<sup>19</sup>

But if on the one hand a small group is to be built up into a black elite, on the other hand the majority of Africans must be forced even more rigorously into the apartheid pattern. The *Financial Mail* pinpointed the dichotomy neatly: "Government's aim of course, is to build up a stable black urban middle class to the exclusion of migrants and homelands"<sup>20</sup> (*emphasis added*).

This internal policy has been accompanied by a new South African political offensive (to parallel its military offensive) to regain its former domination of the Southern African region. However, the new "constellation of states" which South Africa hopes to form, based on "common interests and developing mutual relations", will only sound credible if South Africa makes some attempts to placate its own African population.

The first steps towards the new internal policy were taken by the Vorster government. However, it is only since the ascent of Mr. P. W. Botha as Prime Minister that it has been applied explicitly:

Having correctly assessed the seriousness and urgency of both the international and domestic situations, Botha has made it clear that, regardless of political losses and a right wing backlash, he is determined to implement these changes regarded as vital to South Africa's survival.<sup>21</sup>

The Botha government does not differ fundamentally from its predecessors on the question of grand apartheid, despite the new government's image:

It might be argued that the *verligtes* ("enlightened" Afrikaner Nationalists) have been developing a more sophisticated form of apartheid, secure in their

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belief that allowing it to become a little frayed round the edges will not in any way undermine the core of their policies.<sup>22</sup>

The big difference is that Mr. P. W. Botha seemed willing, if necessary, to split the traditional Afrikaner alliances in order to win the support of "Big Business", to a large extent English-speaking with international connections. The Vorster approach—as revealed at length in the Information Department scandal—was to buy foreign opinion (literally, in the case of the *Washington Star*) by underhand measures. Mr. P. W. Botha in contrast hopes to win the international support that apartheid so disastrously lacks by his new policy; according to Patrick Laurence, the new strategy

... has two recommendations: it creates a buffer between the white elite and the relatively impoverished black masses, and thereby transfers a racial struggle between white and black into an ideological one between capitalism and Marxism.<sup>23</sup>

Those who eagerly anticipate these announced changes, on viewing the product of government deliberations (as opposed to the press releases), on occasion asked whether the government ever planned to introduce the changes in good faith. The *London Times* commented:

It is all very well for Mr. Botha's Minister for Cooperation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, to declare that "apartheid is dead". But as Desmond Tutu, the secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches remarked, they "want to see the corpse first".<sup>24</sup>

Such doubts, perhaps, cannot be resolved at least for the present. But some idea of the pressures involved can be developed by looking at the forces for and against change within the government itself.

#### The forces for and against change

"Big Business" and especially the trans-national corporations operating within South Africa, want more rapid change. As Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, chief of Anglo-American Corporation, South Africa's largest corporation, said in 1976:

In particular, those of us who believe that private enterprise is the system best calculated to widen the areas of individual choice—to open up new opportunities and raise the standard of life—have to show very clearly that this private enterprise system is not something which bears the label "for whites only". In South Africa we need, for our security and for our development, a real unity in the country to resist events such as we have seen taking place in Angola, but it is surely intensely illogical to ask a lot of black people to stand together with whites in order to oppose Communist aggression if, at the same time, by law and custom, they are excluded from most of the benefits which are conferred by the free enterprise system.<sup>25</sup>

Apartheid has provided the mines and factories of free enterprise with cheap labour, which business had no hesitation in exploiting, using labour-intensive methods instead of machines. Indeed the average profit returns on investments

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in South Africa from 1960–1970 were 18.6%, compared to 11% for the rest of the world.<sup>26</sup>

These methods however have become more of a liability than an advantage now. Trans-national corporations are coming under attack in the mother countries and the rest of the world for investment in a racist system. And the cheap labour system itself has begun to look insecure. South Africa has always depended upon its neighbouring countries for a supply of migrant labour, especially for the crucial but dangerous, ill-paid and uncomfortable jobs in the mines. In 1970, 44% of South Africa's black miners came from Mozambique and other "tropical areas" (Angola and Malawi in particular). Another 21% came from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. By the mid-1970s, with socialist-orientated governments in Angola and Mozambique, war in Zimbabwe and Namibia and political conflict on her own borders, and finally a boycott of migrant labour by Malawi, South Africa could not rely upon this supply of migrant labour any more. In fact, Mozambique has not yet officially tried to cut off South Africa's migrant labour supply, but nonetheless, in 1976 Mozambique's migrant labour had dropped to slightly over one-third of its previous supply, and although the number slightly increased in 1977, it decreased again in 1978. By 1977, the migrants from Mozambique and the "tropical areas" made up a bare 14% of the total percentage of black miners. The mines to date have replaced these with men from within South Africa: thus the number of miners from the Cape went up by 2½ times, from the Orange Free State by four times, and so on for the bantustans in all the provinces in the same period (1970–77).<sup>27</sup>

But the bantustans cannot be counted upon as an endless supply of labour at sub-subsistence wage levels and low skills, especially since the 1976 uprising showed that South Africa's black population would not remain quiet forever. Indeed, industry was already pressing for more capital-intensive techniques before the Soweto events. Harry Oppenheimer, head of Anglo-American, told the London Stock Exchange on 18 May 1976:

The increase in black wages (*in the five years before 1976*) reflects the beginning of a process, still actively continuing, of a change-over from a labour-intensive, low-wage, low-productivity economic system—typical of industrial development in its earliest stages—to the capital-intensive, high-wage high-productivity system which characterizes the advanced industrialized countries.

He went on to emphasize that:

... the migrant labour system becomes less and less appropriate from an economic point of view as well as, of course, from a social and moral point of view. This does not mean, unfortunately, that it is to foresee a time when migrant labour, particularly in the gold mining industry, can be completely phased out...<sup>28</sup>

Big business has pushed for a higher level of mechanization. The white elite, however, is not large enough to respond to the demands for skilled workers and trained personnel such a shift would entail. Thus business puts pressure on the

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South African government to create a black skilled working-class, a relatively small segment of the black population which would be more stable, better educated, probably urbanized. Indeed, such a black skilled working-class has already begun to develop, often semi-legally, as business responds to market fluctuations.

This does not, of course, necessarily mean an end to apartheid as a basic means of control over the population; rather, apartheid could be extremely useful during the major social dislocations that such retooling of the economy would bring about. Further, industry still needs a plentiful supply of cheap unskilled labour for the foreseeable future; the bantustans not only supply this, but they provide a 'dumping ground' for those people industry no longer needs (the unemployed, sick, aged and very young) without the expense of a welfare system. But the business community has hoped government would adjust apartheid to cope with its new demands for skilled workers as well.

Both South African-based and trans-national corporations also have a vested interest in the success of South Africa's "constellation of states" foreign policy. Apartheid, paradoxically, curtails South African industry's internal markets by lowering the standard of living of much of the population; South African businesses look longingly at the markets of African states to the north. Independent African states, however, have shown an understandable reluctance to come openly within South Africa's sphere of influence. If South African businesses could point to an apparent improvement in the status of its black population, they might find a more enthusiastic welcome.

These changes are opposed by some white groups. The largest and most organized are the whites-only unions, which have a vested interest in limiting the potential size of the skilled working class to themselves. Many whites too have been wedded to a belief in cheap African labour for so long that they cannot accept the possibility of allowing some Africans to advance. Many whites fear they might lose the apparent privileges the system gives them, such as cheap domestic labour. The white government wavers between these two points of view. It believes in the necessity of rapid and, in traditional apartheid terms, fairly drastic change; on the other hand a white minority government cannot afford to totally alienate a large part of its (white) popular base.

It is impossible to judge how much projected change is honestly intended, and how much is mere window-dressing to appease the forces of change. Certainly some of the announced changes seem to take a very long time from conception to implementation, if they are implemented at all. Others appear purely imaginary from start to finish. But some of the apartheid laws have been altered, and many more may well follow. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely developments since 1976 and assess what is actually happening to the apartheid system.

\* \* \*  
*Between the completion of this book at the end of 1979 and its publication, much has happened. At the level of detail some updating is needed and this is done in a*

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postscript. But the basic analysis and the conclusions have been borne out. The upsurge of resistance across the country has expressed a clear and decisive rejection of the apartheid system in spite of the alleged reforms. And once again the regime, while carrying out a policy of ruthless repression, is announcing imminent changes in a continuation of the policies analysed in this paper.

## Part One: Concessions?

We can be, and are, well on the way to achieving in my country equality for all people before the law and equal chances and opportunities.

Dr. Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, speaking in the U.S., June 1979<sup>1</sup>

The P.W. Botha government claims that it is in the process of dismantling apartheid. It says that it will allow Africans to own homes in the urban areas, to vote for local (township) government, to work in any job and to join trade unions. It says that it will give the townships electricity, that it will do away with Bantu Education and that it will integrate sport. The record of actual concessions certainly does not measure up to these sweeping claims. None the less some changes have been made.

### THE TOWNSHIPS

#### The Community Councils

The first moves towards "wooing the black middle class" were made by the Vorster government. The Community Councils Act passed through Parliament in July 1977. This Act claimed to give a form of "self-government" to the black urban areas to parallel the "self-government" of the bantustans. The community councils would become in theory black counterparts to the town councils of the white areas. But urban Africans would never receive more than purely local authority. The Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, on introducing the Community Council Bill in 1977, stated:

... If people expect . . . that I must disengage the urban blacks from the blacks in the self-governing areas and that I must assimilate him into the white man's politics, I say to you that I am not prepared to do that, nor is it the mandate that I received from the electorate.

... the white must gradually withdraw so that it may ultimately be black government in every respect, but this applies to local government.<sup>2</sup>

The original Community Councils Act empowered the Minister of Bantu Affairs to set up community councils for any urban African residential area. The size of the area is determined by the Minister. The number of members of the council is determined by the Minister. The members of the council are chosen by an electorate determined by the Minister in consultation with the local Administration Board. The Minister may appoint council members to fill any vacancies and the Minister can dissolve any community council whenever

government seems committed to building up a skilled black working class as well, offering them trade union privileges, industrial training, and so on. Other "changes" merely preserve the same institutions in a new form or behind a black face—the community councils, black education, sports policies.

Behind all these changes the white bureaucracy gains larger and larger discretionary powers. Thus, as the *Financial Mail* commented:

A person disqualified by parliament on racial grounds may suddenly acquire rights and privileges at the whim of an official, who is a law unto himself. Yet another disqualified person may be refused or denied the same privilege.<sup>36</sup>

The "concessions" have not led to any significant change:

... Plastering discriminatory laws with exemptions is not the answer. The exemptions are at best a face-saving palliative. The only valid solution is the removal of apartheid laws . . . Wriggle, exempt and concede as it will, the government will not get off the apartheid hook until it takes the only step that counts—and that is to scourge racial discrimination from the Statute Book.<sup>37</sup>

## Part Two: Repression

On 8 November [1979] the Prime Minister said that a reckless or careless Government could turn South Africa into a powderkeg within a matter of days . . . we are now watching the fuse to that powderkeg burn shorter by the day.<sup>1</sup>

*Black Sash Emergency Report*

The creation of a privileged stratum of Africans, however, has an unavoidable corollary: the rest of the African population must be even more firmly controlled. If the government merely aims at creating a small black middle class to support it against the unruly majority—as has been their stated intention—then that majority faces more stringent repression. And to the extent that big business and government turn towards mechanization and the creation of a skilled black working class, there will be increasing black unemployment, with resulting hardship and discontent.

This indeed has been the other side of the coin of Botha's changes. Owing to the impact of the world recession, unemployment has risen disastrously for the black population in South Africa. The Department of Statistics officially claims 9% of economically active Africans are unemployed (501,000 people); the Minister of Manpower Utilization Fanie Botha puts the figure of total unemployment at "over a million" people, of whom most are African.<sup>2</sup> Independent researchers put African unemployment as high as 25%, rising to 27-30% by 1990.<sup>3</sup> Hand in hand with this, the government has cracked down on the unemployed.

### RESIDENCE

#### Tighter Influx Control

First, the government has tightened up the enforcement of the numerous apartheid laws that control the "economically unproductive". In April 1978 the government began a wave of "crime prevention blitzes". Police and army, with guns and fixed bayonets, cordoned off Soweto and Alexandra (on 1 April) and Hillbrow (on 15 April). People entering and leaving the area were searched indiscriminately, ostensibly for "criminals":

The sweep, described by Col. Gert Slabbert, head of the Johannesburg Riot Squad, as "a routine operation" was also designed to pioneer combined

### The Resistance Movement

The largest and most dangerous threat to such plans to save South Africa comes of course from the growing resistance movements, the ANC and PAC. Any chance the new formula has must be measured in terms of a race against time.

On 4 August 1978, African National Congress guerrillas first skirmished with South African troops near Zeerust on the Botswana border. The ANC claimed 10 South African troops were killed; South Africa captured one guerrilla, and did not admit to any losses. (The South African press is well-censored on all "terrorism" stories.) The defence forces used helicopters to search the area, which is hilly and covered with scrub; the ANC also reported that defoliants were sprayed to remove cover.<sup>28</sup>

Since then, there have been more clashes reported when small groups of well armed guerrillas have been intercepted by South African army patrols. All of South Africa's borders are now permanently patrolled by the armed forces, sometimes with dogs. The number of clashes remains uncertain, since South Africa has not always announced them as they occur—they have admitted to four or five. They also have seized several weapons caches, presumably stored for future use. The South African press reported in March 1979, that Botswana police had arrested four black South Africans for possessions of arms: displayed in court were AK-47 rifles, three sub-machine guns, 47 blocks of explosives and a rocket launcher.<sup>29</sup> The independence of Zimbabwe completes the circle of independent states surrounding South Africa from which guerrilla attacks could be launched.

Sabotage has become relatively common. In July 1979 the Defence Force acknowledged over 30 acts of sabotage committed over 12 months. This figure is probably rather low, for instance, in April 1979 an oil-carrying train blew up; the papers labelled it a "mystery explosion". A WRAB liquor store blown up in December 1978 was ascribed to burglary and arson rather than sabotage, despite eye-witness reports of an explosion.<sup>30</sup>

The South African Defence Force has estimated that the ANC has 4,000 people undergoing military training, mostly in Angola, and that many more leave South Africa each year.<sup>31</sup> The Pan Africanist Congress has also guerrilla training camps, in Libya, China and Tanzania.

In May 1979, following the execution by South Africa of guerrilla Solomon Mahlangu, an ANC force attacked a small Soweto police station in Moroka and demolished it, killing a policeman and escaping unscathed. In November 1979, a group of guerrillas attacked the main Soweto police station in Orlando, killing three policemen while sixty off-duty police in a nearby barracks "hid under their beds rather than risk the dash to the main office where their guns were stored".<sup>32</sup>

As the *Guardian* pointed out:

Ironically, the raid came only hours after the Minister for Black Affairs, Dr. Piet Koornhof, announced a new deal for black businessmen as part of a

master-plan to give blacks a better share in South Africa's wealth.<sup>33</sup>

And as the defence White Paper tabled in Parliament in April 1979 remarked: "The military threat against South Africa is intensifying at an alarming rate".<sup>34</sup>

### Conclusion

South Africa's "new dispensation" for Africans, then, provides no more than a face-lift: it attempts to give the Government a "new look" without altering the underlying structure of apartheid. Indeed, in many ways apartheid has grown stronger. Dr. Riekert called his new improved influx control "simplified and streamlined"; the Minister of Co-operation and Development reiterated in July 1979 that the African "would not obtain political rights in white South Africa". Dr. Motlana replied:

One is hesitant to say he is grateful that Dr. Koornhof has now cleared the air with his statement. . . . We are now quite obviously back to square one—doctrinaire, granite hard Verwoerd apartheid.<sup>35</sup>

The clearest affirmation of traditional apartheid values came from Prime Minister P. W. Botha in November 1979:

"I say one man, one vote in this country is out. I now want to say something further: Don't try to do something unconstitutional or you will be sorry for yourself".<sup>36</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that the Botha government has offered the African population some exemptions from the apartheid laws: it has not offered to change the laws. The more clearly this policy emerges, the more clearly emerges the African response. No solution can be accepted that does not give "one man one vote"; or that does not enable the people to control their own destiny. A few extra privileges for a small segment of the population will not save South Africa's apartheid system. Nor, in the end, will the increasingly severe repression that accompanies the concessions.

### POSTSCRIPT September 1980

To what extent and in what ways the events of recent months have involved any significant change in the balance of forces cannot yet be assessed. But it is clear that the new developments have not altered the conditions described or the trends outlined in these pages. If anything, the events of 1980 underscore the analysis of the situation presented here.

This year has seen a nationwide upsurge of organised resistance comparable in extent to that of 1976, if not surpassing it. The state has responded with all the repressive means in its power, together with further moves to devise new ways of adapting apartheid to preserve minority rule. As before, these moves are presented as evidence of enlightenment and reform. Behind them, however, lies a sustained determination to suppress and defeat all forms of resistance.

The unity of different struggles, at work and in the townships, which characterised the strikes and campaigns against rent increases and forced removals at the end of 1979 (see pp. 75-77) showed itself still more visibly in the months that followed. The protests, boycotts, strikes and evident support for increased guerrilla activity such as the simultaneous sabotage in June of the showpiece Sasol oil plants, together amounted to an open expression, on an unprecedented scale, of the complete rejection of the apartheid system. As in the earlier events, those who were intended to benefit from the claimed reforms were active in the struggles.

Along with the suppression of opposition, the regime's response was combined with attempts to divide the oppressed majority by means of a revision of the constitutional proposals outlined on pp. 33-35, and another version of the bantustan policy as part of the "constellation of states" idea. These proposals, along with some for restructuring regional and local government, are far-reaching but, at the time of writing, they remained confused and confusing and in several respects are explicitly presented as merely interim. It is far from clear how they will be implemented. The confusion is indicative of the problems which beset the apartheid regime as it tries to formulate policies which will bring about the "stability" it desires.

The traditional Cabinet committee system has been replaced by five permanent Cabinet Committees containing a considerable number of military representatives.<sup>1</sup> This, and the appointment of General Malan, Chief of the SADF, as Minister of Defence, have made the involvement of the military in politics more prominent, as has the widespread use of the term "total strategy". This term covers strategies and policies which are by and large those analysed in this book, coloured by an urgency resulting from the ever-increasing resistance inside South Africa and the changed situation in Southern Africa following the independence of Zimbabwe. The presence of the military in the government caps its involvement in every sphere in a process initiated in the early 1970's. The process is described in the IDAF Fact Paper *Apartheid War Machine*, published in April 1980, and illustrated by the joint military-police "crime-sweeps" described on p. 45.<sup>2</sup>

As far as the situation of the black majority is concerned, the promised reforms and the "death of apartheid" have not materialised. Conditions have rather worsened.

The widespread school boycott which began in April 1980 demonstrated that in the field of education few, if any, changes had been implemented, as is suggested on pp. 24-5. In many instances conditions have deteriorated, particularly in African and Coloured schools.

In April the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament that the changes in the "influx control" system recommended by the Riekert Report were a "change in mechanism, not a change in policy".<sup>3</sup> The only really major proposal to have been implemented is still the R500 fine on employers taking on unregistered labour.<sup>4</sup> Further reports from Black Sash Advice Offices indicate that the pass laws are

being more strictly applied and that workseekers from rural areas are finding it more difficult to get jobs in urban areas.<sup>5</sup> The consequences of such restrictions and of other forms of "relocation" to the bantustans, with very high levels of black unemployment and the absence of employment opportunities in the bantustans, continue to be brought to light, both by researchers and by events like the recent drought in KwaZulu and elsewhere. The drought exacerbated and drew attention to a situation which was already critical in terms of poverty, starvation, infant mortality and morbidity, and which is a direct result of government policies.<sup>6</sup>

In the labour field there was a major wave of action involving many thousands of workers. In its response the state showed its determination to try to force workers into acceptance of its "conciliation machinery" and its readiness to use the existence of that machinery as a justification for strike-breaking.

As in the strikes in Port Elizabeth in December 1979, described on pp. 75-77, some notable victories were achieved by workers organising outside the government-approved framework,<sup>7</sup> and support in the townships again played an important part. But state intervention, already substantial, assumed increasing proportions, with the detention of union organizers, mass arrests of strikers for "illegally striking" and "riotous assembly", the deportation of striking contract workers to the bantustans, and the banning of leaflets produced to mobilise support for the strikers in the townships.<sup>8</sup> Police action was used to break the strike by 10,000 Johannesburg municipal workers after the Minister of Manpower Utilisation had declared that the strike had "by-passed the conciliation machinery".<sup>9</sup> 1,200 contract workers were put on buses at their hostels and despatched to the bantustans, and the president of their union arrested and charged, together with two other officers of the union, with "sabotage".<sup>10</sup>

Notably, in the wake of the setting up of a shop-steward system by three firms in the Eastern Cape motor industry in September, the Minister of Manpower Utilisation said, in what was interpreted as a hint of change, that management should deal with whatever leadership group had credibility among the workers. But he insisted that black unions would have to be brought under "statutory control" to avoid them "becoming the prey of our enemies".<sup>11</sup>

The actions against trade unionists and workers were part of the suppression of the struggle on many fronts, in workplaces, educational institutions, in the townships. By the end of June 393 people had been detained under the security laws, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations. A number of leading figures in the black community had been banned (including Thozamile Botha and other PEBCO officers). All meetings "of a political nature" of more than ten people were prohibited for two and a half months. Arrests of protesting pupils and students and others took place by the hundred, while police attacks on meetings, with baton charges and teargas, were frequent. Police shootings were estimated by the press to have left over 40 people dead in Cape Town, Bloemfontein, Durban and the Eastern Cape. The full scale of the police actions

could not be known as still further restrictions were placed on access by the press to areas of police actions.<sup>12</sup>

As the repression intensified and the resistance spread, the Schlegelbusch Commission on the constitution issued an interim report in May containing a number of proposals almost immediately implemented by the government.<sup>13</sup> One result was the power to appoint 12 additional MPs to Parliament without the need for election, a device used in September to bring General Malan into the Cabinet and which contributed to the process by which the Prime Minister has restructured government and administration in a way that brings it more firmly under his control.<sup>14</sup>

There was also a scheme to pave the way for yet another "new political dispensation". Its centre-piece is a President's Council consisting of 60 White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese members appointed by the President. It is a purely consultative body and its creation was presented as an interim measure whose principal function appears to be to produce ideas for further constitutional developments.<sup>15</sup> In an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the rejection of the 1979 Constitution Bill, based on its exclusion of Africans (see p. 33) the Government proposed setting up a separate Black Advisory Council with which the President's Council could liaise. Faced with calls to include Africans on the President's Council, the Prime Minister explained that it was out of the question, "an insurmountable obstacle".<sup>16</sup> As he had confirmed earlier in the year, his policies were turning out to be a reformulation of and not a move away from "separate development".<sup>17</sup> He insisted that while the Government was prepared to create consultative bodies for Coloured, African and Indian leaders, it was not prepared to do so on the condition that it accepted majority rule in South Africa. "If confrontation must come over that," he said "then it must come".<sup>18</sup>

With the failure of the proposal for a Black Advisory council to win any support, the Prime Minister dropped it and instead launched a new round of talks with bantustan leaders to promote the "constellation of states" version of bantustan policy.<sup>19</sup> While the propaganda for this emphasises the economic interdependence of all of South Africa and the impossibility of any part being a viably independent economic unit,<sup>20</sup> political "independence" remains a keystone of the policy. Senior Government officials confirmed that "non-independent" bantustans would be excluded from decision-making in the "multilateral development bank" which is to be the centre-piece of the scheme.<sup>21</sup>

A similar adherence to the basic principles of apartheid was evident in the launching of talks in September on a proposed mixed metropolitan government system to replace the present system of provincial and local government. "Reliable sources" made clear that the Government was prepared to negotiate details of the system with Coloured and Indian leaders; that Africans would be excluded as the Government was planning to create autonomous municipalities in the black urban areas; and that the metropolitan board scheme would stick to the group areas and separate development policies, but at the same time provide

another forum where Whites, Indians and Coloureds would have some share in decision-making.<sup>22</sup>

Whatever else happened in the first part of 1980, apartheid was shown to be neither dead nor in the course of being destroyed by the regime. An increasing number of observers came to realise this. A *Times* journalist wrote in July: "For all Mr. Botha's talk of the need for change, what he essentially wants to do is to adapt apartheid to present-day conditions and certainly not to dismantle it",<sup>23</sup> while a review in August in the *Sunday Express* concluded: "The pattern which is emerging is a reformulation of the basic principles of apartheid while forging ahead with peripheral change and economic reform".<sup>24</sup>

More bitterly, the Editor of the *Post* wrote:

The Prime Minister's alleged bold initiatives have remained largely undefined, while many South Africans are beating each other on the shoulder about the non-existent changes that have taken place in South Africa.

They have an almost maniacal hatred for anybody who asks just what has changed in South Africa today?<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile, faced with increased guerilla activity as well as increased mass activity, the regime continues preparing on every front for intensified efforts to try to save apartheid from the forces of resistance and liberation.

# THE GREAT WHITE HOAX

South Africa's  
international propaganda machine



"... In countries abroad we must have every means at our disposal in order that we may present the image of South Africa as it is, namely that of a beautiful, prosperous country, in which law and order prevails and . . . whose, in an atmosphere of peace and calm, numerous peoples, with different languages, cultures, religions and traditions are living together in an orderly manner . . . an example to the whole world."

59

REA African Minister of Information, Dr. C.P. Mulder.

## THE GREAT WHITE HOAX

**Laws for the Protection of German blood and German honour, Nuremberg, 15/9/35.**

**Section 1.** "Marriages between Jews and citizens of German or kindred blood are forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even if, for the purpose of evading this law, they were concluded abroad."

**This Nazi law** is today the South African Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949, in every detail. White South Africa simply changed "Jew" to "non-white" and "German or kindred blood" to "white". This law is still in force.

**Section 2.** "Sexual relations between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are forbidden."

**This Nazi law** is today the South African Immorality Act, No. 21 of 1950, in every detail. White South Africa simply changed "Jews" and "nationals of German or kindred blood" to "black persons" and "white persons". This law is still in force.

**Section 3.** "Jews are not permitted to employ female citizens of German or kindred blood as domestic servants."

**This Nazi law** is today incorporated in the South African Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, Section 77, with "Jews" changed to "non-whites" and "German or kindred blood" changed to "whites". The South African law is even more racist, as the South African Minister of Labour made clear on September 9, 1971 that "no white is allowed to work under a non-white in South Africa". This law is still in force.

### **The Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935.**

**Article 2.** "A citizen of the Reich can be that subject only who is of German or kindred blood. Only the citizen of the Reich enjoys full political rights."

**Article 4.** "A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote in political affairs and cannot occupy public office."

**These Nazi laws** are today the South African Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, No. 26 of 1970, which deprives all black South Africans of citizenship of the Republic of South Africa where most of them were born, as well as political and voting rights in the Republic. White South Africa has simply changed "Reich" to "Republic", "German or kindred blood" to "white", and "Jew" to "Bantu". This law is still in force.

## Foreword

"If you are going to tell a lie, tell a big one". This was the famous dictum of Hitler's propagandist, Dr. Goebbels. Many people wonder how South Africa's apartheid system which is based on the discrimination against the majority of the people of that country can survive.

One answer to this is that the truth about South Africa is hidden from us by one of the most effective lie machines in history.

This report is about how the South African Government, with the support of some wealthy whites, uses every available means and millions of their tax payers' money to defend the apartheid system.

## Acknowledgement:

The Africa Bureau would like to thank the International Defence and Aid Fund for access to the sources of their research and information department.

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One of three advertisements questioned: "Could the Next Olympics be in Pretoria, South Africa?" Another asked: "Could an organisation like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?" And the third read: "Could the Headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Africa be in Johannesburg, South Africa?"

The advertisements were placed, between 1974 and 1975, in leading newspapers and magazines in Britain, United States, and Austria at a total cost of R182,927-92.

These three advertisements have since appeared in West Germany, Holland and France. More recently, plans were drawn up for the publicity of the 'independence' of the Transkei. In March, 1976, Dr Mulder asked Parliament to vote his Department an increase of R500,000. He said, "R420,000 is mainly required for publicity . . . for publications, for guests from various countries to attend the independence celebrations, for TV teams to film the event with a view to wide publicity and so forth. Films and publications will be prepared in this regard to bring the matter to the notice of the world in a really big way. In order to begin this enterprise we need this amount . . . it is true that another amount will be added to this. This is just the initial cost".

## Films

According to the Department of Information's yearly report for 1975, films were shown in 26 countries to an estimated 13 million people, while in the United States 28 million people saw the Department's films on television. Despite a Peronist press law which restricts overseas news coverage to 25% of total content, two television programmes on South Africa were shown on Argentina's television. The SA ambassador, the Information counsellor and former guests of the Department all took part in the programmes. Before that a number of DOI films dubbed in Spanish were screened on Argentina's television service. In Rhodesia, according to the report, thirty two weekly programmes about South Africa were shown in a television series called, "South of the Border". Twenty seven of these programmes included Department of Information films and the other five programmes were panel discussions in which SA information officers took part. The Department also supplied the Rhodesian Ministry of Information with ten of its films which were screened in tribal areas.

## Publications

The Department of Information prints half a million copies of its publications abroad in thirteen languages. It has also published a book on *Communism* by J. A. du Plessis head of research at the Foreign Affairs Association, F.R. Metrowitch, Director of the Southern African Freedom Foundation, C.F. de Villiers, Director of the Foreign Affairs Association.

## Department of Information publications produced and distributed in 1975:

### PUBLISHED IN SOUTH AFRICA

Name of publication	Frequency	Languages	Readership target	Circulation per issue
Alpha	10 x per annum	Afr. – Eng.	Coloured	20 000
Bantu	Monthly	Afrikaans	General*	17 000
Bantu	Monthly	English	General*	53 722
Bantu Education Journal	10 x per annum	Afr. – Eng.	Bantu teachers	40 000
Comment & Opinion	Weekly	English	General*	65 000
Die Taak	Monthly	Afr. – Eng.	SWA Coloureds and Rehobothers	15 000
Eume	Monthly	Ndonga-Kwanyama	Ovambo	25 000
Fiat Lux	Monthly	Afr. – Eng.	Indian	15 000
Ikhwezi Naledi	Monthly	Xhosa	Xhosa	49 742
Inkqubela	Monthly	Xhosa	Xhosa	70 291
Intuthuko	Monthly	Zulu	Zulu	68 127
Izindaba	Monthly	Zulu	Zulu	30 000
Kavangudi	Bi-monthly	Kwangali	Kavango	8 000
Mbvela-Phanda	Monthly	Venda	Venda	31 813
Nhluvuko	Monthly	Tsonga	Tsonga	44 621
Ozombuze	Bi-monthly	Herero	Herero	10 948
SA Digest	Weekly	English	General*	107 939
SA Oorsig	Weekly	Afrikaans	General*	19 090
SA Panorama	Monthly	Afrikaans	General*	30 850
SA Panorama	Monthly	English	General*	117 321
Sari Aob	Bi-Monthly	Nama	Nama and Damara	10 223
Tswelolepele	Monthly	Tswana	Tswana	72 526
Tswelolepele	Monthly	North Sotho	North Sotho	77 633
Tswelolepele	Monthly	South Sotho	South Sotho	52 902
Total: 24	*Local and abroad		Total circulation :	1 052 748

### PUBLISHED ABROAD

Name of publication	Where published	Frequency	Language	Circulation per issue
SA Panorama	Berne	Bi-monthly	French	32 500
SA Panorama	Berne	Bi-monthly	German	86 500
SA Panorama	Berne	Bi-monthly	Italian	24 000
SA Panorama	Berne	Bi-monthly	Portuguese	18 500
SA Panorama	Berne	Quarterly	Spanish	23 000
SA Panorama	Berne	Quarterly	Dutch	38.000
Revue Sudafrica	Berne	8 x per an.	German	5 000
Beelden	Brussels	Monthly	Dutch	12 800
Images	Brussels	Monthly	French	9 300

Service de Presse Sud-Africain	Brussels	Bi-monthly	French	300
Zuid-Afrikaanse Persdient	Brussels	Bi-monthly	Dutch	300
Sud Africa Informa	Buenos Aires	Bi-monthly	Spanish	1 000
Journal Sudafrica	Bonn	Monthly	German	45 000
RSA Pressebericht	Bonn	Weekly	German	530
South African Review	Canberra	Monthly	English	8 000
South African News Release	Canberra	Quarterly	English	80
Noticias da Africa do Sul	Lisbon	Monthly	Portuguese	11 000
Noticias de Africa del Sur	Lisbon	Monthly	Spanish	8 000
Report from South Africa	London	Monthly	English	16 000
South African Press Mirror	London	Weekly	English	3 750
South African Scope	New York	Monthly	English	37 000
l'Afrique du Sud d'aujourd'hui	Paris	Monthly	French	13 000
Sud Africa Ieri. Oggi. Domani	Rome	Monthly	Italian	14 000
Settimana Sudafricana	Rome	Weekly	Italian	5 600
Zuidafrikaanse Koerier	The Hague	Monthly	Dutch	26 500
Nieuwsbulletin	The Hague	Weekly	Dutch	8 000
Heute aus Südafrika	Vienna	Weekly	German	460
Südafrika Kompass	Vienna	Monthly	German	5 800
Total: 28		Total circulation :		454 920

The official *South Africa Year Book* was brought up to date and published in 1975 in English and in Afrikaans. The book is over 2000 pages long and the cost of compiling the information was R220,000 – nearly ¼ million rand. The cost of printing the 1975 edition was R150,000 making a total production and printing cost of R370,000. The average cost of each book (7450 printed) was just under R50.

#### THE INTERNAL PROPAGANDA MACHINE by Julian Burgess

Propaganda for international consumption is an extension of the massive propaganda campaign directed at the citizens of South Africa. South Africans are faced with a monolithic machine that co-ordinates all aspects of government activity. All South Africans are subjected to this pervasive propaganda, both implicitly and explicitly from the time they are born. The administration of the country in terms of the separate social facilities and the ban on racial mixing has an implicit psychological effect which tends to harden racial tendencies. Explicitly, the machinery of government, through the education system, the armed forces, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), operates as a direct medium for propaganda.

The propaganda message is different for each population category. The ideology of apartheid is most strongly expressed in the Afrikaans community where it is combined with the fervour of Afrikaner patriotism. There is a cultural cohesion amongst the Afrikaners in which the Dutch Reformed Church plays a dominant role. The belief is a God-given right to rule.

These beliefs are built into the education system, known as Christian National Education (CNE). Because of its bias in favour of one white racial group CNE has been described as being neither Christian nor National

nor Education. The accent in the school syllabus, particularly the history sector, is on the triumphs and tribulations of the Boers, their persecution by the British, their victories over the blacks and of the bitterness of the concentration camps operated by the British during the Boer War.

These secular, historical and cultural events are projected on the community as a whole. The Boer victory over the Zulus is celebrated as a national holiday and there are a number of other purely white public holidays. These are celebrated by religious ceremonies, displays by the military forces and emotional speeches over the SABC.

The military forces play a major role in indoctrinating the youth of the country. Emphasis on the evils of communism (which is used to cover any sort of opposition to the regime) and a high degree of military awareness and patriotism is part of the propaganda machine. The drumbeat of patriotism makes it possible to confuse the criticism of the apartheid administration with the criticism of South Africa itself.

Both the press, particularly the Afrikaner press which supports the government, and the SABC play a major role in this process. Developments in the Bantustans are lauded, as is any event from which South Africans can extract any credit, while critics of the government are slated with no opportunity of replying. At the same time a constant effort is made to show South Africans what a mess the rest of the world is in. Particular targets for abuse are the African states, the United Nations and Britain. The first is meant to show the dangers of majority rule, the second is a response to the continued criticism of South Africa at the UN while the third, Britain, is an illustration of the dangers of socialism and liberalism.

The Department of Information plays a particular role in propagating the Bantustan policy to South Africans, especially to blacks. Part of its campaign is directed at explaining the Bantustan policies and the reasons for the elections held in these territories.

A total of 24 different DOI publications were printed in 1975 in all the tribal languages in South Africa, including English and Afrikaans, with a total print order of over one million. One of these magazines is distributed to the Department of Bantu Education for circulation among black teachers. Another Department of Information booklet called *Progress of a People*, published half in Afrikaans and half in English, was distributed through Coloured schools during the general election for the Coloured Persons Representative Council in March 1975. It indirectly boosted the Federal Party which is sympathetic to official policy on apartheid. The Coloured Labour Party demanded that these glossy booklets – more than 100,000 – be withheld until after the election.

The overall aim of propaganda for whites in South Africa is to keep Afrikaner nationalism at a high pitch while maintaining white solidarity by exploiting the fear of black domination. The accent on Afrikanerdom does cause divisions amongst the white population. Paradoxically, this tension

between the English and the Afrikaans caused by the political domination of the latter helps to obscure the far more important issue of the dangers of white domination of the black majority. There can be no gainsaying the overwhelming success of the propaganda machine amongst the white population.

Propaganda for blacks is directed at persuading them that the Bantustan policy provides the political opportunities equal to those enjoyed by the whites. South Africa's massive arms expenditure, security forces, its draconian legislation against political dissent and its huge internal and external propaganda machine are all evidence of their conspicuous failure on this front.

#### Books bought from SA publishers by the Department of Information in 1975.

Title	Number	Cost
SA Mosaic 1974	25,000	R 90,000
SA – A Visual History	7,500	75,000
Tourist Guide to SA	100	37,430
Splendours of SA	300	1,990
Towards Dialogue and Detente	366	1,492
SWA Annual 1975	450	810
The Black Worker of SA	6,500	19,900
Swart Tuislande in Suid Afrika	5,000	
Africa at a Glance	150	238,560
Stepping Into the Future	80,000	
SA Progress	9,000	40,500
Education of Whites in the Republic of SA	20	60
SA – 500 Years of History of SA	25	239
South Africa	70	541
The Magic World of the Xhosa	25	181
This is South West Africa	7	35

#### SABC TV by Rosanne Harvey

Television was beamed into white South African homes, across 20% of the country, on 5th January, 1976. Afrikaners viewed the arrival of television with mixed feelings. The opponents in parliament and in the church thought television would destroy the Afrikaner's identity, language and way of life. Their critics would say that these Afrikaners are afraid that television will create envy and discontent among their black farm workers, and provide a glimpse of neighbouring liberation struggles.

The Prime Minister who officially opened the service said in his broadcast: "I must confess that as a person who was not over-enthusiastic about the

introduction of television, I am pleasantly surprised with what I've seen so far. . . . Television has brought the world to our doorsteps and into our living rooms and no longer can it be said that one half of the world does not know how the other half lives. This of course has its advantages. It also brings with it certain responsibilities because even now already we can see how easy it is to create and instil wrong impressions about peoples and countries by slanted news and pictures and unbalanced presentation of facts. South Africa, unfortunately, has long been the victim of such".

But the Afrikaner opponents of television need not fear that the Government has not taken care of these responsibilities. The Chairman and the Board of Governors who decide SABC TV policy were all appointed by the President of the Senate and represent the Afrikaans-speaking, Nationalist section of the electorate. The Chairman is Dr. Piet Meyer, one of the architects of Afrikaner nationalism and an ex-chairman of the secret Afrikaner society, the Broederbond. The Director General, Mr Jan Swanepoel, both his deputies and the Director of Programmes, Mr Pieter de Bruyn, are all Afrikaners. Broadcasting falls under the Ministry of Dr. Piet Koornhof, another member of the Broederbond.

It was the SABC's decision to favour the Afrikaans Press giant, Perskor, by giving it details of TV programmes two weeks before the rest of South Africa's Press.

It is a television channel run by whites for whites. Fifty per cent of the programmes are in English and fifty per cent in Afrikaans. Of the five hour transmission time each night, 2½ hours goes out in English and 2½ hours in Afrikaans and the two services take it in turns for the first half. Each department has two heads, one English and one Afrikaans-speaking, and two separate staffs.

Economically and practically, South Africa should have one service for all South Africans, white and black. Instead the Government plans a separate television service for blacks in urban areas to go on air in about three years time, in 1980. Like its white counterpart, "Bantu" television will be broadcast in two languages and the programmes will go out in the Zulu and Xhosa languages. At first the programmes will be shown in the black urban areas surrounding Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Places like Soweto, the fifth largest city south of the Sahara, with an estimated population of over one million blacks living in identical, concrete slums. Thousands are on the waiting lists for houses and thousands more live there illegally. *The mass of Sowetans do not have the money to hire or buy a television set (£600 for a colour and £250 for a black and white set), nor do they have electricity to plug in television sets.*

In a poll taken in Soweto by black reporters on the *Star* which asked whether, given the choice, it was preferable to provide a television service or free education for all Africans, an overwhelming majority plumped for the latter. 522 questionnaires were completed and of these 501

occupy between 5 to 15% of the total number of beds available to the public in "International" hotels, nor that non whites may not use the dance floor, men-only bars, or the swimming pool if they are not resident in the hotel.

There are segregated hotels for South Africa's 20 million non whites; 2 for blacks only, 1 for Coloureds and 8 for Asians. Alternatively there are 20 hotels for Asians and for Coloureds, 15 hotels for Asians, blacks and Coloureds and 1 hotel for Asians and blacks. Not one of these hotels, in 1975, was extended any financial assistance or grants in aid from the government.

In 1975, the Department of Tourism was voted an increase in funds from R3.3 million to R4.8 million. Out of this, SATOUR, the South African Tourist Authority, was awarded R1.3 million for the year to increase its budget to R4 million. SATOUR is a statutory body which promotes South Africa from its several offices abroad. Mr Marais Steyn is the Chairman of a board of seven members who are each appointed by the State President.

In spite of the increased budget, SATOUR was acutely embarrassed by the findings of a Government commissioned survey by the Bureau of Economic Research of Stellenbosch University that SATOUR was responsible for attracting only 2.4 per cent of foreign visitors. This meant that SATOUR could only take credit for about R5 million of the total R275 million generated by foreign visitors (SA Sunday Times, 2.11.76).

Much of the SATOUR budget is spent on expensive looking brochures selling white South Africa. Among them is the glossy *Discover South Africa*. In it, the whites are pictured on beaches, golf courses, on surf boards, and sitting in rickshaws. White women are dressed in bikinis. The blacks are shown dancing in tribal costume, riding on ostriches and pulling rickshaws. Black women are bare breasted. The whites live in sky scrapers and hotels. The blacks live in mud or corrugated iron huts. We are told: "Visitors to South Africa usually see the Mapoch settlements near Pretoria. Here the colours are brighter as commercially available paints are used. In outlying areas, however, natural earth colours are employed". This may be because it was recommended that "Africans living alongside main roads in South Africa should be given better housing so as to improve the country's image with foreign tourists," by delegates to a tourism conference held in Johannesburg by the Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce. (SA Sunday Times 25.11.1973).

*An Invitation to South Africa* best demonstrates the pooled resources of propaganda agency, Departments of Information and Tourism, SATOUR, SAA, and author. The book, published by Neville Spearman in 1974, is written by author Gerald Sparrow, the organiser of the secret Club of Ten. It is the result of two trips to South Africa, one of them paid for by South African Airways (SAA) in 1972. On that occasion, Mr Sparrow met the Secretary of Information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie. The photographs in the book are courtesy of SATOUR.

Pages from *An Invitation to South Africa*:

Page 15: Politics do not concern the visiting tourist as a rule but he needs to know that this system (apartheid) exists. It has ensured peace and security for nearly seventy years for Africans and Europeans alike. (author's italics).

Page 13: South Africa is a multi racial nation, the largest single group being white South Africans who are made up of men and women of Dutch, English, German, French and, to a lesser extent, immigrants from other European countries. ". . . . It is a common misunderstanding to think that all the black citizens are one large body. However, white and black have equal citizenship, equal protection under the law and equal access to the courts which are acknowledged to be independent and of the highest standard".

Page 23: "The hotel direction will be white and you will travel by white transport. This is the custom of the country and way of life of South Africa and you will find when you get to know the real background that separation works and is a big factor in assuring that black and white live at peace with one another.

Page 50: "The taxis are segregated but you will probably not notice this".

Foreign Relations Committee and other politicians. Dr Mulder met Vice-Admiral Ray Peet, deputy assistant secretary in International Security Affairs, whose responsibilities include such matters as the arms embargo against South Africa. It was the Department of Information rather than the Department of Foreign Affairs that paved the way for the Chief of the SA Defence Force, Admiral H.H. Biermann, to meet Vice Admiral Peet and the Acting Secretary of the US Navy, William Middendorf in May, 1974.

Dr Rhoodie visited the States the same year, in October, carrying top secret dispatches, including a letter informing the President of an impending Russian presence at Nacala in Mozambique and the details of Soviet co-operation with FRELIMO.

It was Dr Rhoodie, together with General van den Bergh the head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), who prepared the groundwork for the meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Dr Rhoodie and General van den Bergh accompanied Mr Vorster on his visit to meet the President. It was the first meeting between Vorster and an African head of state since Mr Vorster's meeting with Dr Banda in 1971. The South African party met representatives of the Senegal, Gabon and Zambian Governments. Dr Rhoodie met and invited a number of



Dinner in Zurich for Prime Minister John Vorster, General van den Bergh (seated beneath the flag) and Dr Henry Kissinger on 9th May 1976. (Picture by Popperfoto)

newspaper editors to South Africa as guests of the Department of Information.

The PR work was so successful that, in November 1975, a South African Airways jumbo jet touched down at Abidjan on its first scheduled flight to a Black African State since 1961. Great numbers of press men and photographers were there to record the event. The surprised passengers had been told the plane would touch down at Las Palmas on its way to Johannesburg. They were not allowed to disembark at Abidjan. The first official passengers to climb on board the plane were Dr Rhoodie and Mr Brand Fourie - Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were welcomed by Denys Rhoodie who had travelled on the plane from London.

The Department of Information has kept up its relationship with the Ivory Coast. Dr Mulder met President Houphouet-Boigny again in May, 1976.

In August, 1976, Messrs Mulder and Rhoodie visited the United States where they had talks with the public relations firm, Sydney S Baron which deals with South Africa's affairs in America, and with their Washington lobbyists. From there, the information officers flew to Canada to attend the Montreal Games despite a ban on South Africa's participation in the Olympics. On the flight back to South Africa, Mr Mulder again stopped off at Abidjan for talks with the Ivory Coast Minister of Information, Mr Dona-Fologo, who was invited to South Africa as a guest of the Department.

#### Information Branch: Foreign Information

The Department is represented abroad by its offices in 17 countries: Austria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Rhodesia, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany. It plans to open offices in Brazil and Japan. For the first time, four black information officers were posted in 1976 to embassies in London, New York, Paris and Cologne.

The information officer's job is to feed information to journalists, politicians and businessmen, to compile the DOI publications, to arrange film shows, talks and television appearances. An essential part of the information officer's work is to seek out the opinion formers and decision makers and invite them to "see South Africa for themselves". Official guests are then shown "homeland" and urban African areas, Coloured and Indian universities, Simonstown and the Mala Mala game reserve.

They meet a wide range of government officials, politicians, newspapermen, academics and representatives of organisations like the Industrial Development Corporation and the Bantu Investment Corporation. Interviews are arranged with members of the opposition United and Progressive/Reform parties and Coloured and Indian political leaders. Chief Buthelezi of Kwa Zulu is much in demand. Mr Arthur Grobbelaar, General Secretary of the multi-racial Trade Union Council of South Africa, once complained in an interview (*Rand Daily Mail*: 12.9.75) that he was having to spend up to four hours a week being cross-examined by overseas visitors. Some organisations

and helped to arrange the meetings and itineraries of thousands more who visit South Africa under their own steam.

The Foundation's political contacts and activities absorb an enormous amount of time and money. In 1965, the Foundation went to considerable efforts to try and stop the Netherlands Government from giving a contribution of R20,000 for legal aid to SA political prisoners. It campaigned, in the sixties, to break the British embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. In 1974 and 1975 the SAF concentrated on boosting Prime Minister Vorster's detente policies. In 1975, Dr Marais visited the United States where he met 10 Senators, and leading members of the House of Representatives, senior officials of the State and Defence Departments and the editorial boards of the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Time* and *Newsweek*. Since then Dr Marais has stepped up his foreign visits. He has visited Zambia where he met Dr Kaunda. His programme for October and November, 1976, included visits to Tokyo, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Miami, London and Geneva. It ended with a major seminar on investment in South Africa held in Dusseldorf. The list of speakers at the seminar included the SA Minister of Finance, Dr Horwood and puppet black chiefs such as Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and Chief Sebe of the Ciskei.

The Foundation brings out a number of publications of its own. The monthly magazine, *Perspective*, was replaced by the quarterly publication called *South Africa International* which is sent to some 9,000 people abroad who have all had initial personal contact with the Foundation. It also publishes the *South Africa Foundation News* which is distributed free to its members and to politicians, journalists and businessmen and to libraries and academic institutions. Great emphasis is given to evidence of "understanding" in Western countries of the government's policies, and to favourable reports on South Africa from visitors. For instance, in the *SAF News* of April, 1976, it reported:

"Back from South Africa, Tory ex Minister Eldon Griffiths wrote a penetrating article in the London *Daily Telegraph* entitled, 'South Africa Keeps its Cool', which concluded: 'Which African country has the freest Press, the most independent courts of law and is immune to military intervention in its parliamentary government? The answer is that nation which has the healthiest, best educated and most prosperous black population in the continent - South Africa'".

Both magazines take up the familiar themes of SA propaganda; the opportunities for foreign investors, the welfare of the blacks, the communist menace and the need for foreign investment to prevent black unemployment. No mention is made of the fact that even at the height of the SA boom in 1974 there were an estimated 1 million black unemployed.

The Foundation influences the Press partly through its own direct efforts, and partly as a result of articles written by their guests. In 1974, the former

Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer and Speaker of the House of Commons, Selwyn Lloyd, visited South Africa, courtesy of the Foundation, and then wrote an article for the *Readers Digest* in 1974, which repeated all the standard white SA propaganda about its history and the current living standards of the blacks. The article was reproduced and distributed free by the Department of Information offices overseas.

The Foundation is responsible for several column inches of print in pro-South African supplements and features, one of its most effective propaganda weapons in the battle for increased foreign investment. In one such supplement, published by the French financial daily, *Les Echos*, nine of the thirteen articles were written by the Paris Director of the Foundation.


*The Investors' Chronicle* published a supplement on South Africa in 1975 which carried several pages of advertising from SA companies and an article on "detente" by Richard Blausten. It was, according to a Foundation spokesman, almost entirely written from material supplied by the Foundation. In it, Mr Blausten quoted a figure of R4.6 million aid given to black Africa by South Africa. Even this figure is low compared to aid given by major donors to the African continent. But it makes an interesting contrast to the "some R100,000,000 aid quoted by Mr John Chettle, the Foundation's Director for North and South America, when he gave evidence to the Africa sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *The SAF News* did not miss the opportunity of quoting from Blausten's article including his favourable comments on the Foundation.

Not all the efforts of the SA Foundation have been so successful. A sponsored visit by Philip Decraene of *Le Monde* did not prevent him from writing a "highly aggressive" article on the release of the film *Last Grave at Dimbaza*. The front page of the *SAF News* commented sourly on his attack but was comforted that Mr Decraene had written several other articles in which he had given "a more than adequate picture of the complexities of the South African situation". When the *Financial Mail* commented on the Foundation's embarrassment the Foundation sent an angry reply protesting about the film. The editor replied that criticism of South Africa's politics, no matter how severe, should not be confused with criticism of South Africa. Advice which would deprive the SA Foundation of one of its main weapons.

#### The Trust Bank

Dr Jan Marais, chairman of the Foundation and of the Trust Bank, ran a campaign in September, 1973, to promote foreign investment and trade in South Africa. The Trust Bank paid for a series of advertisements placed in foreign newspapers which featured life sized profiles of three African leaders in South Africa accompanied by a signed statement from each.

The three leaders were the Chief Executive Councilor of the Kwa Zulu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi; the Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope and Mrs Lucy Mvubelo, secretary of the National Union of Clothing



#### Economic sanctions make me shudder.

"I have often expressed my differences with the white government of Pretoria in no uncertain terms. But the mere idea of total economic sanctions from abroad to assist us, makes me shudder. We, the black people, will be the first to suffer."

L. M. Mangope  
9/8/73

Chief Minister L.M. Mangope,  
Bophuthatswana Government

Workers in South Africa. Mrs Mvubelo's statement said that she doubted whether any suggestions for alternatives to the apartheid system would be desirable or effective for Africans in South Africa. (*Rand Daily Mail*: 27.9.1973).

The advertisements appeared in New Zealand, Australia, United States and Britain.

#### THE BROEDERBOND BUSINESS LOBBY by Rosanne Harvey

When the Nationalist Party swept into power in 1948 one of its first objectives was to establish Afrikaner dominance in big business which was then mainly in the hands of English and Jewish South Africans. This was achieved by channelling Afrikaner savings into Nationalist Party linked insurance companies like SANLAM and the Volkskas Bank to back selected Afrikaner businessmen. This scheme was coordinated by the Broederbond (Brotherhood), a secret society dedicated to strengthening and promoting the cultural, political and financial supremacy of the Afrikaners.

The Bond was formed in 1918 but later, in 1924, was banned by the British and driven underground. It grew in numbers with the rising tide of

Afrikaner nationalism. Before and during the war the Bond acquired a strong Nazi character through a fascist organisation called Ossewa Brandwag. The victory of the Nationalist Party after the war in 1948 was a victory for the Bond. Dr Malan was elected Prime Minister and, according to Mr Vorster, every Prime Minister since Dr Malan has been a member of the Broederbond. There are Bond members in the cabinet, in the government, the civil service, secret police, armed forces, educational institutions, and leading Afrikaner financial and industrial organisations.

One of the Bond's most successful ventures was the Volkskas bank which was formed in 1934 to promote Afrikaner business. It started as a people's bank with a capital of £615. Within three months the shares had risen to 5,000 and the assets of the bank to £1,000,000. When he resigned from the chairmanship of the bank in 1944, Prof L.J. du Plessis announced that the bank had outgrown itself as a small concern and was to become a commercial bank.

Prof. du Plessis then became chairman of the Federale van Afrikaanse Kunsverenigings (FAK) which was conceived by the Bond primarily as a cultural body. FAK organised a national convention in 1944 at which Prof. du Plessis helped to establish the Reddingsdaadbond whose purpose was to help poor Afrikaner whites but which collected money from poor whites, through its 370 branches, to finance the takeover of leading banks, factories, firms, stores and hospitals. In the sixties it was reported that Prof du Plessis was the chairman of the Broederbond.

One man who benefited from the help given to selected Afrikaner businessmen by Nationalist Party linked banks and companies was Dr Anton Rupert. In 1948 Dr Rupert formed the Rembrandt tobacco company. Since then Volkskas have been Rembrandt's bankers. SANLAM Bonus Investment Corporation agreed to buy at least one share issue by Rembrandt in the fifties.

Rupert and Rembrandt have close connections with the Nationalist Party and the Broederbond. In 1951 Dr Nico Diederichs was the chairman of Rembrandt. Dr Diederichs, an architect of the Broederbond movement and of the Reddingsdaadbond, later became Mr Vorster's Minister of Finance. Mr Ivan Makepeace Lombard, former Chairman of Rembrandt, was the Broederbond's first General Secretary. Dr Piet Meyer now Chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and a former Chairman of the Broederbond was, in the fifties, head of the Rembrandt liaison department. Rupert was revealed as a member of the Bond when a row broke out between members of the Nationalist Party in the late sixties.

At present, Rupert's Rembrandt company has four other directors with links with the Nationalist Party or associated organisations. Dirk Hertzog is past chairman of the Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce and of Van Riebeeck Finance. Johannes Piek was a former journalist on *Die Burger*, the pro government newspaper, and a director of its publishing group, Nasionale Pers. Jonas Steyn is an ex Nationalist MP and, lastly, Conrad Kriel was a former director of Volkskas.

United Kingdom, the Netherlands, West Germany, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Greece and Italy . . . Prospective immigrants are expected to furnish proof of their qualifications, must be mentally and physically healthy and be able to read, write and speak a European language." The message is clear.

#### CLUB OF TEN by Rosanne Harvey

The Club of Ten is a secret, British-based organisation under whose name several advertisements have appeared in leading European and American papers which defend the SA regime and attack its critics. When the first advertisements appeared they were commissioned by Mr Gerald Sparrow, a former Judge of the International Court of Bangkok.

Mr Sparrow stood as a prospective Labour candidate for Exeter in 1958 but resigned after he claimed that the party had been infiltrated by Communists. In the General Election in 1970, he stood as a parliamentary candidate representing the Desmond Donnelly Democratic Party in Huyton, the then Prime Minister Mr Harold Wilson's safe seat. Mr Sparrow is a prolific author and has written some forty-odd books whose titles include: *Great Assassins*, *Great Traitors*, *Great Deceivers* and *A Portrait of Lord Butler*.

In February, 1972, Mr Sparrow flew to South Africa for a six week trip sponsored by the South African Tourist Corporation and South African Airways. In November, 1972, he returned to South Africa with his Thai wife, as a guest of the SA Government to complete his research. Mr Sparrow admitted that his publishers, Boydell Press, were guaranteed £1,500 by the SA Government for 750 advance copies of the book. But, despite this offer, Boydell have not published the book. (*Guardian* 13.6.1974).

Another British publisher, Neville Spearman, did print a travel book by Mr Sparrow in 1974 called *An Invitation to South Africa*. (see Part One). It contains several references to South African Airways and on page 44 the author writes; "As the reader may have noticed, I am partial to South African Airways. And not without reason. Apart from the magnificence of their international Jumbo routes their international services are, I think, a model of what services should be . . . Porters are always available and I found the white aircrews including the stewards and stewardesses, did their job as if they enjoyed it".

In the two visits Mr Sparrow paid to South Africa in February and November 1972 he met both the Minister of Information, Dr Mulder, and the Secretary of Information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie. Mr Sparrow had first come across Rhoodie when he was assistant editor of the magazine *To the Point* to which Gerald Sparrow contributed one or two articles.

Dr Rhoodie was promoted to Secretary of Information over the heads of a number of colleagues during 1972 and, almost at once, the general information effort abroad was stepped up. An overseas advertising campaign was

planned but before the official advertisements appeared in the Press a complementary series of advertisements was launched in the spring of 1973 under the name of the Club of Ten.

In August 1973 the London *Times* carried an advertisement under the headline, "Does Britain have a Conscience?" In it the Club of Ten referred to a Government inquiry into the wages paid to blacks in South Africa by British companies (prompted by Mr Adam Raphael's articles in the *Guardian*) and suggested that MPs should also probe the British wages paid in India, Black Africa, Ceylon and Hong Kong.

Mr Gordon Winter, who was deported from South Africa and who appears in the report on "The South African Connection in Britain", wrote a series of articles on British wages paid to the tea plantation workers in Hong Kong. Gordon Winter also wrote about Club of Ten activities and was granted a special interview with Mr Sparrow for the SA *Sunday Express*, 4th November, 1973.

Further advertisements appeared in the summer and autumn of 1973 under such headlines as "No Dealings with Diabolos", which was an attack on the World Council of Churches for its programme to combat racism, and "The Double Standards Game" which denounced pundits for ascribing the bombings in Ireland, for instance, to "fringe groups" and the bombings in South Africa to the police state system.

The next year, the Club of Ten attacked the *Guardian* for "South Africa baiting" in an advertisement which first appeared in the *Observer* on 9th June, 1974 under the headline, "An Analysis of Indignation", and then the *Times*. The *Guardian* claimed that the copy for this advertisement was secretly telexed from the Information Department in South Africa to the Information Department in London and handed on to Mr Sparrow. The Department of Information, although it has always denied any connection with the Club of Ten, admitted that much.

Mr Sparrow's reaction to the publicity was to write to the *Guardian* offering to supply names of individual cash backers of the Club of Ten to the Foreign Office and even to the *Guardian* on condition that it apologised for and stopped its investigations into Club of Ten supporters.

The offer was not taken up by the *Guardian* but Mr Sparrow did submit five names to Miss Joan Lester MP, who worked in the Foreign Office ministry, after a question had been asked in the House of Commons by Mr Leslie Huckfield MP concerning the Club of Ten. Miss Joan Lester replied on behalf of the Government that the matter was being "looked into".

Four of the five names contained in an envelope were: Mr Louis Luyt (fertilizer millionaire), Mr Werner Ackermann (property tycoon), Mr Jan Pickard (financier) and Mr Charalampos Nichas (potato millionaire), all South Africans. The first three formed the Foreign Affairs Association in Pretoria. According to Mr Sparrow, the names were given to him by the South African embassy.

The other millionaire, Mr Lampos Nichas, was introduced to British journalists on 22nd August, 1974, at a press conference held in the Royal Horse Guards Hotel, Mr Nichas owns several farms in South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. He presented Mr Sparrow with a cheque for R50,000 for the Club of Ten's advertising campaigns and for its new quarterly magazine, *The Phoenix*. But *The Phoenix* burned itself out within a year and has not since risen from the ashes.

Mr Sparrow resigned. Later he wrote a book on the formation of the Club of Ten called "The Ad Astra Connection". Ad Astra is the name of the building which houses the Department of Information in Pretoria. Sparrow indicates that a Mr Richard Body, Conservative MP for Holland with Boston, asked him, over lunch, if the Club of Ten would contribute towards the cost of publishing a book on the political and economic consequences of setting up trading barriers between countries. Mr Body is a noted anti-Common Marketeer.

The Club of Ten agreed to pay the Open Seas Forum (of which Mr Body is Chairman) £1500 to publish the book. When it was published in October 1976 copies of "Towards an Open World" were sent to people in "influential positions" with an accompanying letter from a Mr Donald Boddie, "London Consultant" to the Club of Ten. On Club of Ten notepaper Mr Boddie draws attention to a chapter which points to the dangers of specific trade barriers and political sanctions. Both the barriers and the sanctions, of course, damage the South African economy.

The letterhead gives a forwarding address in London. In February 1976 it was announced that the right wing journalist and former editor of the London *Evening News*, Mr Donald Boddie, was the London consultant of the Club of Ten. (*Rand Daily Mail*: 7.2.1976). The announcement coincided with a splash of advertisements from the Club of Ten which warned readers; "The Free World Stands Today in Greater Danger Than At Any Time Since The Darkest Days of World War 2".

At the time doubts were being raised in the Press about South Africa's role and military involvement in the Angolan war. In the advertisement South Africa's part in the war was described as a "role of honour" in the defence of the West against communism. The advertisement went on; "In some quarters in the West it was argued that having Russia take over Angola would be preferable to being caught on the same side as racist South Africa. In the First and Second World Wars the free world heard no such arguments when South African (infinitely more racist than today) fought and died on our side".

One crucial challenge for SA propagandists is to convince the West that the divisions in South Africa are not between black and white but between Communist and anti Communist. In the process the Club of Ten has turned several somersaults. In the first place the mass of racial legislation brought in by the Nationalist Party after its election in 1948 is evidence of a more racist government than the previous governments which exploited black labour. Secondly, the present Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, was interned for several months during



"Photographed in Angola; firepower the Russians have put into the hands of Cuban-led pro-Marxist forces . . . automatic weapons from behind the Iron Curtain carried by MPLA soldiers." Club of Ten advertisement appearing in newspapers in February, 1976.

the second World War for his pro-Nazi sympathies. In the third place several hundred black South Africans fought and died along with whites for the Allied West and so did the Russians. The Club of Ten was further embarrassed by the photograph in the advertisement which, it was claimed showed "dangerous" MPLA soldiers holding "automatic weapons from behind the Iron Curtain". In fact, as the Guardian newspaper pointed out, the weapons shown were Israeli Uzi sub machine guns.

While Mr Donald Boddie was editor of the London *Evening News* an advertisement appeared in several newspapers on 16th April, 1973, placed by another SA propaganda group also sponsored by Mr Luyt, the Committee for Fairness in Sport. Under the caption, "Fleet Street Blinkers", the CFS attacked British newspapers for not giving more than a few column inches to the SA Games which had ended the week before and which had been put on to compensate South Africans for being expelled from the 1972 Olympics. Part of the advertisement read; "When nearly 900 athletes from 5 continents converge on one single city it's an event. When they include several Olympic stars it becomes a newsworthy event. And when they come in all colours and mingle freely on and off the fields in Pretoria, South Africa, it becomes a very newsworthy event . . . Perhaps the event disqualified itself because it did not fit the stereotype of South Africa. Often stereotypes do determine news." The photograph showed a white Springbok runner shaking hands with a black sprinter whom he had just beaten in the 2nd round of the 100 metres sprint.

The only newspaper which responded to the advertisement was the *Evening News*. An article appeared on 19th April, 1973, across seven columns under the headline, "Winning where Diplomats Failed" by John Goodbody. Mr Goodbody interviewed two top sports officials who had attended the Games, Mr Adrian Paulen, President of the European Athletic Federation and Charles Palmer, President of the International Judo Federation.


Mr Goodbody quoted Mr Palmer as saying, "I went there looking for the 'con trick' and I am not easily bluffed. But there has been a big wind of change there. If things go on like this I can't see how the International Federation of the Olympics can refuse them entry".

Only the *Rand Daily Mail* was there to call the bluff. It reported: "Pretoria, after a gasp on Sunday to recover from 16 days of multi-racialism, settled down yesterday to the task of restoring apartheid. By mid-morning the signs pointing to the internationally marked toilets scattered around the show-grounds were starting to reflect South African normality as 'non-white' and 'nie-blanke' were stencilled on to them. Work on the signs at Pilditch stadium was due to start later. These were obvious top priority tasks, for workmen had not even had time to remove the white, green and gold South African flags before painting in apartheid". (quoted in *Race against Race*, published by the International Defence and Aid Fund). Mr Donald Boddie gave up the editorship of the *Evening News* later on in the year.

Still smarting from South Africa's isolation during the Angolan war the

public and private propaganda groups received a further setback when many countries refused to recognise the "independence" of the Transkei. The Club of Ten's advertisement accuses Britain of double standards in recognising "a minor tribe put into power in Angola by Soviet tanks and Cuban soldiers" but not the "non violent" independence of the Transkei on 26th October, 1976.

Once again the Club of Ten has its facts wrong. Official maps show clearly that the Transkei comprises three distinct areas whereas the Club of Ten map shows one geographic area.



#### THE UNITED KINGDOM - SOUTH AFRICA TRADE ASSOCIATION by J. Burgess

The United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA) was established in 1965 by W. Luke, who was then chairman of the South Africa Foundation's London Committee. Its function is to increase both trade and investment in South Africa and to achieve this by political and commercial contact and by improving South Africa's international image. From the beginning UKSATA was involved in the South African propaganda machine. The Foundation and UKSATA both held half the equity each in a company called Perspective Publications Ltd. This produced a magazine called *Perspective* until 1970 when the Foundation replaced it with the quarterly, *South Africa International*. No indication was given in the magazine that the objectives were to further British and South African business connections, or who the owners and editors were. The magazine concentrated almost entirely on the favourable aspects of South Africa and commented widely on remarks by the Foundation's visitors to South Africa favourably disposed towards the regime.

UKSATA enjoys the support of powerful interests in Britain. It shares the same offices and telephone number as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). It has a membership of over 200 of the most powerful British companies. It has a sister organisation in South Africa called the South Africa Britain Trade Association (SABRITA) which involves many of the most powerful South African companies, which are also members of the Foundation. The vice president of UKSATA, Sir Nicholas Cayzer, is also a Council

the IMF and IBRD after attaining independence."<sup>1</sup>

In a subsequent statement he made it clear that he was not merely preparing reports, but lobbying:

"IBRD . . . discussions with officials of the IBRD in relation to South Africa's participation in projects under consideration in the IBRD.

"Gold . . . the preparation of correspondence with government officials to ascertain the applicable statutes and regulation in the US pertaining to the private ownership and transfer of interests in gold."<sup>2</sup>

1. Registration statement to US Department of Justice, 6 February, 1976.
2. Statement of 6 August, 1975.

#### Russell E. Honsowetz

Honsowetz, a former US marine, seems to be a kind of volunteer for the South African cause, although his expenses are reimbursed, and he will share in the profits if successful. He purportedly represents VEDS (Vereeniging Engineering Design and Supplies (Pty) Ltd.), whose address is listed in different places as Vereeniging and Pretoria. He has submitted on their behalf applications to the State Department's Office of Munitions Control for armoured personnel carriers and Bell or Sikorsky helicopters, and explained to the Department of Justice:

"The Republic of South Africa is most anxious to purchase military goods from the US. However, under our current policy . . . my hands are tied . . . The Munitions Board told me not to submit any more requests for export licences for military equipment to the Republic of South Africa."<sup>1</sup>

It is not explained why an allegedly private company should be attempting to import US military equipment that is presumably intended for the armed forces.

1. Registration statement to US Department of Justice, and letter of 2 December, 1974, to State Department Office of Munitions Control.

#### PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE: A Report by Esau du Plessis and Peter Ripken

South Africa's propaganda efforts on the continent follow the same pattern as in Britain and the US with massive co-operation between organisations with interests in South Africa, the South Africa Foundation and the Department of Information.

The propaganda machine is also able to exploit the cultural agreements that exist between South Africa and a number of European countries. These are particularly useful in giving official respectability to the propaganda and give access to both official and unofficial channels. For instance propaganda films given free by the South African Embassy in Germany are widely distributed to schools and colleges.

Aspects of cultural accord are stressed particularly in Holland and Belgium because of the similarities between Dutch and Flemish and Afrikaans. In this respect South Africa has taken advantage of the split between French and Flemish speaking Belgians. While the French sector has broken the cultural agreement with South Africa the accord with the Flemish thrives and South African Embassy officials are regular guests at Flemish language festivals. Right wing Flemish groups in Belgium such as the Vlaamse Militanten Order (VMO) give considerable support to South African causes and often reproduce articles from South African Embassy publications in their own publications. The VMO gives strong support to the *Vrienden van Zuid Afrika*, a pro South Africa lobby group.

In Holland the Cultural Accord, which was signed in 1951, has been increasingly criticised. As a result the Dutch government announced in November 1976 that it will be abolished after a year if there is no change in South Africa's apartheid policy. The Cultural Accord is operated by the Nederlandse-Zuidafrikaanse Vereeniging (NZAV). It publishes a monthly magazine *Zuid Afrika* which is aimed at increasing connections with South Africa in the fields of investment, tourism, trade and migration.

Like the South Africa Foundation it allows itself to criticise aspects of apartheid to disguise its call for support for the machinery that enables it to survive. The NZAV is subsidised by the Dutch government due to its recognition by the Ministry of Social Affairs as an Emigration Bureau. As with Germany (where a special immigration organisation called Transa operates with the co-operation of the Federal Labour Exchange) the cultural agreement in Holland provides useful avenues for encouraging white emigration to South Africa.

The Department of Information is the mainspring for the propaganda activities throughout Europe. A particular effort is made in Holland (the South African Embassy at The Hague is the biggest in the Netherlands) and Germany, the latter because of the growing economic connections between the two countries and because of German connections with other German language countries such as Austria and Switzerland.

The main German publication produced by the Department of Information is the *Journal Sudafrika* which is distributed to public figures such as MPs and journalists and particularly to ministers in the Protestant churches. Other publications include pamphlets on such things as the Bantustans, development opportunities, and prospects for immigrants etc. A relatively new ploy is sending "background papers" to MPs and others on political issues such as the South African UN ambassador's speech on South Africa's intervention in Angola. These are described as being "an attempt to give objective information" in an attempt to hide their propaganda nature as previous propaganda handouts were returned by several MPs.

The World Council of Churches has been a particular target of the Embassy. A series of advertisements under the heading "Churches without a man-

date" followed the WCC's decision in August 1974 to extend the Programme to Combat Racism. Particular pressure has been brought on the Lutheran Church (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland - EKD) to support those elements in the church that disagree with the WCC's resolution. The campaign against the WCC is an urgent one for the Department as criticism of apartheid from the world's Christian bodies undermines their contention that they are upholding Christian standards in South Africa and that those opposed to them are communist inspired. In 1972 and 1973 the Department distributed a pamphlet titled "The WCC Club" which vehemently denounced the EKD's official support of the WCC's resolution. This has been followed by attempts to influence Lutheran ministers by sending them unsolicited propaganda, particularly *Journal Sud Afrika*.

A tour of South Africa by leading ministers and officials of the EKD was organised with the help of the South African government and the South Africa Foundation. The favourable comments of these individuals on the situation in South Africa came at a particularly embarrassing time for the EKD as it coincided with the revelations that the Bonn representative at NATO, General Rall, had been in secret consultation with South Africa over a nuclear power deal.

Close co-operation is maintained between the Department of Information, the South Africa Foundation and German groups such as the Deutsch-Sudafrikanische Gesellschaft (DSAG), Transa etc.

The DSAG is a highly active organisation and appears to be financed by both the Department of Information and the Foundation. It has some 3,900 members and is headed by the Foundation's permanent representative, Mr. R.F. Gruber. Its activities include press contacts, exhibitions about South Africa and the organisation of student exchange programmes. The academic exchange programme (DAAD) is involved in a programme of holiday jobs for engineering, business and medical students. In 1975 this involved 80 students.

Local meetings on South African issues are organised, sometimes in conjunction with sympathetic groups such as the Rotary Club. The magazine *Afrikapost* serves as an unofficial publication for DSAG. Besides giving ample editorial support for the South African regime it also gives widespread coverage of speeches made at DSAG meetings.

Co-operation between the various pro-apartheid groups has been instrumental in getting a number of influential Germans to visit South Africa and to return with favourable comments. The chairman of the Workers Representative Council of Bayer AG is one example of a guest of the South Africa Foundation whose favourable impressions of apartheid in South Africa were given widespread publicity by the Foundation. Probably the most important delegation was that of the Federation of German Industrialists which visited South Africa in November 1975. The delegation's itinerary included a meeting with the South African Premier, B.J. Vorster.

Visitors who have given generous praise to the South Africa regime after

visits there include Schleswig-Holstein's prime minister Stoltenberg, Baden-Wurttemberg's prime minister, Filbinger and the speaker of the Federal Diet, von Hassel. A regular visitor to South Africa has been Franz-Josef Strauss. His criticism of the Schmidt government for trying to effect change in South Africa at the time of the Vorster-Kissinger meeting in Bavaria in June 1976 excited the comment in the liberal press that it could have been written by Eschel Rhoodie, the Secretary for the Department of Information.

The pro-apartheid lobby in Germany makes a particular effort to influence the German press. The visitor programme helps in this regard, particularly the invitations to members of the influential regional press. Tremendous leverage has been gained by the help in the preparation and financing of supplements on South Africa in the major German newspapers such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, *Handelsblatt* and *Die Welt*. There have been over 50 such supplements since 1970. All contain massive advertising by the South African government departments, and para-statal industries. Most of them feature an interview with a South African cabinet minister and the articles invariably stress the benefits of trade and investment with South Africa. This penetration of the press is increased by the placing of advertisements on directly political matters by both the Embassy and the Club of Ten.

The co-operation of German firms with interests in South Africa is also obtained in the propaganda battle. For instance Volkswagen published a glossy pamphlet written by a well known journalist (Thilo Koch) which praised the social and labour policies of Volkswagen South Africa. The pamphlet was widely distributed to influential people such as MPs.

The propaganda agent's job is made considerably easier by the line of unconditional support for the apartheid regime pursued by the most important newspaper trust, the Springer group. It is interesting to note that Karl Schiller, former Economic minister of Germany who is employed by Anton Rupert's EDESA - a bank established for directing investment capital to South Africa's neighbour states through South Africa, is Springer's economic consultant. The Springer group also has very close connections with Franz-Josef Strauss.

The newly formed Foreign Affairs Association soon became involved in Germany. It organised a group of politicians to visit Germany, including Bantustan ministers and Nationalist MPs. The FAA made use of the public relations agency, Hennenhofer KG, which also produced one of the many films distributed by the SA Embassy.

The relationship between the DSAG and the Foundation in Germany is paralleled by its co-operation with other South African lobby groups in Europe. In Holland it works with the Jan van Riebeeck Stichting, which is subsidised by the Foundation. In France where the Foundation has an active office, it co-operates with the Comite France Afrique du Sud. The SAF also has an office in Vienna and in Switzerland it co-operates with the Swiss South Africa Association. One of the most important guests the Foundation has brought to South Africa is Dr Gygli, general chief of staff for the Swiss

#### Defence Force.

In Holland a new pro-apartheid group, the Komitee Overleg Zuid-Afrika, has been formed with the help of several right wing groups. It will join the existing groups such as the Nederlandse-Zuidafrikaanse Vereeniging, the Stichting Aktiegroep Zuid-Afrika and the Nederlandse Zuidafrikaanse Weggemeenschap (NZAW). The NZAW has strong connections with the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. Every year in March the NZAW invites two South Africans, usually one white and the other black, to tour the Netherlands to "create understanding for, and to present an objective view of South Africa." Past visitors include Dr. Treurnicht, a former head of the Broederbond, and a chief reporter of Radio Bantu, one of the services of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

More sinister is the attempt by the Plural Societies Foundation to give South Africa's Bantustan policy a respectable academic and scientific following. The editorial board of the magazine *Plural Societies* consists of Hollanders well known for their pro-apartheid attitudes and it is printed by the same group that handles the South African Embassy publications in the Netherlands. In its reports on mixed cultures throughout the world favourable reference is often made to the South African solution to this universal problem. The Plural Societies Foundation has also produced a two volume study on *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; A World Survey*.

One of the associate editors is Nic Rhoodie, head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria and co-author of *Stepping into the Future* one of the propaganda pieces on African education distributed by the Department of Information (see Part Five). Mr Rhoodie is a cousin of the Rhoodie brothers who are the first and second in command of the Department of Information in Pretoria. Eschel Rhoodie, the Secretary of the Department, has considerable experience of propaganda in Holland as his career includes a stint as information counsellor at The Hague.

Apartheid on the continent is therefore sold at many different levels. One example illustrates both the nature of the product and its salesmen. The South African press (*The Star* 24.4.1976) reported that Mr. Roland Hepers, a South African diplomat in Switzerland had been alleged to be responsible for derogatory remarks about blacks made in an interview with *Elle* magazine. When asked to comment on these allegations Mr. Hepers said "We are not allowed to talk to the Press" - a somewhat unusual position for an information attache to take.

## PART FIVE

### PROPAGANDA ISSUES

#### Health propaganda by John Laurence


South Africa has been heavily criticised by reputable international bodies such as the World Health Organisation for introducing racism into the practice of medicine, and has countered with extensive propaganda articles, arguments and booklets. Inevitably, these are compounded of photographs of happy black patients, mainly at the "show" hospitals, of statistical trickery (see below) and of the usual scrupulous avoidance of any useful comparison between medical facilities for black and white in South Africa.

One such book, *Health and Healing* (Dept of Information, Pretoria), in attempting to put an ever greater gloss on the propaganda "image" of black health facilities, praises South Africa's care for black victims of malnutrition, while admitting that "kwashiorkor is still prevalent among the Bantu" (page 7). (Kwashiorkor is malnutrition so severe that it is classed as a notifiable disease.) Yet on the BBC "Man Alive" programme on December 12, 1974, a South African Department of Information official informed Britain: "We have only a few cases of malnutrition." The "facts" are thus twisted to suit any argument.

In truth, South African medicine is so racist that the blood of whites and blacks is kept separate in hospitals for transfusions (a practice traceable to Nazi ideology). The vast propaganda exercise for such black hospitals as Baragwanath near Johannesburg (housed in old army huts, but boasted of as "the biggest hospital for blacks in the world") conceals the fact that in the grim black "city" of Soweto, which Baragwanath serves, the ratio of resident doctors to residents is one to more than 100,000 - while in neighbouring white Johannesburg, for whites it is one for less than 1,000 persons. A black man who falls seriously ill in Soweto at night often dies, unless he can get to the rare resident doctor or the one hospital.

Infant Mortality Rates tell the true story, too. Of recent years, the black IMR in wealthy white cities such as Bloemfontein and Grahamstown (as given in official Medical Officers' Reports) has been as high as almost 200 black babies per 1,000 dying in their first year - while the figures for whites are always below 30 per 1,000. The reason lies in the literally murderous discrimination in the ratios of doctors available for whites and for blacks in South Africa. The way this discrimination is concealed in South African propaganda is both illuminating and typical.

TAKE ONE PEACEFUL PEOPLE,  
300 YEARS OF HISTORY,  
A DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENT,



AND YOU HAVE A RATHER UNIQUE  
NEW INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATE

We'd like to welcome you to the Republic of Transkei. On October 26 we, the Xhosa nation, celebrate our peaceful evolution to total independence from South Africa.

We'll have our own judicial system, civil service, army, police force, economy and free society. And we'll also have full recognition for our language, our culture and our traditions in a land where we've lived and prospered for over 300 years - Transkei, a part of Africa which is just about the size of Switzerland.

For further information on one of the countries with the brightest economic prospects in Africa, and its attractive investment incentives, write Transkei Development Corporation, P.O. Box 103, Umtata, Republic of Transkei.



REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI  
AFRICA'S QUIET INDEPENDENCE

Club of 10 advertisement appearing in British newspapers in September 1976.

The Transkei's own propaganda campaigns

In the month before "independence", the Transkei government launched a world-wide propaganda campaign seeking international recognition. Or did it? For the advertisements followed the format, schedules, arguments, untruths and false analogies of South Africa's own propaganda advertisements for the Transkei "homeland" during previous years, and they claimed that the Transkei is now "fully democratic", "totally independent from South Africa" and that its Parliament is even modelled, statute by statute, on the British Parliament.

Such claims are astonishing, for nowhere was it mentioned that just before "independence", Prime Minister Matanzima imprisoned the entire Executive of the Transkei Opposition party. Nor was it mentioned that the infamous South African Proclamation 400 would remain in force: the Emergency Regulations which make it a criminal offence for a Transkei citizen to "make any statement or perform any action" likely to interfere with the authority of a Transkei chief or headman, "to boycott official meetings, or to treat a chief or headman with disrespect."

The claim of "total independence" from South Africa is similarly suspect. 600 white South African police patrolled the Transkei on "Independence" Day. South Africa refused permission for British television's "This Week" team to cover the Transkei's "Independence" celebrations. And despite repeated statements that the Transkei is a "non-racist state" after "independence", it preserves intact the South African legislation which is the most racist in the world today - the South African Immorality Act which makes human love between people of different skin colours a criminal offence.

Yet one must not blame the Transkeians themselves. The people have had no say in the feudal structure of their Parliament, nor have they ever been given the chance to express their views on independence at the polls. On the contrary, not only did Chief Matanzima, the Transkei's unelected ruler, always refuse a referendum, but he negotiated independence directly - and without even the consent of his Party - with the all-white South African government.<sup>10</sup> Like the blacks in "mainland" South Africa, the blacks of the Transkei have all their decisions made for them by others. Presumably that is why all elections for ten years past have produced apathetic minority polls.

Such apathy is easily understandable. For in the year before "independence", even Chief Matanzima himself was threatening: "the only practical difference independence will make to the average Transkei citizen is that they will carry Transkei passports instead of South African passes."

The Meaning of "Independence"<sup>11</sup>

It is indeed true that for black Transkeians (but not, should there be any, white Transkeians) the passport to South Africa now fulfills the same

South Africa in Figures

LAND

South Africa is 472,359 square miles. Under the Native Land Act, no 27, of 1913, and the Native Land Act, no 18, of 1936, whites gave themselves 86.3% of the land and the remaining 13.8% to the Africans. The Coloured and Indian people were not given any land. There are 10½ whites per square mile and 285 blacks per square mile.

POPULATION	1970 census	1974 (estimated)
Africans	15.0 million	17.7 million
Whites	3.8 million	4.2 million
Coloureds	2.0 million	2.3 million
Asians	.6 million	.7 million

GOVERNMENT

The white minority of 3.8 million rule the black majority of 17.6 million. Only whites may elect or be elected Members of Parliament. Blacks may only elect members of the Bantu legislative assemblies which have limited powers in the homelands. Coloured and Asian people have no franchise in South Africa.

HOMES

South Africans are not free to choose where to live. Africans must live in Bantu areas, whites in white areas, Coloureds in Coloured areas and Asians in Asian areas as defined by the Group Areas Act, no 36, of 1966.

EDUCATION	% GNP	Amount Allocated
Africans	0.6%	140
Whites	2.9%	628
Coloureds	0.5%	108
Asians	0.2%	45

GNP: 1976: R21,717 million

EXCHANGE RATE: MID 1976

1 Rand = 1.14 US dollars  
= 0.67 British sterling  
= 5.7 French francs  
= 2.89 German marks


SUID-APRIKAANSE  
INSTITUUT  
AMSTERDAM  
KEIZERSGRACHT 41

NOTES

# ... A RATHER UNIQUE ... INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATE

... come you to the Republic of Transkei.  
... Xhosa nation. celebrate our peaceful  
... independence from South Africa.  
... own judicial system. civil service, army,  
... and free society. And we'll also have  
... language. our culture and our tradi-  
... e've lived and prospered for over 300  
... of Africa which is just about the size

... mation on one of  
... ightest economic  
... its attractive  
... write  
... Corporation,



REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI  
AFRICA'S QUIET INDEPENDENCE

... in British newspapers in September 1976.



**Economic sanctions  
make me shudder.**

“ I have often expressed my differences with the white government of Pretoria in no uncertain terms. But the mere idea of total economic sanctions from abroad to assist us, makes me shudder. We, the black people, will be the first to suffer. ”

*L. M. Mangope*  
9/8/73

Chief Minister L. M. Mangope,  
Bophuthatswana Government Service

For further information contact The Economics  
Department, THE TRUST BANK OF AFRICA LIMITED, 31st Floor, Trust Bank Centre, Heerenegracht, Cape Town, South Africa



ers in South Africa. Mrs Mvubelo's statement said that she doubted  
er any suggestions for alternatives to the apartheid system would be  
le or effective for Africans in South Africa. (*Rand Daily Mail*:  
973).

advertisements appeared in New Zealand, Australia, United States and

## **ROEDERBOND BUSINESS LOBBY** by Rosanne Harvey

he Nationalist Party swept into power in 1948 one of its first objectives  
establish Afrikaner dominance in big business which was then mainly  
hands of English and Jewish South Africans. This was achieved by char

# Les de Villiers Secret Information






**Tafelberg**


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# MULLDERGATE

THE STORY OF  
THE  
MULLDER  
INTO SCANDAL





**MERVYN REES**  
**CHRIS DAY**




**MERVYN REES** has been a crime and investigative reporter working in Southern Africa for nearly twenty years and with the *Rand Daily Mail* for most of that time. Without doubt the outstanding journalist of his kind in South Africa, he was joint winner with Chris Day of the national award for enterprising journalism in 1969 and has received honourable mention for this award on four other occasions. He worked exclusively on the Muldergate assignment for a full two years.

**CHRIS DAY'S** journalistic career in South Africa has spanned twenty-one years, spent mainly on the *Rand Daily Mail*, where he has been a city affairs reporter, feature writer and news editor and is now an assistant editor in charge of the newspaper's investigation team. He has worked with Rees on many assignments and acted as coordinator on the Muldergate investigation, during which he joined Rees in the hunt for Eschel Rhodie.







Rand Daily Mail



SAAN







SAAN




Cape Times

Four Info 'front' men: John McGoff, above left, the controversial Michigan publisher who made a bid to take over the Washington Star; financial whizz-kid David Abramson, above right; rally driver and Abramson partner, Stuart Pegg, below left; below right, the man who claimed to be the owner of the Citizen.

Johannes van Zyl Alberts, above left, involved in the Citizen and To the Point. Les de Villiers, above right, a former deputy secretary for Information. Andre Pieterse, below left, the Golden Rendezvous film-maker. Gerald Sparrow, below right, Club of Ten spokesman.




SAAN



Danie Coetzer, Rand Daily Mail


Rand Daily Mail



Above: Judge Mostert's bombshell press conference.

Two men whose roles emerged from the Erasmus reports: General H. J. van den Bergh (left), former head of BOSS, signing a petition calling for his own prosecution; and Lou 'Loot' Reynders (below), retired BOSS auditor.

Opposite: top, State President B. J. Vorster leaves Cape Town's Tuynhuys after announcing his resignation; and below, newly installed Prime Minister P. W. Botha.



Cape Times

SAAN



1970 SA expelled from Olympic committee

1976 - SOWETO UPRISINGS + TELEVISION INTRODUCED IN SA  
after public lobbying

1977 Biko is killed

1978 INFO SCANDAL EXPLODES THROUGH RAND DAILY MAIL (now defunct) + other papers journalists Mervyn Rees + Chris Day publish a book in 1980

60s backdrop of the cold war + fear of communism

Vorster's cabinet includes General Hendrik van den Berg (Bureau of State Security) head of BOSS (lunched in 1969)

by mid 1970s

Vorster Prime Minister (resigns in 1978)

incl. the notorious "90 day act" enables detention without trial for 90 days - basically a license to arrest, detain + torture anyone for 3 months without having to justify it (extended to 180 in 1965)

the info scandal occurs within the context of increasingly repressive laws to deal with government opposition. Vorster + van den Berg, both members of the Ossewabrandwag bridge covert violence with propaganda + extreme legislative restrictions

Afrikaner nationalists & infamous for their support of the Nazis incl. WWII sympathies

Rees & Day wrote sources describing the combined power of Malher as a prospective prime minister as "poking one's head through the door of a dictatorship"

Malher

for 8 months

found guilty + acquittal + move he lives

question of the inquiry/scandals legitimacy in terms of attention/interest Narrative of the entire proceedings speaks of a political grapple that enforces + undermines apartheid on an evil regime

this bungling naivety appears again within the actual propaganda produced

which also speaks to the prevalence of the operation

Vorster + the Oschi 1995

Van den Berg raises chickens after the scandal ends his political career

shows high level bungling - even the espionage has a level of provinciality. Rhodie attempts to make cosmopolitan diplomats out of conservative provincial statesmen

the power allocated to Rhodies 'propaganda war' is accommodated within this imagining

R&D contextualize the story against a hankering for "absolute power" with the statement "there is content in South Africa a popular conception of Lotd Actor's famous phrase: 'Power is marvellous; the saying goes, 'absolute power is absolute' (CR)

not only as propaganda - but even so, the everyday realities of their alleged target audience... AFRI-COMICS Golden Pundevous Tigers don't cry...

1970s Rhodie  
press that communism  
has become legitimate  
in Europe

South Africa 1970s  
1970 = bantustan homelands  
act

(code name 'Olympus')  
Minister 1966-1978  
in 1978  
Mulder attempts  
to succeed Vorster  
but loses to  
P.W. Botha

Minister of  
Information

Eschel Rhodie

central "charismatic" figure  
publishing connections in Netherlands  
+ US

1 of fraud in 1979  
led on appeal  
to US in 1982 where  
died until his death in 1993

R&D 1980 p160-169  
"The Brownie Dichom"

"The only way to influence the  
media was to own it... the best way  
of handling student movements is  
not to fight them, but infiltrate them.  
and with political movements, one must  
infiltrate them, help finance them,  
and take them over"

absolute  
power is  
name flows  
1980-11

Available the logic of  
"SECRET PROTECTIONS"  
with secret budgets... easily  
exploited by Vorsters... cabinet  
+ subsequently by Botha's  
to oust Vorster Mulder  
Rhodie plays  
the scapegoat  
throughout for  
both sides

Journalists (Rees & Day) → peaked  
with the  
info scandal (?)  
book collates investigative reports etc.  
and the 'story' of the story - effort  
rationalised against "if this then..."  
... but - rhetoric of

essentially  
eradicates the prospect of  
South African citizenship for  
black people  
despite investigations into  
the Department of Information  
+ pressure to withdraw from  
succession race

'Outrage' remains  
over misuse of  
tax payers money  
(besides the "official  
secrets..."  
production  
of propaganda as legitimate  
media... besides Apartheid?)

Rhodie & Mulder meet in the Netherlands 1970/71 (R&D 1980:167)  
"we got on famously" "he impressed me right from the start" - Rhodie takes  
the post of  
Secretary for Info. in  
1972 "provided he  
would be allowed to  
implement a secret  
propaganda war"

Secretary of information from 1972 - 1977

rationalised against  
'anti-SA' international sentiments

'Club of Ten'

"Friends of SA" organization  
reputed to comprise "Friends of SA"  
businessmen etc. Placed a series of  
advertisements over the mid 70s  
attempting to reframe the political  
situation within SA & Apartheid against  
a critique of "double standards by the  
media in Europe & America  
(and the rest of the world)"

"The advertisements of the club,  
all written by myself [Rhodie] or [Les]  
de Villiers, were models of accuracy  
and steered clear of promoting apartheid... the  
advertisements pointed out atrocities elsewhere  
in the world, racism, even genocide, and they appealed  
to readers to send the advertisements to their governments  
to force them to respond as vigorously as they always  
did in the case of South Africa..."

plan was followed up through  
planning committee (alleged) including  
"Vorster, Mulder, Nico Niederichs, Rhodie  
Dunlop, Rhodie (Eschel's brother) +  
Les de Villiers"

## The information scandal

'I told Vorster and Diederichs in no uncertain terms that the Department of Information was nothing more than a super post office which produced brochures and publications; which made films that had such a soft sell that even the South African Tourist Corporation had found it difficult to market them. The kind of crap that was being churned out included films on the flowers of South Africa and the freedom of an eagle in the Drakensberg mountains.'

'I told them that we would not continue a major operational effort in the Department, directed towards the general public and based on the old concepts.'

Rhodie's face hardened, and he looked more like Gaddafi than ever. 'I told them bluntly: we would deviate radically from this and would go after the opinion formers and decision takers in the Western world—by any means possible.'

He sat back, sipping at a glass of water as another garish Ecuador Airline passenger jet came swooping past the hotel window. Although dressed in an open-necked sports shirt and a pair of white slacks, his body was stiff and formal. He was back in Vorster's office that February day in 1974.

'I looked across at Diederichs and said, do you know that there is a strong movement in the United States towards business disengagement and that is something that is going to hurt South Africa deeply?'

'I switched to Vorster: there is a new philosophy in the world which originated in Holland—that the political system in South Africa is based on structural violence. This argument enables other organisations to support groups and people who are bent on using violence as a solution to the problems of South Africa.'

(...)

'I told him—and I think this is the crux of the matter—that if South Africa were to make headway in the world, and to break out of its isolation in order to establish channels of communication, then two things would have to happen: first, we would have to look very carefully at those laws, regulations, practices and customs in South Africa which affronted the dignity of the black man—and which had nothing at all to do with the overall objectives of separate political freedom, or the establishment of independent homelands for blacks, or those things that deeply affronted the friends of South Africa abroad.'

Rhodie's one hand clenched, smacking into the palm of the other: 'I made a major issue out of this, because racism had become the greatest social, political evil of the world. And we were vulnerable—because many laws and regulations, and many customs and traditions were, frankly, based on colour.'

'I pointed out that Communism was now a respectable political movement, particularly in Europe. In Italy and France the Communist parties were very strong and it would not help for South Africa to defend itself by saying that the agitation against us was being led by the Communists. I said a major effort must be made to eliminate those laws and rules based purely on colour.'

Rhodie paused again, took another sip of water and carried on with his account.

'That, I told them, is the first part of the plan. And then I outlined the second crucial aspect of the plan.'

Rees: 'Was this the Brownie dictum?'

'Yes, this was the Brownie dictum. I said we could not hope to go through official channels, nor through diplomatic channels, to make any headway in the world. I presented studies which had been made of the effectiveness or otherwise of the information efforts of, for example, Germany and the United States. I pointed out that in the US alone, within the Federal Government, there were something like 8,000 information offices spending millions and millions of dollars, yet all the market surveys which had been conducted showed their credibility was extremely low.'

'The reason for this was simple: people, politicians and the media did not believe the information because the people disseminating it were being paid to present the official line. The answer, I said, was also simple: create new avenues, instruments, organisations and people who could speak on behalf of South Africa without being openly tied to us...'

Day: 'Like the Club of Ten?'

'Exactly, like the Club of Ten.'

(...)

These then were the two key pillars to Rhodie's platform: bring about change in South Africa to make it easier to gain acceptance abroad; and establish a secret propaganda network.

Rhodie said he told the meeting that this campaign should sidestep the question of race relations in South Africa and concentrate on those issues which would present the country's assets—its strategic importance, its long alliance with the West, its strategic minerals and metals, that the Government was committed to objectives which, at least in theory, were similar to those which the United Nations supported.

'I used the example of a seminar organised by UNESCO in Yugoslavia on the problems of a multi-national society where the resolutions adopted at the time by 36 countries were in direct line with the thinking of the South African Government.'

Rhodie stood up from his chair, the first time he'd done so while talking to Rees and Day during their work sessions. 'I turned to Vorster and said: "Are you fully aware of what I mean when I refer to a propaganda war, and what is involved in psychological warfare?"'

'I specifically said to him: "I want you to approve, not an information asset, but a propaganda war in which no rules or regulations count. If it is necessary for me to bribe someone, then I would bribe him or her. If it was necessary for me to purchase, for example, a sable mink coat for an editor's wife then I should be in a position to do so. If it was necessary for me to send somebody on a holiday to the Hawaiian Islands with his mistress for a month, then I should be able to do so. Are you fully aware of what I mean then, Mr Prime Minister?"'

The hotel room went quiet. Rhodie looked out of the window, down a long valley and across to the snow-capped peaks of the Andes.

'What did Vorster say?'

He turned and looked at the journalists: "Vorster said he approved the propaganda war—a war in which I should not be concerned about rules and regulations."

Rhodie sat down again, crossed his legs, and continued talking. 'I then said to the Prime Minister that I had several projects in mind that we should undertake over the next five years. When it came to the question of money, Dr Diederichs, who was then standing at the window, turned to me and asked what amounts I envisaged.'

The Rhodie smile came on briefly. 'I told him to sit down, because I said it

might come as a shock to him that I wanted something like R25-million a year over a five-year period. I told him that if, after that period, we had not succeeded in achieving a breakthrough, then I would gladly resign. We would make it in the next five years, or not at all.'

'Diederichs turned to me and said he liked the presentation. He was prepared to accept it and he was prepared to provide the money.'

Rhodie's pride was almost visible when he said: 'Do you know, Dr Diederichs said he was terribly disappointed that he had not had this conversation ten years ago—South Africa badly needed this kind of programme.'

In motivating the need for this vast budget, Rhodie said he told Vorster that Germany had occupied, and won over, a number of countries without firing a shot simply by using psychological warfare and propaganda. 'You know, van den Bergh and I were against any military activities or military arms support anywhere in Africa.'

Rhodie said he was asked by Vorster to prepare an outline of the programme on paper; this he did, and he asked for a total R65-million, of which R15-million would be spent in the first year.

Vorster said he could not take the money out of his BOSS budget, because the Opposition would attack him, saying the money was being used for the BOSS apparatus. Diederichs, he said, later told him that a general outline of the projects proposed for the initial period, as well as the necessity for them, was given to P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, who had agreed that this was a good idea. The money would be channelled through the Department of Defence, to BOSS, and then to the 'G' funds in the Department of Information.

(Rees & Day 1980 p 170-173)

\* political rhetoric via variously involved parties (Rhodie used emotive manipulation, drawing on individual patriotism and afrikaner nationalism...essentially setting a stage/middle ground to solicit and manage a series of projects with inflated budgets (the dealings were couched in the political rhetoric of the war of information).

Politicians & businessmen set to gain from the dealings thus had a common ground—a colloquial polite space that traded dishonesty for heroism...  
corruption etc



"Rhodie: 'I believe that the concept of John Vorster as a statesman was exaggerated. Everybody who counts knows very well that it was myself and the General who set up these meetings and, in fact, Vorster was very reluctant to act on our initiatives... we had to drag John Vorster kicking into Africa.' (R & D 1980 181)

"Rhodie: 'I persuaded Connie Mulder to travel. I wanted him to meet people of different colours, creeds, and nationalities. I took him to Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco, Taiwan, Scandinavia, Egypt...'

Rees: 'Egypt! How did you get into Egypt?'

Rhodie: 'Well, actually we never got beyond the airport... they confined us to a hotel room, and we left the next day...'

R & D 1980 p 179-180

(1980 p 165-166)

Day & Rees describe as a "flaw in Rhodie's makeup that he gave no indication that he had realised at first hand that the system of government that he propagated so enthusiastically had for so long forced thousands of black families to split up because of the migrant labour laws"

one of the few concrete references within the entire book to any actual Apartheid injustices... - avoidance of banning? reporting at large?

Mulder addresses the Washington National Press Club in 1975.



"What kind of information does he have?" asked Rees. Myrtle was getting edgy... [he] started to move <sup>off</sup> again, but stopped suddenly, turned round and said: 'Rit, you know, was asked by \* Vorster to keep an eye on what he called the "kaffir taxi".'

"The kaffir taxi?"

'Yes, apparently that's what he said. He meant Rhodie's outfit. Didn't you know that Rhodie's nickname at school was "kaffir"?'

Rees & Day 1980 p 63  
(Chapter 8: The fall of Olympus)

\* 'Rit' refers to advocate Retief van Rooden, legal advisor to Vorster's government - infamously van Rooden defended the state and the South African police over the death of Steve Biko. van Rooden is quoted to have said at a debate in the United States that Biko had "spoken rationally to the doctor" before going 'beserk' and then "by unfortunate chance" had "hit his head against a wall."

Retorting to a comment that he should not have been given a visa, van Rooden "stood in the corridor shaking his finger at the reporters" and saying, "you may laugh, but I am telling the truth..." (p 61)

## THE CODE NAMES

A fascinating area that has not yet been written about concerns the code names used by the people involved in the secret activities of the Department. I shall list some of them:

Eschel is known both as GADAFI (after the Libyan head of state) and THOR (surprise surprise);

Les de Villiers was DIRTY HARRY (either because he looks vaguely like Clint Eastwood or because of his predilection for pretty women).

Vorster is referred to as OLYMPUS (the god of gods); Sydney Baron is known as THE RED BARON

Dr. Mulder is called KNIP OOGIES ... General van den Berg is referred to either as MOSES ... or DIE LANG MAN

During the seventies South Africa secretly spent R75 million on a covert propaganda campaign. The funds were hidden in the secret budget of the Minister of Defence, without Parliament's approval. When details leaked to the press, it set off a string of dramatic events forcing the abdication of the State President. The fall-out changed the political face of South Africa. Despite massive press coverage, and months of secret hearings by a commission of inquiry under Justice Rudolph Erasmus, a thousand questions remained unanswered. The central figure in the drama was Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, who had the responsibility of executing the secret programme and whom the government of Mr. P.W. Botha first tried to silence and then, unsuccessfully, to imprison. Now, the complete inside story of the entire drama is told for the first time, by the only person who had access to all the information — Eschel Rhoodie himself. **THE real INFORMATION SCANDAL** will surprise and enrage. It will also shock you. Revealed, at last, is proof of whether or not the R75 million was a total waste, and who was responsible, as well as the identity of the man whose political maneuverings unleashed the storm.

PIK BOTHA: Eschel Rhoodie and Connie Mulder were ludicrous . . . they wasted millions without achieving anything.

US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT: South Africa's Information campaign had achieved definite success in terms of short and long term objectives.

AFRICA REPORT, Washington: Americans will have to study South Africa's Information campaigns with great care.

PROFESSOR BARNARD: We did a lot more good than anything else, and in the end that is all that counts.

PIK BOTHA: Eschel Rhoodie was a bumbling amateur.

GENERAL HEIN DU TOIT: I have great appreciation for some often brilliantly conceived ideas of Dr. Rhoodie.

W.J. GREEF MP now Mr. Speaker: Dr. Rhoodie, to his credit, has done enormously good work in his department for South Africa. I have no hesitation, as far as his work is concerned, to laud him and to say that he deserves all praise.

OWEN HORWOOD, in Parliament: Dr. Rhoodie's actions are treasonable.

AL HAMISHAR, an Israeli newspaper: In any normal country, such an industrious and efficient head of Information as Eschel Rhoodie would have been granted the status of candidate for the Assiduous Worker Prize.

BEELD: It was a mistake to appoint him as Secretary.

THE STAR: Every senior government official approached for comment in Pretoria today was emphatic that Dr. Rhoodie was well qualified for the position.

THE OBSERVER, London: His whole operation was deliberately detached from the stolid background of Afrikaner bureaucracy . . . he talked compassionately about human rights and the excesses of apartheid and to many people he was a genuine idealist. He represented the opening out of Afrikanerdom into the larger world of international business and diplomacy.

**ESCHEL  
RHOODIE**

**THE** **real**  
**INFORMATION**  
**SCANDAL**



**NIEUWE WAPENFEITEN**, het motto voor de vredesweek 1974, is weer zo'n leus waarin verschillende zaken tegelijk verpakt zitten. Zoals een tekening waarin je afwisselend de ene of de andere voorstelling kunt zien.


Het Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad gebruikt dit soort leuzen graag, omdat het niet één boodschap of één onderwerp heeft, welke er bij het publiek ingeheld moet worden. Het wil slechts ieder jaar opnieuw een beroep op de mensen doen om zelf iets te doen tegen oorlog, armoede, schending van mensenrechten, enz. Dat ze iets kunnen doen is een kwestie van geloof. Wat ze kunnen doen ligt voor iedereen verschillend al naar gelang zijn of haar situatie en bekwaamheden. Tegelijkertijd ligt het voor iedereen hetzelfde, omdat het steeds vraagt om inventiviteit, inzet en een portie moed.

**NIEUWE WAPENFEITEN**. Het motto van dit jaar is een waarschuwing. Er gaat bijna geen week voorbij of je kunt wel iets in de krant lezen over nieuwe ontwikkelingen op het gebied van strategie en wapenfeiten. De bovenste prent op deze pagina toont zo'n nieuw wapenfeit. Een nieuw staaltje van dodelijk vernuft. In 1945 was de atombom ook zo'n nieuw wapenfeit; de fragmentatiebom in Vietnam en de raketten die wel tien of meer kernkoppen naar hun doel kunnen brengen eveneens. Maar ook de kernproef in India, de opkomende Europese wapenindustrie, Nixons nucleaire hulp aan Egypte zonder voorwaarden en het openlijke streven van sommige Amerikaanse kringen naar een militair vermogen om alle Russische kernkoppen in één klap uit te schakelen, zijn even zovele levensgevaarlijke wapenfeiten van de laatste tijd. Maar zijn het wel **n i e u w e** wapenfeiten? Nee, nieuw zijn ze niet, want ze betekenen niets nieuws. Ze zijn het zoveelste produkt van oeroude verschijnselen als de bewapeningswedloop en onafhankelijke staten die elkaar (moeten) wantrouwen. De wetenschap, de bureaucratie, het leger, de industrie, ze maken praktisch alle tuig die ze kunnen bedenken. De hele samenleving en ieder mens afzonderlijk zijn medeverantwoordelijk voor dit soort ontwikkelingen, die steeds weer hebben geleid tot de wapenfeiten in de meest gebruikelijke zin van het woord: de veldslagen en de oorlogen uit onze geschiedenisboekjes.

Vandaar dat het motto „Nieuwe Wapenfeiten“ niet alleen een waarschuwing inhoudt, maar ook een oproep om werkelijk **n i e u w e** wapenfeiten te scheppen.

Laat duizend bloemen bloeien, zeggen de Chinezen. Laat ieder van ons bedenken of hij of zij niet iets nieuws kan doen dat de machteloosheid doorbreekt en een reële invloed — hoe klein ook — uitoefent ten goede.

De Colombiaanse landarbeiders die (op de onderste foto) land bezetten dat ongebruikt ligt, laten zien dat het mogelijk is je los te maken uit een eeuwenlange traditie van onderhorigheid en berusting. Het gaat met vallen en opstaan. En er is moed voor nodig. Ook vrouwen en kinderen moeten niet bang zijn om eventueel de gevangenis te vullen. Zulke landbezettingen heten eerst altijd „onwettig“. Maar heel wat landloze en hongerige boerenfamilies zijn de wettige eigenaars van een stukje grond geworden, n a d s t z e h a d d e n b e z e t. „Wie is onze grootste vijand?“ vraagt zo'n boer. „De grootgrondbezitter? De politie? Het leger? Nee, onze grootste vijand is onze eigen angst!“ Een ander voorbeeld dat tot de verbeelding spreekt is dat van Rosa Parks, de vrouw die in een bus in de Amerikaanse stad Montgomery weigerde op te staan voor een blanke. Dat was een wapenfeit van de eerste orde. Die daad leidde tot een boycot die meer dan een jaar werd volgehouden. Martin Luther King werd er een nationale leider door en de beweging voor gelijke burgerrechten was vanaf dat moment wereldnieuws. Een hartverwarmend verhaal, maar we denken al gauw dat in onze situatie zulke bijzondere daden niet worden gevraagd. En inderdaad, zo bijzonder misschien niet, maar toch...



Another advance in engine technology from General Electric. On time, on speed, on cost for the B-1.



VREDESWEEK 1974

# Nieuwe wapenfeiten

22-29 september

*The newspaper for peace published by the left wing Inter Church Council for Peace in the Netherlands and which consistently attacked the bona fides of South Africa.*

brought in two new operators, one from South Africa and one a prominent Dutch businessman, with first class political connections, as lobbyist. One was paid R8 000 for a one-year project. The other, B.P. Rauweda R30 000 per year on a three-year contract as lobbyist. In ad-



uitgave stichting: "de stem der stommen"

# VREDESKRANT 1974

## EEN ANDER VERHAAL OVER VREDE EN MEDEMENSELIJKHEID

Van gebied naar de stude uit de  
"Vredesweek van de Vrede", een  
uitgave van het Internationaal  
Vredesbureau, dat heropgericht  
wordt tijdens de Vredesweek 1971.

Dit jaar gaan de activiteiten  
van het IKV zo ver, dat zij  
Abraham, Gideon, Jezus en  
Paulus in één adem noemen met  
de islamitische leider  
Malcolm X en Martin Luther King.  
Het kan dan zijn dat binnen een  
IKV een aantal kerken samen-  
werken, hun christelijke benade-  
ring bij de beoordeling van ge-  
weld klinkt huichelachtig.  
We hebben hier duidelijk te ma-  
ken met het politiseren van het Evangelie. De Christelijke leer  
wordt hier gebruikt om politieke doeleinden te bereiken.  
De Vredesweekpublicaties 1974 van het IKV zijn gericht op acties  
tot bevrijding van mensen, die onderdrukt worden. Met name de be-  
vrijding van Zuidelijk Afrika heeft de volle aandacht.  
Het misbruiken van Bijbelse teksten is slechts een methodiek.  
Het doel binnen Nederland is zonder meer de maatschappijvernieu-  
wing. Het einddoel binnen Zuidelijk Afrika is zonder meer Zuid-  
Afrika.

"Door allen  
die het mee zijn,  
te maken dat de  
toekomst voor gerechtigheid  
die niet meer gelooft  
dat het nog andere kan,  
door die opwerping  
en afschaffing zijn,  
en dat geen mens en presteer  
meer in staat  
zijn om hen  
die het niet dragen,  
niet kende te krijgen  
en te vernemen,  
gewelddadig,  
dat zij op hun punt blijven,  
overvloedig, overvloedig."

Afgzien van dit alles komen we terug op het streven naar vrede  
en gerechtigheid in de wereld.  
Geen zinnig mens wenst oorlog. Het streven naar vrede is een stre-  
ven waar wij allen achter staan. Maar laat dat gebeuren langs een  
zinnige weg. Men kan niet volstaan met Zuidelijk Afrika, de Zuid-  
amerikaanse landen; al die objecten waar de liniese sympathieën  
liggen.

Laten we niet voorbijgaan aan de ellende die bestaat in de landen  
achter het IJzeren Gordijn, in China.

Laten we bewust zijn van de ellende gebracht door de zogenaamde  
"bevrijdingsbewegingen" in Zuidelijk Afrika, de IRA in Ierland,  
de Palestijnse bevrijdingsbewegingen, en de vele vluchtelingen die  
vielen door vliegtuigkapingen.

"De oorlogen in de geschiedenis waren in twee soorten verdeeld:  
gerechtigd en ongerechtvaardigd. Alle gerechtigde oorlogen  
zijn gerechtvaardigd, alle onrechtvaardige zijn de oorlogen in de weg  
staan zijn ongerechtvaardigd."

Citeert uit het werk van Mao Tse Tung  
(Het Rode Boekje)

Geen enkele oorlog is gerechtvaardigd.  
Als Christenen dienen wij te staan aan de kant van de geweldloos-  
heid. Wij zullen streven naar waarheid, gerechtigheid en liefde.  
Wij zullen alle handlangers van het geweld aanklagen, of ze nu  
van rechts of van links komen. Wij geloven niet in de dwang van  
oorlog en wapens.

Niet de extremisten, niet de terreurorganisaties, niet de vlieg-  
tuigkapers, niet de bevrijdingsbewegingen, maar de slachtoffers  
verdienen onze hulp. Dat is een daad van medemenselijkheid!

### Misleidende leiders

Uit Jesaja 3: "O, Mijn volk, uw leiders zijn verleiders. Zij maken  
de weg, die u een pad moest zijn tot een doolweg".  
Het resultaat kunnen we overal om ons heen horen: "Zie jij het nog  
zitten?" en "Ik kan er geen touw meer aan vast kleden" of "Geef  
mijn portie maar aan...".

Vele mensen geloven het dan ook wel.  
Maar juist door deze zo listig gecreëerde apathie kunnen de heren  
"verleiders" ongestoord hun gang gaan.  
Steeds groter wordt het aantal slachtoffers door het wanbeleid van  
deze wolven in schaapsvacht, zowel hier als elders.  
Zij zijn de advocaten van kwade zaken, die de bedrijvers van ge-  
weld, protegeren en stimuleren en zich om de slachtoffers niet be-  
noemen.

Hebben we nog een stemglad? Waarom laten we dat dan niet horen?  
We mogen niet alleen geen deel hebben aan "de werken der duister-  
nis", maar moeten die juist ontmaskeren.


Daarom luidt het parool: ONTWAAK, gij die slaapt! Waarom zou de  
antichrist over u lichten? Sta op uit de dood en... Christus zal  
over u lichten!

De woorden van die misleiders moeten gestopt worden, want hun  
woorden werken voort als de kanker en doen de goddeloosheid en  
de wetteloosheid steeds verder drijven.

Waarom zijn we in deze zaken zo zorgeloos?  
Staan we niet zo onverschillig tegenover allerlei persoonlijke  
ziekten? Heeft u bederf (verrotting) ooit uit zich zelf zien op-  
houden? Keten we wel wat er aan de hand is? Of willen we het niet  
weten?

We dienen ons de nog geboden gelegenheden ten nutte te maken,  
want deze dagen zijn zeer boos (kwad). Doch dan dienen we wel te  
onthouden en op te staan!  
Wij ken het nog!

REDACTIONEEL.



## NIEUWE WAPENFEITEN

van bevrijdingsbewegingen

40 cent

The "newspaper for peace" produced by a secret front organisation of the Department of Information to counter the anti-South African propaganda spread by the Inter Church Council for Peace.

operations. As I explained it to General Van den Bergh when the General was evaluating the secret operations: "They talked a hell of a lot, but they produced only when I sat on their tails". Wim Venhoven was a prime example. In 1978 payments to Bergh were cut off. Instead we

tached correspondence. His "contact" in London was David Abramson who was paying him the money for the publication of the magazine.

Technical & Scientific.  
25

DEVELOPMENT PRESS

The Secretary  
Department of Information  
Pretoria

14.7.78.

Confidential

I am somewhat in the dark about your current role and the implications of the announced reorganisation of the Department. I would be grateful if you could inform me whether confidential correspondence should continue to be addressed to you. If not, to whom? Also, does the London contact remain the same?

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

*Lawrence Morgan*  
Lawrence Morgan

Intertech  
Development Press Division  
The White House  
Stanton Lacy  
Ludlow, Salop,  
England.

Telephones:  
Seifton (0565 4733) 296  
Bromfield (0565 477) 313  
London 01-242 2320  
Telex: 28905 Development.

Roseman & Partners (West Germany)  
D.L.Morgan & Partners (England)

27.7.1978

Mr L. Morgan  
Intertech  
Development Press Division  
The White House  
Stanton Lacy  
Ludlow  
SHROPSHIRE  
England

Dear Lawrence

Thank you for your letter of 14 July 1978.

Please address all correspondence to your friend in London.

Yours sincerely,

*Eschel Rhoodie*  
ESCHEL RHOODIE.

In Holland there were many secret payments to various organisations. There were many people well disposed towards South Africa (I had worked in Holland at the South African Embassy from 1967-1971) but they were unorganised, had no real financial support and no one really wanted to get out and fight the anti-South African lobby if he was going to lose money in the process, or if he had to pay out of his own pocket. In the end the total expenditure on the house magazine of the Dutch South African Organisation (the NZAW) was paid for by us, including monies paid to the editors and for the distribution costs. Between 1974 and 1978 the organisation, listed as G26-B in the secret programme, received some R72 000 from South Africa. Dr Wim Veenhoven of the NZAW received a personal secret allowance of 12 000 Dutch guilders per year, tax free, and was still receiving this money when I left the Department in 1978.

Nothing better illustrates the methods we used in Holland than the *Stichting Beheercentrum*, an organisation run by Wim Veenhoven and Henk Bergh and which received some R70 000 from us (up until



Jan van Zyl Alberts gave up more than 20 directorships at my request and devoted himself full time to implementing various secret projects for Information in South Africa with a budget exceeding R17 million. He saved the state hundreds of thousands, made a profit of close on R2 million and was then publicly and indirectly accused by the Erasmus Commission of theft and fraud. When the accusations had to be tested the Attorney General refused to prosecute because the evidence of the Commission would not stand up in a court of law. The Commission's prejudice in his case was outrageous. Photo: Alberts Library.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE WORLD OF THE PRESS

Three operations on which the opposition press in South Africa spent a great deal of money and time to unravel were *To The Point*, *The Citizen*, and *The Washington Star*. It ended up with the National Party trying to placate the opposition press while exposing and ditching one of South Africa's best and most powerful friends in the media in Europe.

In previous chapters a great deal has already been said of the various publication programmes of front organisations such as the Southern African Freedom Foundation, Prescon Business News, the Foreign Affairs Association, The Institute for the Study of Plural Societies, *Africomics*, *Pace*, *Hit*, *Southern African Development*, *Le Monde Moderne*, and many others.

The *Washington Star* will be dealt with in Chapter 9.

Others are still to be presented but, apart from *The Washington Star* project, the money allocated in secret for the establishment and running of *The Citizen* and for subscriptions to the international edition of *To The Point* dwarf any other project in terms of cost.

*The Citizen* has generated more political heat than almost all other secret projects combined — and probably as much nonsense and as many rumours as anything else.

\* \* \* \* \*

*To The Point* was the very first secret operation in which I got involved, even before I became Secretary of Information.

The first time I heard of *To The Point* was early in 1970 when Hubert Jussen mentioned to me in The Hague that he was considering retiring, but that he wished to make one last effort at establishing a truly conservative international news magazine.

Five years later the Government was secretly buying 30 000 copies per month of the magazine for distribution, world wide, to opinion formers, businessmen, army, navy and airforce officers, stockbrokers, lawyers, professors, and politicians at a cost of millions of Rands per year.

When I first met Jussen in 1967, I was Counsellor at the South African Embassy in The Hague for press and information. I had just come from Pretoria where I was Head of the American Desk. Jussen, at that time, was publisher and director of the biggest political weekly in Holland, *Elseviers Weekblad*, and a member of the Press Council of the Netherlands.

In 1968 I arranged for Jussen to visit South Africa as a guest of the Department of Information. At that stage we were still at liberty to invite prominent Dutch journalists, editors, and politicians to visit South Africa without the "peoples court" set up at Schiphol airport by the left wing press and the communists trying to judge the returning visitor from South Africa.

During his visit to South Africa, Jussen met Dr Nico Diederichs, Dr Mulder, and also Mr Vorster. Jussen was a heavyweight who deserved the best of attention. Just after World War II he became a trusted associate of General Eisenhower. Although very little was recorded of their meetings, Eisenhower used Jussen to help rebuild the Dutch and Belgian press after the devastation of the war in the European lowlands. He later became director of the biggest Dutch daily newspaper *De Telegraaf* before he established and built up the hugely successful *Elseviers Weekblad*. The Queen approved of his appointment to the Press Council, and he became a Commissioner of KLM, the Royal Dutch airlines. In 1970 he was appointed chief executive of the *Verenigde Nederlandse Uitgewery*, the largest publications group in Holland — about the size of Perskor, Nasionale Pers, and SAAN combined. He was a powerful friend yet he was to be knifed by the government he tried to help.

In 1969 and 1970 Jussen again paid visits to South Africa. After the summer of 1970, he told me that the climate for establishing a new conservative news magazine in Europe had worsened and that his friend Axel Springer, publisher of *Die Welt*, had to live with a 24 hour bodyguard. He therefore found conditions in South Africa refreshingly different and was amazed that the Prime Minister's office could be

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reached directly from the street at the Union Buildings without a single policeman stopping you. (Not any more).

My own assessment of conditions in Europe at the time was more or less the same as that of Jussen with whom I had become good friends.

Jussen told me that he believed he could begin a conservative weekly magazine in South Africa and could expand it to Europe and the United States. He believed that the magazine should concentrate on Africa because the world was so terribly uninformed about Africa, particularly Southern Africa, while the few magazines which did circulate in Africa, such as *Jeune Afrique* were either totally controlled by radical Arab states or were politically far to the left.

I spent an evening at Jussen's house advising him in the preparation of his evaluation of such a project for South Africa, how the paper costs would affect him, labour costs, office accommodation, Post Office regulations, etc. He also asked my opinion about the availability of senior editorial staff, printers, printing costs and airmail distribution of existing newspapers and news magazines. It was much later that he told me he would find it difficult to keep such a project afloat without some kind of financial support from the Government by way of block subscriptions. (The Dutch government directly subsidises the press in Holland to the tune of millions of dollars every year in order to guarantee a diversity of opinions to the public.) Later in 1970 he flew to South Africa and much to my surprise, returned a week later with the news that he had won the support of Gerald Barrie, Connie Mulder, Nico Diederichs and John Vorster. They were not only keen he should set up the magazine in South Africa but were prepared, in principle, to provide financial help by way of pre-paid subscriptions.

Early in 1971 Jussen told me that he expected to get the financial support from the Government and that he had already contacted Martin Duizings, Editor-in-Chief of *Elseviers*, to become Editor of the magazine. It was Duizings and I who coined the name for the magazine. We were sitting at a restaurant in the Hotel d'la Europe in Amsterdam discussing the future of the magazine when Duizings remarked that what he wanted editorially was something that would always be to the point. Then he smiled and we both said in Dutch: "*Dat is het. Seg, wij noemen Hubert's baby To The Point.*"

At the same time Duizings, who had not yet been to South Africa, asked me whether I would not be interested in returning to journalism.

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I declined the offer. Not long afterwards Duizings told me that *To The Point* had been registered as a company. When I asked him whether Jussen was set on going ahead with the project, he told me that his wife Olga (a beautiful and refined girl — one of the heiresses to the Kryenborg fortune in Holland) was also going to put up money for the magazine. Duizings asked me to mention a few names of people he could approach for senior editorial positions. At that stage Dirk Richard, editor of *Die Vaderland*, was visiting Holland while Gordon van der Merwe was heading SAPA's office in London. Both were good men, but while Van der Merwe impressed Duizings, he felt that Richards was too provincial in his outlook.

I remained very sceptical about the chances of the project and when Jussen departed for South Africa, I bet him a whole case of KWV 10 year old brandy that the Government would not come up with sufficient funds. "I just can't see Gerald Barrie doing a thing like that. He has no vision. If he does recommend support, it will probably not be enough to pay a quarter of your salaries."

Shortly afterwards I had to take the case of KWV to Jussen's house where he told me the matter had been taken out of Barrie's hands. After a meeting of senior Ministers consisting of the Prime Minister, Dr Diederichs, Mr P.W. Botha, Mr Ben Schoeman, Mr D. Uys, Dr H. Muller, and Dr Connie Mulder, a decision had been conveyed to Jussen that the Government would provide enough funds for a five-year period, after establishment of the magazine, to cover the costs for printing and mailing 30 000 copies all over the world. The Government would provide the addresses.

I could hardly believe my ears, but there it was.

Jussen told me that Gerald Barrie was present when the project was discussed with the Prime Minister, and that according to both Mulder and Barrie the only person in the group who voted against the proposal was Mr Ben Schoeman. Dr Mulder later confirmed this fact.

Jussen did not discuss any financial arrangements with me except that he had established a company, African International Publications, and that the magazine would be funded by the Jussen Family Trust from Switzerland. This time not only Duizings but Jussen also asked me to join the magazine as Deputy Editor. But I could not reach a decision. I had just received a promotion and found myself as the highest

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paid Information official overseas. My South African civil service rank was higher than that of the Ambassador.

In April 1971 Jussen surprised me by telling me that I would receive an invitation from the KLM on an inaugural flight to South Africa on board one of their newest aircraft. The next day I received a phone call from Dr Mulder in Cape Town asking me to come and see him in Cape Town. The timing was no co-incidence, and when I arrived in Cape Town, Mulder told me in his office that the Government had decided to provide Jussen with this assistance but that it was going to be done in great secrecy. The money would be coming from the account of the Prime Minister on the subhead of the Bureau for State Security. Because millions were involved, Mr Vorster wanted to have someone he could rely upon at all times within the inner circle of the magazine, not only to keep an eye on the editorial content, but also to make sure that the magazines we paid for went to the right people. In fact, it would be expected of me to assist in gathering names and addresses. Jussen, on his side, had also asked the Prime Minister to nominate someone with journalistic and international experience to serve in a senior editorial capacity. He was sensitive to the fact that the magazine was not only owned by a foreigner but also edited by one.

Dr Mulder told me he was appealing to me to take the job because it was in the national interest. He told me Mr Vorster would "greatly appreciate" my co-operation. He would transfer me back to South Africa in August so that I would not have to resign abroad and be saddled with the cost of getting my furniture and car back to South Africa. I would work for a while in Pretoria as an adviser to his Ministry in the morning, and in the afternoon I could travel to Johannesburg at government expense to work on the preparation of the first edition. Gerald Barrie had been fully briefed and would take care of the rest of the arrangements.

On my return to South Africa I found myself promoted to Senior Information Controller with an office next to the Minister. In the meanwhile Jussen and Duizings had arrived in South Africa and appointed Gordon van der Merwe as the number three man in the editorial hierarchy after Duizings and myself. Barrie saw to it that I received the necessary government funds to travel by car to Johannesburg every day, with subsistence included. It cost several hundred Rands per month, and I often wondered how Barrie succeeded in getting past his

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own auditors with the payments — which were clearly in violation of all rules and regulations.

One can readily understand my amazement when I read in the South African newspapers that Gerald Barrie swore he never knew that Information had any secret programmes going.

Before I resigned from the department I saw Dr Diederichs. He told me that specific amounts would be provided by General Van den Bergh and that after a certain peak had been reached, the amounts would decline to nil in the fifth year. As owner of the company Jussen was in full control and would enjoy complete autonomy. Without that autonomy Jussen would never have agreed to go ahead. He did not have to report to the Government and he did not have to submit financial statements, said Dr Diederichs. All that he had to do was to provide a magazine for international distribution, a magazine which could pride itself on balanced, responsible journalism. Dr Diederichs also told me that Jussen had instructions from Mr Vorster to destroy all financial records at the end of each year which could in anyway indicate the government was secretly subscribing to so many copies.

I also went and saw General Van den Bergh and Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to whom I explained the set-up. Fourie showed no surprise; in fact he invited me to check with him regularly on developments in Africa. "We do not want *To The Point* to expose a particular leader as a corrupt individual when the Government may secretly be conferring with him on other matters," Fourie laughed. Subsequently Martin Duizings and I also came to see him together, on the same subject. When Brand Fourie later denied any knowledge of secret projects of the Department of Information I was no longer surprised. By then amnesia among high politicians and civil servants had become an epidemic.

With all this information at my disposal, and with Gerald Barrie's blessing I went with Dr Connie Mulder and Hendrik van den Bergh to see the Prime Minister at the Union Buildings. I told Mr Vorster that I would be a great deal happier to resign if I knew that my pension was safe. While Mr Vorster felt something could be done about the matter, General Van den Bergh thought otherwise. It was too risky, he explained, and in any case *To The Point* belonged to Jussen. He should provide my pension. It was then that Vorster turned to me and said: "I know that *To The Point* belongs to Mr Jussen and that he is going to

be your boss. Not I. But if the State should ever decide to cancel its subscription to the magazine and as a result the magazine should cease to exist, I fully realise you may be out of a job, and a promising career in the public service would be cut short. Therefore I promise you now, so that Dr Mulder and General Van den Bergh can bear witness, that if that happens we will find ways and means to help you. You can count on that just as we count on you never to let this secret get out."

It was quite a speech for Vorster, and I resigned from the Public Service satisfied, glowing with zeal and idealism.

For my 16 years service I received a lump sum pension payment of about R5 000!

During my time at *To The Point*, Duizings and I handled the editorial and news budget. Jussen never discussed the general state of affairs with me or Duizings. I did see correspondence with Axel Springer in Germany and the mighty McGraw Hill group in the United States. I believe that somehow Jussen was also getting funds from these two sources as well as from his wife, Olga. For example Hans Gemani, the Africa representative of Springers biggest newspaper *Die Welt*, had his offices on the same floor as *To The Point* and wrote regularly for us. Later in 1973 AIPC also became the representative of McGraw Hill in South Africa.

Some time in 1972 just after my appointment as Secretary I was called to a meeting between Dr Mulder, Mr Barrie and General Van den Bergh at which General Van den Bergh said that since the subscription funds was part of a publications project, it should really not remain on the budget of the Prime Minister. He was going to ask the Prime Minister to transfer the funds to the secret account which Treasury had then already provided for Information. *Gerald Barrie thus knew from 1972 that Information was getting funds in secret from another state department, but he waited until six months before his retirement, in 1978, to begin his audit of Informations secret expenditure, while telling Parliament he had no prior knowledge of such funds.*

It was not until 1974 that Dr Diederichs finally told me the exact amounts involved and that the payments were always transferred from South Africa through the Reserve Bank to the secret trust account of Jussen in Switzerland.

In 1975 *To The Point* went truly international when it opened the offices of the European edition in Antwerp, Belgium. Jussen had al-

ready established a company in Belgium in 1973 (*To The Point International*) and was the only shareholder. The financial assistance for the two editions finally became part and parcel of the Governments secret five-year programme. In 1975 Dr Diederichs provided another R300 000 to enable Jussen to do some test runs for the magazine in the United States. It was clear to me that if *To The Point International* did well, the Government was prepared to consider subsidising an American edition as well.

Meanwhile Jussen was also anxious to obtain the services of a senior South African businessman with good connections in the right circles. On Vorster and General Van den Bergh's recommendation, Jussen appointed Jan van Zyl Alberts as Manager of *To The Point*. Although I knew that Alberts was a trusted friend of Van den Bergh and the Prime Minister, I also thought that they might be testing my ability to keep a secret, so for at least eighteen months I never mentioned to Alberts that I was party to the secret of state subsidy. I did so only after Mr Vorster and General Van den Bergh gave me the green light. I always believed that Alberts did not play any other role at *To The Point* except as General Manager for the South African edition in Johannesburg. Alberts often told me that Jussen never discussed the finances of the foreign edition with him. The movement of funds between the Reserve Bank and the Jussen account abroad remained a top secret. Much later Jussen told me that the Prime Minister and the Reserve Bank had given Jussen extraordinary permission to move funds back and forth from Europe without exchange control. After payment to Jussen in Rands, the Rands were converted to dollars in Switzerland and transferred via the Jussen personal account to South African commercial banks in dollars.

In 1975 when Mr Owen Horwood took over from Dr Diederichs as Minister of Finance, Jussen prepared a complete statement of money he had received and expended, including a complete breakdown of how much it cost to print and airmail each copy to various countries of the world. I studied this report carefully, and since in my own department we produced and published many magazines and newspapers for distribution in South Africa and abroad, I was convinced that Jussen's budget was very accurate. I took this statement to Dr Diederichs who kept it and handed it back to me, with his initials on each page. This was on the same day Senator Horwood and I met in Dr Diederichs's

rich's office in Cape Town to brief the new Minister of Finance on all of our secret programmes. Thereafter the subsidy for *To The Point* was regularly included on the five-year programme with Senator Horwood's approval.

Dr Horwood's later testimony that he did not know of secret state funds for *To The Point* is simply untrue. He saw the specific figures in the office of Dr Diederichs in 1975. He saw the totals in 1976, 1977 and 1978.

After I had resigned from *To The Point* to accept the post of Secretary of Information, Duizings asked me to assist him in getting someone else to fill the vacancy. I proposed Dr John Poorter, at that time Director of Information at the South African Embassy in London. I flew to London to talk to Poorter and convinced him that it was a chance of life time. After speaking twice to Duizings, Poorter accepted the post. My instructions from Vorster was not to inform Poorter of the secret subsidy. His argument was that the subscriptions lists had been completed. The magazine was ideologically on the right track, and there was no need for Poorter to know. I just could not accept this callous attitude. Poorter had a promising career in front of him, and although he was financially well off, I felt I owed it to him to inform him that the Government was committed to a further five year subsidy, and that at least for the next five years his job as Deputy Editor of the magazine would be safe. Poorter resigned after this personal assurance on my part, and he said that he would not have left if I had not put it to him in this way.

African International Publications was an independent company from the beginning, and the Government never held any shares in the company. When I had to resign from the Public Service and to carry the loss in pension advantages, I knew that the magazine was not owned by the State. When I was re-appointed as Secretary of Information, I had to buy back my pension. Because I have also heard Mrs Jussen speak of the large amounts of money which her husband was getting from her for his "last venture", I am equally convinced that the Government did not furnish all the funds that Jussen required. Senator Horwood also never asked me to check the income and expenditure of the magazine, as I was asked to do in the case of *The Citizen*.

The background to the ownership of *To The Point*, subsequently confirmed by the State Trust Board, is extremely important to under-

stand as it was instrumental in one incredible affair which brought *Rapport* and *Beeld* in a head on collision with myself.

An editorial severely criticising the Department of Foreign Affairs and some South African diplomats appeared one day in *To The Point*. To my amazement the next issue of *Rapport* contained a front page attack on me personally in which it was claimed that, translated, my magazine (*Rhodie se blad*) had stabbed Foreign Affairs in the back. It hardly bothered to disguise its belief that I was the author of the editorial. The next Monday *Beeld* repeated the story. The newspaper had ample time to telephone me at home to ask my comments, but it never did so.

I was furious. At that stage Brand Fourie and I were meeting regularly in Pretoria and Cape Town to discuss matters of mutual concern. We were both worried about the bad blood that had existed over the years between Foreign Affairs and Information, a legacy of the Barrie era. In the last year of his stewardship, for example, Gerald Barrie refused to speak to Fourie, except by letter.

In September 1975 I wrote in a confidential Departmental newsletter that Brand Fourie and I regularly consulted with each other. "I have great respect for his capabilities and what he has achieved," I wrote. "Between our Deputy Secretaries and heads of divisions there are also first class professional and personal relations." If it was at all true, as Pik Botha charged, that I was always trying to "poison" relations between the two departments, this is hardly the sort of thing to write in a confidential staff letter. I therefore received permission from the Public Service Commission and the State Attorney to take *Rapport* and *Beeld* to the Press Council. The Government paid the costs to have an advocate represent me and the State Attorney provided a representative. The Press Council found, absolutely correctly, that there was no basis for the *Rapport* story, or *Beelds*, and the mere fact I used to work for the magazine did not give them the right to tie me to the proprietorship of the magazine or its editorials. *Rapport* and *Beeld* had to apologise, on the front page, and to pay a stiff fine.

Nothing is more certain to get a newspaper in South Africa to hate your guts and to vow to get back at you sometime than to force them to apologise, even for a blatant untruth. Newspapers don't apologise like ordinary citizens do. For some reason they believe it will demean them. Like royalty. From that date on, *Beeld* turned against me and

my department, so did *Rapport*. I would think they should have acted differently. They had published those reports, false and untrue in every sense, knowing they had not heard my side of the story, knowing they did even attempt to obtain my views before they rushed into print.

The stiff sentences and the front page apologies created an uproar in the press.

Years later, I read with utter amazement, that after the publication of the findings of the Erasmus Commission, Pik Botha actually humbly apologised to the press "because the Government (and I) had lied to them about *To The Point*". Pik Botha should have had his head examined. At the very least he should have waited for the State Trust Board to complete its work before currying favour with the press. No wonder these papers thought of him as Prime Minister!

I have never lied to the Press Council about *To The Point*. I have consistently said that I never wrote the editorial concerned. I have always stated that *To The Point* did not belong to me, or to the Department of Information, or to the Government. The fact that the Department of Information also spent tens of thousands of Rands on subscriptions to various newspapers (such as *Rapport*, *Beeld*, *The Star*) and various magazines does not give the Department a proportionate say in the ownership or editorial policy of these papers. In the Netherlands newspapers are subsidised to the tune of millions of Rands by the State and yet these newspapers will be the first to point out their private ownership and independent editorial position.

Pik Botha not only apologised, but he repaid the money which *Rapport* and *Beeld* had to pay to the Press Council at the time. In 1982 the State Trust Board, Parliament's watchdog and the state's autonomous investigator of the various Information projects officially found that *To The Point* was not the property of the state and that *To The Point* did not belong to anyone but the owner, Mr Hubert Jussen. Is Pik Botha going to ask the newspapers to return the money? Better still, I want to know whether *Beeld* and *Rapport* will voluntarily return the money to the state? Pik Botha submitted the report of the State Trust Board to Parliament and *Rapport* and *Beeld* did not contest its findings. So the statement that *To The Point* was my magazine remains as false as it was at the time the report first appeared as is any allegation that I had written the editorial in question.

My guess is that Pik Botha will not be very anxious for the taxpayers' money to be returned, since his relations with the press are more dear to him than anything else. And I guess *Beeld* will never apologise to me, because *Beeld* is above apologising. Just like *Pravda* never has to apologise to anyone in Moscow. But I am not so sure about *Rapport*. It may just surprise me. After all, the new editor Wimpie de Klerk is a man of God. He could not live with such a situation. He would not hold on to money which belongs to the taxpayer.

*To The Point* did an excellent job of informing the West about Africa, and Africa about South Africa. The Erasmus Commission quoted an English speaking journalist who was opposed to all state subsidies as saying "the magazine did a fine job". Yet, purely because of rumours, the Erasmus Commission made public the state's subsidy. This destroyed the independent reputation of the magazine, embarrassed Hubert Jussen, in fact, wasted all the millions the state had invested in the magazine. All of the hard work that had gone into the building up of an international magazine which did a better job on Southern African news than *Time* or *Newsweek*. In fact, the circulation of *Time* and *Newsweek* fell in total by about 18 000 as readers in South Africa started buying *To The Point*.

Overseas, *To The Point* readers ranged from Cabinet Ministers to students, and masses of mail were received to express satisfaction that at long last a magazine existed which objectively presented news-in-depth on Southern Africa.


From the state's point of view, its massive subscription to copies for overseas distribution was a success, whichever way one looked at it. It was a window in the paper curtain which other countries were trying to draw in front of South Africa.

It was never necessary to reveal the State's role in *To The Point*, for the commission found no evidence of any malpractice on the part of the Department of Information regarding *To The Point*. It was, at best, a colossal blunder on the part of Erasmus, for the commission's brief did not include the exposure of projects which it found to be in order. At worst, it was nothing less than irresponsible nudism.


The fact that the same act of nudism was performed in the case of the Institute for the Study of Plural Societies and the Foreign Affairs Association, two organisations which probably did more than any other single organisation in South Africa to open up channels of direct

communication with hundreds of individual opinion formers and dozens of organisations in key countries overseas, leads to only one logical deduction: the Erasmus Commission, with its former Free State National Party legal adviser and two public servants as Commissioners, could not care a hoot about South Africa's foreign interests or the protection of key friends such as Hubert Jussen. Instead they not only threw the dirty bath water and the baby into the street, but also the bathroom furniture and fixtures. Their actions, in the commission's own words, "strengthened the hand of P.W. Botha." But they were never asked to strengthen or weaken any politician's hand. That was not in their mandate. Making statements such as these exposed the commission to unkind thoughts that its compulsion to bare so selectively, was not the product of independent thought. Whatever the case may be, *To The Point's* death, in 1980, can be attributed directly to the commission's act of nudism, for had the Erasmus Commission kept quiet the Government would not have cut off its subsidy. But once out in the open, there was no way this independent and objective weekly, the only international news magazine in South Africa, could survive. The Government cut off its subsidy and Jussen retired to France, hurt and bitter at all of South Africa for the actions of the Erasmus Commission. There will be no other Jussens for South Africa to turn to. The Erasmus exposures have scared them off, permanently.

Drs Beurt and Corrie-Jane Servaas, owners of *The Saturday Evening Post*, America's oldest magazine, then made an offer for R500 000 to buy *To The Point* with the provision that Pik Botha give an unequivocal assurance that *To The Point* would have the same access to Cabinet Ministers as any Afrikaans newspaper. Servaas made it clear he would not require any subsidy from the state. He told Pik Botha that in his bid to rescue *To The Point* he had the support of two of the biggest foreign companies represented in South Africa, one German, one American. But Pik Botha was adamant. *To The Point* was a Mulder-Rhodie creation (it was not as I have shown) and he could not give such an assurance. On such personal political vengeance did South Africa lose an internationally respected news magazine in which the taxpayer had already invested over R10 million in annual subscriptions.




*The life of a fugitive . . . Eschel Rhoodie feeds . . .  
Reunited, Rhoodie and his wife Katie stroll thro*



Mervyn Rees

llamas while in self-imposed exile in Ecuador.  
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
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# South Africa: A Visual History




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